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Introduction
One of the foremost issues facing cultural theory today concerns the mean-
ing of the digital condition. Most people who talk about the emerging digital
society often associate it with technological developments such as the In-
ternet and MP3 players, DVRs and smart phones, videogames and digital
cameras—in other words, with consumer products that provide people with
new ways of accessing an endless stream of information and that are said to
be ushering in a new age of personal empowerment. Similarly, much of
cultural theory is inundated with proclamations that the emerging digital
reality is leading us beyond all of the structures of the past, requiring in
turn a fundamentally new mode of analysis that gives up totality for frag-
mentation, class for the multitude, and the global for the local and the
contingent.
However, as I argue in the following chapters, in the context of a grow-
ing set of violent global contradictions—from the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq to the crises in finance, housing, food, water, and the environment that
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2 Introduction
have, at one point or another, dominated the news over the past decade—it
is perhaps time to undertake a different approach to the contemporary mo-
ment. It is time for a critique of the digital times. This is because, I suggest,
how people think about our ‘‘digital times’’ has increasingly important con-
sequences. The acceleration in developments in science, technology, com-
munication, and production that began in the second half of the twentieth
century and that has condensed into the concept of the digital has resulted
in what might be the most contradictory moment in human history. On the
one hand, the advances in the productive forces of society have made it
more possible than ever not only to imagine but to realize a world in which
the tyranny of social inequality is brought to an end. On the other hand,
despite the potential productivity of human labor, the reduction of these
developments to an unprecedented level of accumulation of private profits
means that rather than the end of social inequality we are witness to its
global expansion. The digital world, in other words, is the site of class con-
flict. What is represented as our so-called new digital reality is in actuality
the technological and cultural manifestation of underlying class relations
that are concealed through the dominant discourses of the digital today—
discourses that, having declared the death of depth in the analysis of social
life, focus on the intricate surfaces of culture. As new technological advances
that could end ‘‘the wretched servitude of having to struggle for daily
bread’’1 are used instead to expand the wealth of a few by exploiting the
labor of the many, it is no longer the case that technology can take on the
appearance of a simple or neutral aspect of human society. What this means
is that what the digital represents is not yet fixed but is ultimately to be
determined by the class struggle between capital and labor—the ‘‘two great
hostile camps . . . directly facing each other’’ over the future of humanity.2
The Digital Condition is a contribution to the debate over the meaning of
the digital that aims to open a space within cultural studies to talk about the
digital condition from the position of what Marx and Engels call ‘‘the prop-
erty question’’3—the economic, political, and social organization of society
around the ownership of private property and the way in which this division
of ownership determines all aspects of social life, including culture. As I
argue throughout this book, it is the contradictory relation of property in
capitalism—between those who own the means of production and those
who own nothing but their labor power—that will ultimately determine the
direction that the digital takes.
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In many ways, Jean-François Lyotard’s influential analysis of the emerg-
ing technological age in The Postmodern Condition remains one of the pre-
dominant theoretical guidebooks for thinking about the digital condition.
Arguing that at the end of the twentieth century ‘‘knowledge has become
the principle force of production over the last few decades,’’4 Lyotard fa-
mously proposes that this transition brings with it a fundamentally new
cultural and economic condition defined by a crisis of legitimacy and an
‘‘incredulity towards meta-narratives.’’5 In response he argues that the
praxis of critique has to be replaced with the playful pragmatics of ‘‘paral-
ogy,’’ or the concern with ‘‘undecideables, the limits of precise control, con-
flicts characterized by incomplete information, ‘fracta,’ catastrophes, and
pragmatic paradoxes.’’6
In fact, in the wake of Lyotard’s separation of knowing the particular
from understanding the totality, it has become almost standard protocol for
contemporary cultural analysis to begin by defining culture as a fluid site of
competing, but never fully determining, discourses. From this framework,
it is argued that to read culture as shaped by economics or politics is too
totalizing and reductive and therefore unable to recognize the multiple ways
in which culture operates at local levels as a space of resistance to the status
quo. For instance, Lawrence Grossberg argues that while cultural theorists
‘‘need to be involved with notions and analysis of labor . . . in the classroom,
in the university, in the media and consumer culture, in the nation and in
the world,’’7 they should nonetheless ‘‘reject the assumption that produc-
tion is determinacy in the last instance’’8 and refuse ‘‘to see everything
locked in place by, guaranteed by, economic relations.’’9 In other words, the
explanation of culture in terms of its outside (its political economy) is no
longer possible because the outside is beyond understanding. Instead, cul-
tural studies should be about ‘‘describing how people’s everyday lives are
articulated by and with culture, how they are empowered and disempow-
ered by the particular structures and forces that organize their lives, always
in contradictory ways, and how their everyday lives are themselves articu-
lated to and by the trajectories of economic and political power.’’10 The
assumption here is that only the immanent is knowable and that the praxis of
critique, which seeks to connect the immanent with the outside to produce
understanding of the existing, no longer has any explanatory value as we
enter the digital age.
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It is this same postcritique logic that we find written throughout contem-
porary theories of digital culture. For example, it is said that in place of
the ‘‘hard-edged certainties of industrialization, Enlightenment empiricism,
and modernity’’ the digital is defined by ‘‘malleable concepts of postindus-
trialism, technoscience, and postmodernity.’’11 Similarly, cultural theorist
and one of the leading writers on cyborg theory, Chris Hables Gray writes,
‘‘We do not live in the seemingly stable modern world our grandparents
did. Their belief in inevitable, comfortable progress has been supplanted by
our realization that scientific and technological innovation are relentless
and quite ambiguous’’12; in their self-described ‘‘Manifesto’’ entitled ‘‘On
Cultural Studies, Technology and Science,’’ Stanley Aronowitz and Michael
Menser argue, ‘‘although technology and science may be everywhere, there
is no determinism anywhere, if by determinism we signify a one-to-one
correspondence between the causal agent and its effects.’’13 In other words,
the digital common sense is that we are entering a new stage of society more
fuzzy than economically structured, more fluid than fixed by class division,
and, despite tremendous technological development, more unfinished than
at any other time in history.
In fact, one finds this same theory of a break between culture and the
economic, between knowing and understanding, even among theorists who
are calling for a more ‘‘critical’’ approach to Internet culture. Geert Lovink,
for instance, argues in Zero Comments: Blogging and Critical Internet Culture
that ‘‘nothing is as fluid, fragile—and unsustainable—as today’s network
landscape’’14 and that ‘‘the very notion of a network is in conflict with the
desire to gain an overview.’’15 In this context, Lovink writes that despite the
fact that ‘‘the contemporary worker faces more job uncertainty than her pro-
letariat precursor,’’16 it is time to shift away from ‘‘soft constructivism and
Ideologiekritik toward a nonjudgmental approach’’17 called ‘‘distributed aes-
thetics.’’ Like Lyotard’s theory of paralogy, ‘‘distributed aesthetics’’ is a post-
binary, postdialectical logic. In claiming that it is time to go ‘‘beyond poles
such as real–virtual, old–new, offline–online, and global–local’’18 and instead
to ‘‘dig into the dirty everyday doings of the network society,’’19 Lovink’s
theory of ‘‘distributed aesthetics’’ is ultimately a proposal for a pragmatic
theory of the existing digital culture. That is to say, despite suggesting that
we move beyond such binaries as the ‘‘local’’ and the ‘‘global,’’ to focus only
on the ‘‘everyday doings’’ means remaining stranded at the level of the imma-
nent, without recourse to a way of understanding the outside forces that
shape it. We are, in other words, always stuck at the level of the local.
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Introduction 5
It is on these terms that the dominant reading of technology in cultural
theory has responded to the contradictions of digital society by reading the
digital as an engine of difference—suggesting that the expansion of mass
production around the world has meant the explosion of opportunities ‘‘for
greater and greater numbers of people (men and women)—with however
little money—[to] play the game of using things to signify who they are.’’20
If class exists today, it is said to be simply one of a range of possible differ-
ences that shift, reverse, come together, and fall apart, depending upon the
contingent and contextual needs of individuals who wish to define them-
selves as members of a group. Class, on these terms, has been replaced
by ‘‘networked multitudes’’ that ‘‘create temporary and voluntary forms of
collaboration’’ that exceed any and all attempts at homogenization.21 In fact,
what has made this reading of the digital condition so popular in cultural
studies today is that it does not ignore class (which would place one com-
pletely outside of the realm of ‘‘seriousness’’) but rather rewrites it so as to
be less disruptive, less explosive, and therefore more palatable to the domi-
nant class interests. It is not uncommon for so-called progressive and radical
cultural theorists at the center of the discipline—such as Mark Poster,
Donna Haraway, N. Katherine Hayles, Slavoj Žižek, Michael Hardt, and
Antonio Negri—to describe the details of a world that is divided by ‘‘the
ecological crisis, the consequences of the biogenetic revolution, imbalances
within the system itself (problems with intellectual property; forthcoming
struggles over raw materials, food and water), and the explosive growth of
social divisions and exclusions.’’22 It is not that cultural theory simply fails
to describe the economic inequalities of digital society; it is that in the con-
text of contemporary theories of digital culture—which focus on consump-
tion over production, desire over need, and lifestyle differences rather than
class—cultural studies turns class into a safe concept that can be discussed
in polite company. This is another way of saying that class is used descrip-
tively and is hollowed out of any explanatory power. Using class descrip-
tively thus allows cultural theorists to demonstrate an awareness of growing
economic contradictions (and even their interconnections with matters of
race, gender, the environment, disability, and health care)—but not in a way
that these theorists are likely to be confused with ‘‘vulgar’’ thinkers who
understand class as shaping all other aspects of social life. Class becomes an
affective category based more on the perceptions of class collectivity and the
effects of inequality than objective position in the relations of production.
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6 Introduction
On the contrary, I argue that what is necessary today if we are not only
to know the expanding and complex relations of the digital condition but to
understand them is the praxis of critique that connects the inside of the new
cultural forms and theories with their economic outside. Drawing upon
Marx’s argument that the ‘‘ideal is nothing else than the material world
reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought,’’23 I
argue that capitalism’s global networks of production that have created the
conditions of the digital cannot be understood through the spontaneous, dis-
continuous, networked, and fragmentary because what appear to us as such are,
in actuality, reflections of social and historical forces that shape our lives.
On these terms, I propose that in order to understand the contradictions of
digital culture it is necessary to begin from a conceptual framework in which
social contradictions do not become the basis for rejecting critique but
rather serve as an opportunity to deepen our understanding of the world in
which we live and labor. In other words, rather than the paratheory of Lyo-
tard’s postmodern condition that begins with disconnections and disconti-
nuities, what is most needed today is the meta theory of Marx that works to
connect the nonmimetic reflections of the economic as they shape and define
the digital condition.
It is through the praxis of critique that Marx addressed the ‘‘meta-theo-
retical’’ question of theory and its relationship to modes of social organiza-
tion. For example, both the 1857 introduction to the Grundrisse and the
1859 preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy are essen-
tially inquiries into the relationship between theory and reality. Always a
historical materialist and a dialectician, Marx in both texts argues that the
emergence of contestations within theory is neither a formal process shaped
by its own internal immanent force nor a natural given, such that, for exam-
ple, each generation will simply view the world differently from the way its
predecessors did. Rather, Marx argues, developments and contestations in
theory are the effect of history or, to be more precise, the outcome of the
formation and re-formation of modes of production. ‘‘Mankind,’’ he writes
in the preface, ‘‘always sets itself only such tasks as it can solve; since, look-
ing at the matter more closely, it will always be found that the task itself
arises only when the material conditions for its solution already exist or are
at least in the process of formation.’’24 Sigmund Freud’s unconscious, Wer-
ner Heisenberg’s theory of quantum mechanics, Franklin Roosevelt’s New
Deal, Pierre Bourdieu’s New Internationalism—these are not instances of
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the workings of an autogenetic and self-delighting (that is, ahistorical) rea-
son but acts of social engagements. For example, Freud’s theory of the un-
conscious is a way of explaining the growing contradiction between what
Marx identifies as ‘‘use-value’’ and ‘‘exchange-value.’’ Whereas the human-
ist theory of the self as a rational, and therefore free, individual corresponds
to the moment when private property comes to dominate social life and
explains this development as the movement toward a more ideal reality,
Freud’s theory of the self is a pathologizing theory of the social in which the
rational is understood to be driven by the irrational and the unknowable. It
is a theory, at a moment of advanced industrialization and heightened global
conflict between imperialist nations, that explains the irrationality of pro-
duction for profit as an inevitable consequence of the forces of desire that
operate beyond rational understanding and critique. My point is that social
theories are historical and an effect of the mode of production. A concept
becomes the site of debate when what it represents—in this case, the ends
to which human labor will be directed—can no longer remain neutral.
In this sense, The Digital Condition takes up the challenge posed by Terry
Eagleton in ‘‘Lenin in the Postmodern Age’’:
You can attain anti-capitalist consciousness simply by looking around the world
with a modicum of intelligence and moral decency, but you cannot attain a
knowledge of the global trade mechanisms or the institutions of workers’ power
in this way. The distinction between spontaneous and acquired political con-
sciousness, whatever historical disasters it may have contributed to, is itself a
valid and necessary one.25
Through an analysis that looks at both high theory as well as the concrete
cultural practices of digital culture, I argue for a counter mode of reading
the digital—namely, the historical materialist theory of nonmimetic reflec-
tion—that reconnects questions of culture to the objective relations of class,
labor, and production. I believe that there is an urgent need for cultural
analysis to help serve as a guide for social agency and that the basis of such
a project lies in understanding the complex ways in which ‘‘the property
question’’ determines all aspects of social life. By analyzing the culture and
theory of the digital condition, I demonstrate why what matters is that even
as the sites of production expand across the globe, what defines the logic of
the digital network remains the basis of capitalism in the exploitation of
labor. In other words, in contrast to the argument that we are entering a
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network capitalism beyond the contradictions of class, what is necessary is a
theory of capital networks—the way in which all aspects of life today are
determined by the unequal property relations between those who own and
control the means of production and those who own nothing but their labor
power. The Digital Condition is a contribution to the struggle of working
people to bring about a society in which technology is placed not in the
service of profit but in the interests of the meeting and expansion of the
needs of all.
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The Spirit Technological
Many of today’s theories of digital culture treat digital technologies like a
deus ex machina—these technologies seem to appear out of nowhere and yet
become the primary means for resolving all social contradictions. According
to this model, we are undergoing a fundamental change in how we live and
work and we consequently require fundamentally new ways of understand-
ing the world that break with all past models and theories, especially theo-
ries that focus on class. Through a close examination that connects some of
the core texts and assumptions of digital culture to commodities such as the
iPod, I challenge the dominant representations of digital technologies. I
argue that most representations disconnect the new technologies and the
culture which surrounds them from the economic relations of class and ex-
plain why a class theory of digital culture and technology is necessary if we
are to understand contemporary society.
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10 The Spirit Technological
Reading Digitally and the Un-Reading of Labor
Reading digitally is the form ideology takes in what might be referred to as
the era of the digital condition: a regime of accumulation that emerges in the
post–World War II period in which developments in production, communi-
cation, and transportation have enabled capitalism to encircle the globe. It is
the means by which the exploitation of labor is obscured behind a ‘‘spiritual
aroma’’ that suggests that humanity is entering a postcapitalist, postna-
tional, postlabor, posthierarchy, postwork society in which consumption
rather than production drives the economy and developments in science
and technology have replaced labor as the source of surplus value. What the
digital refers to, however, is not simply imaginary or fictional but material
developments in the means of production that have heightened the contra-
dictions between capital and labor, putting the question of the future of
society at the forefront of cultural theory. In one sense, it corresponds to
technological advances in computing, communication, and transportation
that have resulted in the tremendous growth in the productivity of labor
such that the possibility of meeting the needs of all has perhaps more than
ever been materially possible. Yet, insofar as all technological growth under
capitalism is subjected to the logic of profit, these developments are re-
stricted in their use to the expansion of the conditions of exploitation and
the universalizing of capitalism across the globe. It is for this reason that
the digital has become a site of class struggle. That is to say, it is not sim-
ply that the digital is plural nor is it that all readings of the digital are equal.
In the hands of capital, the concept of the digital has become an example of
the way in which this contradiction turns into what Marx calls ‘‘an inverted
world-consciousness’’ that is the product of an ‘‘inverted world.’’1 The digi-
tal thus refers both to the process by which capital appropriates the products
of labor and turns them into the tools of private accumulation that are then
wielded against the working class as a means of extending the capitalist
system globally, as well as the way in which this process is naturalized as an
inevitable consequence of technological development.
To read the world digitally is another way of saying that the dominant
theories of the digital today define the developments of technology in the
interests of capital by excluding any understanding of the real possibilities
that could be achieved if the private ownership of the means of production
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were eliminated. Instead, much of what passes for serious thinking about
digital technologies is an increasingly celebratory theory that is declared
sophisticated because it abandons the ‘‘reductive’’ and ‘‘crude’’ theory of
class in favor of a social theory of multiplicity and difference. In this image,
digital society is made to appear as the other of class inequality because it is
said to be a fundamentally new version of capitalism—a capitalism of digital
networks—that suspends all prior economic and social relations by replac-
ing the ‘‘hard’’ world of production with the ‘‘soft’’ world of consumption
and exchange. What supposedly differentiates the so-called network capital-
ism from earlier incarnations of the capitalist mode of production is that
‘‘Information, in the form of ideas, concepts, innovation and run-of-the-
mill data on every imaginable subject—and replicated as digital bits and
bytes through computerization—has replaced labour and the relatively
static logic of fixed plant and machinery as the central organizing force of
society.’’2 In this context, the digital condition is said to refer to a society in
which the vertical hierarchies of the industrial system have been replaced
with horizontal digital networks of exchange that defy the exploitative logic
of earlier modes of capitalism by dematerializing the means of production
and thereby erasing the class antagonism of private ownership. As the Ger-
man sociologist Helmut Willke puts it, ‘‘it is not important where you are
as long as you are with or within the network.’’3 Instead of a system in
which the value created by workers flows upward to the owners, network
capitalism is defined as a system in which value flows outward to anyone
(and everyone) who can access and participate in the circulation of informa-
tion—a process that occurs after the commodity has been produced, in the
realm of consumption.
The problem is that knowledge cannot replace labor as the engine of the
economy because it is not the other of labor but the product of labor. Re-
gardless of whether it is the development of a microscope that enables scien-
tists to examine the properties of a virus so as to be able to cure disease
or advances in computing that have created the capability of storing and
transmitting an entire library for a fraction of what doing so would have
cost previously, the ability to expand our understanding of the world around
us requires that labor be applied to the development of new technological
means for advancing abilities of labor power in the future. But these devel-
opments do not occur within a social vacuum. Technology does not have an
independent existence from society. As Frederick Engels writes, it is too
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12 The Spirit Technological
often the case that the history of technology is presented as if the new tech-
nologies had simply ‘‘fallen from the sky.’’ Instead, as he proposes, what
drives the development of society is not technology but industry and the
needs of labor:
If society has a technical need, that helps science forward more than ten universi-
ties. The whole of hydrostatics (Torticelli, etc.) was called forth by the necessity
for regulating the mountain streams of Italy in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. We have known anything reasonable about electricity only since its
technical applicability was discovered.4
Furthermore, insofar as labor does not take place in a social vacuum either,
the ends to which labor makes use of technology and knowledge are deter-
mined by the relations of production. What is posited as a contradiction
between knowledge and labor in digital theory is the effect of the social
division of labor that creates the appearance of a conflict between manual
and intellectual labor. The real division of the digital condition is not be-
tween ideas and things but between the interests of capital and the interests
of labor.
In so-called digital theories of the social, however, the transition to a
digital economy results in not only a contradiction between ideas and things
but a crisis at the level of ideas itself. Whether it is the articulations of a
networked economy in high theory or the cultural representations of a cut-
and-paste consumer society in the pages of popular magazines and iPod
advertisements, the dominant argument is that it has become impossible
to understand the world with any certainty because the digital condition
represents the fragmentation of society into a thousand different markets
with a thousand different desires. Reading digitally therefore means accept-
ing that in an increasingly fragmented world to think means to be aware of
the impossibility of understanding beyond the local and the contingent. For
example, in defining the role of theory in the digital age, Timothy Druckery
writes, ‘‘Perception, memory, history, politics, identity, and experience are
now mediated through technology in ways that outdistance simple eco-
nomic or historic analysis.’’5 Similarly, Douglas Kellner and Steven Best
argue that ‘‘contemporary developments exhibit so many twists and turns,
and are so highly complex that they elude simply historical sketches, reduc-
tive theoretical explanations and facile generalizations’’ and, as such, ‘‘the
social maps called classical social theories are to some extent torn, tattered,
and fragmented, and in many cases outdated and obsolete.’’6
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The target of the argument that classical social theories are ‘‘outdated
and obsolete’’ and that technological developments undo simple (that is,
reductive) ‘‘economic or historic analysis’’ is any theory that attempts to
connect the form that capital accumulation takes with the underlying eco-
nomic logic of capitalism in the exploitation of labor. Instead, the social is
read as irreducible to the economic, even as capitalism has reduced the his-
tory of class antagonisms from several to two.7 In other words, the digital
economy of network capitalism has come to represent the moment when
the economic conflicts between capital and labor will be replaced with what
Bill Gates calls the ‘‘friction-free economy’’8 or what Thomas L. Friedman
refers to as the ‘‘flat world’’9—a time when class differences no longer mat-
ter because capital will be able to extract tremendous profits from virtually
every aspect of daily life without having to exploit labor, and consumers will
escape the limits of the working day and shape and reshape their identities
at will through access to an ever-expanding global market. As digital enthu-
siast Nicholas Negroponte exclaims, ‘‘Some people worry about the social
divide between the information-rich and the information-poor, the haves
and the have-nots, the First and Third Worlds. But the real cultural divide
is going to be generational.’’10 The generational is what replaces class in a
progressive theory of history with the perfection of capitalism as its end. In
other words, according to the logic of the generational it is only a matter of
time before capital finally ‘‘gets it right’’ and succeeds in eliminating all
social inequality. In this vision of the world, to raise the question of why
inequality exists in the first place and to put forward even the slight possibil-
ity that capitalism results in social inequality is not because of a lack of
technology but because of the division of ownership that determines to what
ends new technological developments are put is to speak in ‘‘old’’ discourses
that have no place in the digital celebration.
In reality, the difference between so-called old and new theories is deter-
mined not generationally but ideologically. Capital has to regularly repro-
duce the ideological distinction between the old and the new because as the
forces of production develop, they come into conflict with the relations of
production. In turn, those concepts that at one moment provide a seamless
explanation of the existing at another moment come apart at the seams. At
such moments, it becomes necessary to redefine the boundaries of intelligi-
bility so that, in inverted fashion, what is always appears on the side of the
new while what could be is always relegated to the side of the old. Fredric
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14 The Spirit Technological
Jameson’s theory of the ‘‘postmodern turn’’ is a prime example of the
reshuffling of boundaries between the old and the new to accommodate
developments in production. Jameson argues that we are entering a new
economic regime which necessitates new economic theories that can ac-
count for the expanded role of consumption in the determination of value.
This is because ‘‘aesthetic production today has become integrated into
commodity production more generally: the frantic economic urgency of
producing fresh waves of ever more novel-seeming goods (from clothing to
airplanes), at ever greater rates of turnover, now assigns an increasing essen-
tial structural function and position to aesthetic innovation and experimen-
tation.’’11 According to Jameson, the incorporation of culture into
production means ‘‘a prodigious expansion of culture throughout the social
realm, to the point at which everything in our social life—from economic
value and state power to practices and to the very structure of the psyche
itself—can be said to have become ‘cultural’ in some original and yet unthe-
orized sense.’’12 In other words, the new is so new that it operates beyond
the realm of any prior theories of the relation between the cultural and the
economic levels of society. Having displaced any theoretical understanding
of culture that seeks out the deep connections between the cultural and
economic in favor of a contingent and reversible knowledge that presup-
poses contemporary culture is somehow so different that it exceeds such
theories, Jameson argues that ‘‘if the idea of a ruling class were once the
dominant (or hegemonic) ideology of bourgeois society, the advanced capi-
talist countries today are now a field of stylistic and discursive heterogeneity
without a norm.’’13 What Jameson proposes here is that to read capitalism
in terms of class is to impose an old norm onto a new situation that cannot
be adequately theorized. Or, rather, it can be theorized only if we accept the
argument that capitalism has so fundamentally changed as to have become
essentially unrecognizable.
It is in this theorization that we can begin to see why reading digitally
has become so useful for capitalism. Reading digitally creates the conditions
by which the workforce learns how to think about the complex interactions
that a networked economy depends upon, while also learning not to worry
about why the networked economy works the way that it does. What passes
for theorization is, in other words, the ideological register of capitalist
know-how. Even when Jameson argues, ‘‘postmodern culture is the internal
and superstructural expression of a whole new wave of American military
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and economic domination throughout the world,’’14 following his own logic
there is no way of making sense of such a statement. To read the world
through a cultural lens, as Jameson proposes, is to read the question of
global imperialism as simply one in a multitude of possible discursive forma-
tions that, insofar as there is no longer a capitalist norm, can just as easily
exist alongside a range of alternative discourses. Without a theory of private
property to explain the causes of ‘‘military and economic domination,’’ we
are left with only vague impressions as to the meaning of such domination
for and impact on working people around the world. We might be outraged
at what happens, but we will never be able to understand why it happens
and how to transform it. A cultural theory of capitalism thus turns history
into a reflection of the marketplace, where the heterogeneity of commodi-
ties is a poor substitute for freedom from exploitation.
Property, Class, and Digital Identities
As ideology, popular theories of the digital economy function as a means of
displacing any discussion of property relations and the impact that property
relations have on every aspect of society. It is, of course, precisely in the
interests of capital to prevent such investigations because they bring to the
surface the increasing contradiction between the developments in the forces
of production that constitute the possibilities of the new technologies and the
relations of production that undermine these possibilities by restricting the
use of labor to the interests of the private accumulation of capital. Instead,
one of the primary arguments is that material property does not have the
same meaning in a digital society and that the only real property that matters
is the idea. Or, as Robert Hassan suggests, what makes ‘‘Microsoft, or Apple,
or Google what they are’’ is not ‘‘fixed assets’’ or labor, but ‘‘ideas.’’15
This line of thinking is extensively developed in The Age of Access, in
which postwork and postproperty theorist Jeremy Rifkin argues that ‘‘a new
kind of capitalism is journeying to the center stage of world history.’’16
What we are witness to, he argues, is that
the birth of a network economy, the steady dematerialization of goods, the
declining relevance of physical capital, the ascendance of intangible assets, the
metamorphosis of goods into pure services, the shift in first-tier commerce from
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a production to a marketing perspective, and the commodification of relation-
ships and experiences are all elements in the radical restructuring going on in the
high-tech global economy as part of humanity begins to leave markets and prop-
erty exchange behind on its journey into the Age of Access.17
What defines the ‘‘Age of Access,’’ in other words, is the end of traditional
property relations in which the ownership of material resources, and the
ability to use this ownership to command the labor of others, served as the
basis of wealth. ‘‘Wealth,’’ he argues, ‘‘is no longer vested in physical capital
but rather in human imagination and creativity.’’18 According to Rifkin, in
the contemporary moment ‘‘what is really being bought and sold are ideas
and images’’ and that if industrial capital was characterized ‘‘by the ex-
change of things’’ the network economy is characterized ‘‘by access to con-
cepts, carried inside physical forms.’’19 In this postproperty economy,
corporations no longer own property but lease it and instead of exclusion
and control look to create ‘‘partnerships’’ and ‘‘reciprocal relationships.’’20
What Rifkin is proposing is a capitalism that is beyond the market: a post-
property society ‘‘measured by the idea of what is mine is yours and what is
yours is mine’’ rather than ‘‘mine and thine.’’21 While such pronouncements
might appear progressive, and perhaps even socialist to some, a closer look
at Rifkin’s proposal will make clear that it is less about a fundamental trans-
formation of capitalist property relations and more about a slight revision
of the terms of capital accumulation.
The problem is that while Rifkin eliminates property at the level of the
idea, he cannot do so in the realm of the material world. That this is the
case is marked by his having to acknowledge that even in the digital econ-
omy, social divisions still exist. According to Rifkin, ‘‘the gap between the
possessed and the dispossessed is wide’’ and in addition there is a growing
gap between ‘‘the connected and the disconnected.’’22 In other words, Rif-
kin’s world is one that is still divided economically. Yet, by turning the divi-
sion of property into an issue of access, which is really another way of saying
being able to enter the marketplace, he erases the possibility of understand-
ing why this division exists in the first place. In rewriting property as ‘‘ac-
cess,’’ the only possibility for eliminating the gap between the ‘‘connected
and the disconnected’’ becomes the expansion of capitalism. To gain access
is to be able to participate as a seller of one’s labor power, which is precisely
the kind of ‘‘free access’’ that is the hallmark of capitalist property rela-
tions—namely, that those who own and control the means of production
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provide ‘‘access’’ to these resources in exchange for labor power and all of
the surplus value that the laborer produces.
Capitalism cannot eliminate private property because the existence of the
owners who control the political economy of society is dependent upon
their ability to buy the labor of a renewable class of workers who have noth-
ing to sell but their labor power. The defense of this relation—what Rifkin
is calling ‘‘free access’’—was established early in the history of capitalist
ideology as the basis of the ‘‘freedom’’ of the individual. Immanuel Kant,
for example, in challenging the remaining vestiges of feudalism sought to
establish the ownership of private property as the requirement for the de-
velopment of civilization. In contrast to the ‘‘complex and hierarchical sys-
tem of land tenure under feudal lords,’’ in which there was no protection
from the seizure of land by the aristocracy who controlled all land in the
country because of their ‘‘divine right’’ as rulers, what Kant proposes is a
more ‘‘simple’’ and ‘‘legal’’ system of ownership in which ‘‘everyone may
acquire and own property’’ and that this right to own property is protected
by the establishments of property rights against the seizure of property
without cause or right.23 Kant argues it is a principle of reason that society
has the ‘‘authorization . . . to put all others under an obligation, which they
would not otherwise have, to refrain from using certain objects of our
choice because we have been the first to take them into our possession.’’24
Although it is possible to conceive of property ownership prior to the estab-
lishment of the civil constitution, it is just ‘‘provisionally rightful possession.’’
According to Kant, it is possible to achieve ‘‘conclusive possession’’ only with
the establishment of an ‘‘actual civil condition.’’25 In other words, property
can exist only in community with other property owners, each of whom
respects the property rights of the other members:
For only in accordance with this principle of the will is it possible for the free
choice of each to accord with the freedom of all, and therefore possible for there
to be any right, and so too possible for any external object to be mine or yours.26
In this, Kant rewrites the aristocratic right to property in which property
ownership is determined primarily through inheritance and military take-
over as the bourgeois property right that is determined by a ‘‘legal’’ relation
between owners—namely, property should ‘‘freely’’ go to whoever can
‘‘possess’’ it through purchase. If you cannot purchase it, then you cannot
possess it. At the same time, by locating individual property ownership in
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the ‘‘spirit’’ of reason, it becomes natural and therefore equally unchal-
lengeable by those who were denied this freedom because they lacked the
means to acquire the now ‘‘freely accessible’’ property and thus were at the
mercy of the new, legal property owners.
At the core of capitalism is a fundamental and unequal relation to prop-
erty. By property, I do not mean the houses, cars, HDTVs, iPods, Blu-ray
players, computers, and other consumer goods that people own and that
fulfill certain historical needs that they may have. The problem of inequal-
ity, in other words, does not rest in personal acts of consumption. Rather, I
am referring to the ownership of the means of producing these items. The
division upon which the possibility of private accumulation of capital is
based is a division between those who own and control the means of pro-
duction and those who own nothing but their labor power. Marx writes,
‘‘Property [is] the right, on the part of the capitalist, to appropriate the
unpaid labour of others or its product, and to the impossibility, on the part
of the labourer, of appropriating his own product.’’27 The ‘‘freedom’’ of the
worker to sell her labor power on the market for a wage is based upon a
precondition that she has no other means by which to meet her needs. As
Marx explains, the capitalist system is built upon the necessary condition
that in the market
two very different kinds of commodity possessors must come face to face and
into contact; on the one hand, the owners of money, means of production, means
of subsistence, who are eager to increase the sum of values they possess, by
buying other people’s labour power; on the other hand, free labourers, the sellers
of their own labour power, and therefore the sellers of labour.28
What is the basis of ‘‘freedom’’ for the worker is, in other words, that they
have no other commodity to sell except their labor power. It is on these
terms that Marx explains the economic process underlying the only guaran-
teed freedom in capitalism—namely, the ‘‘free’’ exchange of labor on the
market:
The immediate producer, the labourer, could only dispose of his own person
after he had ceased to be attached to the soil and ceased to be the slave, serf, or
bondman of another. To become a free seller of labour power, who carries his
commodity wherever he finds a market, he must further have escaped from the
regime of the guilds. . . . Hence, the historical movement which changes the
producers into wage workers appears, on the one hand, as their emancipation
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from serfdom and from the fetters of the guilds, and this side alone exists for our
bourgeois historians. But, on the other hand, these new freedmen became sellers
of themselves only after they had been robbed of all their own means of produc-
tion, and of all the guarantees of existence afforded by the old feudal arrange-
ments. And the history of this, their expropriation, is written in the annals of
mankind in letters of blood and fire.29
It is on these terms that Marx writes that the existence of free labor is de-
pendent upon the condition that workers are free in a double sense: ‘‘that
neither they themselves form part and parcel of the means of production as
in the case of slaves, bondsmen & c., nor do the means of production belong
to them, as in the case of peasant proprietors; they are, therefore, free from,
unencumbered by, any means of production of their own.’’30 It is this funda-
mental division of property that determines one’s class position in which
those who do not own or control the means of production of society are
not free but rather compelled through economic coercion either to sell their
labor power to the capitalist or to give up all possibility of meeting their
needs. Class, in short, is an objective relation to the means of production.
It is in this sense that even Rifkin’s proposal that the logic of leasing
represents a new form of property relations—the renting of an item for
only so long as it is useful to a particular moment of production—does not
challenge the logic of capitalist ownership but extends it. This is for two
reasons. First, the development of leasing is similar historically to the devel-
opment of the retail, banking, and service industries. The emergence of a
retail industry, to take only one of the circulation industries under capital-
ism, enabled the manufacturing industry to lower costs by taking over the
storage and sale of the final commodity for which the manufacturer would
otherwise be responsible. While the manufacturer has to turn over part of
the accumulated surplus value to the retailer in exchange for this service,
this process still results in a smaller reduction in profit for the manufacturer
than would result if the manufacturer had to address the storage and sale of
the commodity internally. Similarly, if corporations are starting to lease
rather than purchase equipment it is because they are willing to turn over a
portion of the surplus value to a business that can take care of the mainte-
nance and care of the machines for less than the previous cost. What Rifkin
promotes as a postproperty theory of digital capitalism is in actuality a plan
for capitalists to reduce costs of production and circulation. In no sense are
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the means of production turned over to the worker whose labor actually
produces the surplus value that the capitalists divide among themselves. Pri-
vate property does not go away because the means of production have been
updated. The idea that advances in production in themselves change social
relations is to substitute a change in forms for a change in logic. If increases
in the productivity of labor have meant that more capital can be put toward
the development of science and technology, or that new businesses have
emerged which take up certain aspects of circulation that corporations used
to do for themselves, we still remain within the structure of private owner-
ship. Even in a digital economy, everything from the resources necessary
for the production of knowledge (books, classrooms, electricity, buildings,
oil, computers, and so on) to the means for disseminating that information
(paper, computers, phone lines, fiber optic cables, television and radio net-
works, and so on) remains under the ownership of capital.
It is this reading of property that is central to seeing why a theory of
class exploitation remains critical to understanding contemporary social re-
lations. According to the predominant reading of the digital condition, in
contrast to the rigid social hierarchies of the Industrial Age that created
clear and recognizable divisions between owners and workers, class is said
to have become too difficult to read in the digital age of production because
the development of the economy is now based upon vertical relations and
an increasing plurality of available commodities rather than on a division
of ownership. Instead of a ‘‘whole, centered, stable and completed ego or
autonomous, rational ‘self,’ ’’ the subject today is defined as ‘‘more frag-
mented and incomplete, composed of multiple ‘selves’ or identities in rela-
tion to the different social worlds we inhabit.’’31 Class, on these terms, shifts
from an economic relation to a cultural one shaped as much as, if not more
than, by how class is ‘‘perceived’’ as it is constituted in reality. The digital
society is said to ‘‘confound any spectral politics based upon self-confident
class identities of previous periods’’32 and to transform the social into a space
of difference without consequence in which ‘‘there is no single underlying
principle fixing—and hence constituting—the whole field of differences.’’33
It is in these terms, for example, that the emergence of online forums such
as Facebook and YouTube are read as potential sites of ‘‘cosmopolitan cul-
tural citizenship . . . in which individuals can represent their identities and
perspectives, engage with the self-representation of others, and encounter
cultural difference.’’34 But ‘‘cultural difference’’ is not in itself disruptive to
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capitalism. In fact, capitalism is an engine of cultural difference. It requires
the production of an endless stream of lifestyles in order to market other-
wise similar commodities. The problem is not, in other words, that capital-
ism abhors difference. It is that capitalism will ultimately tolerate any
differences that do not challenge the one difference that it cannot elimi-
nate—the difference between capital and labor. It is this difference that is
obscured when class is read digitally.
For example, Zillah Eisenstein begins her critique of the digital economy
by marking the fact that ‘‘some 800 million people are starving across the
globe’’ and that ‘‘of the world’s largest one hundred economies, fifty-one
are corporations, not countries.’’35 ‘‘Class exploitation,’’ she writes, ‘‘seems
to be back with a vengeance.’’36 But, for Eisenstein, class is not an economic
relation but a cultural one that defies a clear understanding. That is to say,
she argues that a traditional class analysis in which class is defined as a divi-
sion of property cannot account for the ways in which ‘‘consumer culture
and consumerism,’’ which for her as for most theorists today characterize
the networked landscape of digital life, ‘‘are woven through a notion of
individualism that seduces everyone, the haves and the have-nots alike.’’37
An economic theory of class has lost explanatory power in defining the
boundaries of contemporary culture, according to Eisenstein, because it no
longer can explain the seemingly universal introduction of technology and
the ways in which it has reshaped the lives of both the rich and the poor. In
this context, she argues instead, power relations have become ‘‘multiple and
complex’’38 because digital technologies have the ability to allow the user to
deconstruct the very class structures to which he or she was previously
bound. ‘‘The emergence of ‘digital technology,’ ’’ she concludes, ‘‘has the
potential to undermine existing relations of power. The flow of information
cannot be contained. The Internet creates new lines of communication and
challenges old constrictions of private/public dialogue.’’39 But, class is not
simply a matter of power. Power is an effect of class relations, not its cause.
What determines power in capitalism are the relations of property between
owners and workers. By representing class as power, Eisenstein places class
on the level of the political and the cultural rather than on the level of the
economic. As a result, cultural critique moves toward the surfaces and ef-
fects of capital while leaving its logic intact.
The problem is that while such arguments displace class in the aroma of
a digital spiritualism, on Earth the class division has not lessened but has in
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fact grown. As such, even as digital theorists claim that class has ceased to
be a material reality, it seeps back into their discourse but in other terms.
In other words, the economic realities of contemporary capitalism mean
that to be serious one cannot simply ignore class, and yet to speak in a dis-
course that will be recognized by other cultural studies scholars requires
that class be ‘‘revised’’ in terms that excuse exploitation. So, for example, in
place of class as an economic binary, one finds class as a ‘‘cultural’’ or ‘‘polit-
ical’’ binary, such as in the ‘‘digital divide,’’40 the gap between the ‘‘inter-
acted’’ and the ‘‘interacting,’’41 or the conflict between ‘‘empire’’ and the
‘‘multitude.’’42 In other words, in a world divided by a class binary, reality
cannot but shape the image of a world divided into two. These arguments
begin with the effects of property relations—they turn class into a matter
of access to commodities, not the production of commodities. Class, how-
ever, is not a matter of lifestyle, consumer choice, market access, or repre-
sentation. It is an objective relation between those who own and control the
means of production and those who do not and, therefore, are forced to sell
their labor power to those who do. This is the reality of capitalism, not the
digital spiritualism of postclass market harmony.
Mark Poster’s What’s the Matter with the Internet? is a clear example of
the way in which the economic divisions of the digital condition are rewrit-
ten as conflicts other than those shaped by the relations of production.
What makes Poster’s book particularly effective in this respect is that it is a
reflection of the contradiction between the proclamations that class has be-
come a plural identity without structure and the material reality that contin-
ues to simplify class relations. That is to say, it combines the more
celebratory rhetoric of the past claims of the ability of technological devel-
opment to supersede the economic conflict between capital and labor—
found, for instance, in the work of Alvin Toffler (The Third Wave) and
Daniel Bell (The Coming of Post-Industrial Society)—with the more tempered
theorizations of technology by Geert Lovink (My First Recession: Critical
Internet Culture in Transition) and Kevin Robins and Frank Webster (From
Information Society to the Virtual Life) that have emerged following the crash
of the dot-com bubble in the United States into a more subtle third way
approach that is neither too celebratory nor too critical. It is precisely in
writing of capitalism as an in-between subtlety that Poster’s work has been
recognized as a serious take on digital society, even as declining real wages,
rising unemployment, and an expanding gap in wealth between the rich
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and the poor show that far from becoming more equal, digital society is
synonymous with inequality.
Beginning with the assumption that as a result of recent technological
advances we are entering an entirely new moment beyond the social divi-
sions and inequalities of the past, Poster writes that in the digital society,
‘‘Nothing stands outside of the cultivatable, and so culture itself must be
regarded as constructed rather than as given, historically contingent rather
than timeless and certain,’’43 and, as such, ‘‘the magic of the Internet is that
it is a technology that puts cultural acts, symbolizations in all forms, in the
hands of all participants.’’44 Poster sees digital technologies as creating the
conditions for suspending class conflict because they give everyone access
to the tools of representation that previously were available only to a select
few. Of course, Poster cannot simply dismiss class. He writes that a digital
society ‘‘is surely no total departure from all previous history’’ and that
technological developments thus far tend to ‘‘favor the wealthy and the edu-
cated everywhere.’’45 Yet according to this analysis what is different about
contemporary culture is that it has become more flexible and can accept a
wider array of difference within the existing, such that class is just one aspect
of a broader social picture that no longer is centered on any norm. Echoing
Baudrillard’s theory of the contemporary as a culture of simulation,46 as well
as the corporate interest in fostering ‘‘market diversity,’’ Poster argues that
culture has become a ‘‘problem’’ on the basis of the disconnection between
the original and the reproduction that emerges in the potentially endless
copying of digital culture. For this reason, he proposes that culture has ‘‘lost
its boundary’’47 and ‘‘fits badly’’48 with previous modes of understanding it.
Prior analyses of culture, he suggests, assumed as a starting point a clear
and definable relation between those who produced culture and those who
consumed it. In contrast, Poster writes, ‘‘cyberspace means producing cul-
ture as you consume it.’’49 In the tradition of the work of cultural theorists,
such as Marshall McLuhan’s The Medium Is the Massage and Manuel Cas-
tells’s The Internet Galaxy, Poster declares the emergence of a global net-
work of production and communication to be symbolic of a more decisive
transformation that shakes the primary economic foundations of capitalist
society, shifting it from a system based upon production and exploitation to
one based on consumption and access.
That the digital reading of new forms of consumption having suspended
the terms of class conflict that Poster offers here has become the primary
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way of making sense of the development of the networked economy can be
seen in the fact that it is the reading most popular not only with savvy
theorists of digital culture but also with those whose work is firmly within
the established boundaries of corporate culture. For example, management
theorist Peter Drucker calls the emergence of a global cyber economy a
‘‘Post-Capitalist Age’’ in which ‘‘[t]he basic economic resource—‘the means
of production’ to use the economist’s term—is no longer capital, nor natural
resources . . . nor ‘labor.’ It is and will be knowledge.’’50 He goes on to argue
that ‘‘the leading social groups of the knowledge society will be ‘knowledge’
workers. . . . [U]nlike the employees under Capitalism, they will own both
the ‘means of production’ and the ‘tools of production.’ ’’51 What is central
to this argument is the idea that the substitution of knowledge for labor
means the end of social inequalities precisely because of the inability of
capital to control the production of ideas. The shift to knowledge work is
thus understood as suspending the class divisions between owner and
worker because of the way in which it takes the control over the means of
production out of the hands of the owners and places it under the control
of all workers. Rather than a class division between capital and labor, society
is instead redefined by the relationship of the ‘‘info-rich’’ and the ‘‘info-
poor.’’ Insofar as all own the means of production—that is, everyone owns
his or her ‘‘creativity,’’ which is said to be the driving engine of the new
economy, as Richard Florida proposes in The Rise of the Creative Class52—
even this division is presumed to be short-lived, as it follows from this argu-
ment that such a division of information exists only until the fully
networked economy is finally implemented. In this context, the argument
is that technological developments alone will bring about the end of all
social antagonisms as production is automated and exploited labor is re-
placed with the labor of machines.
It is within this framework that Poster defines the digital as signaling a
‘‘linguistic turn’’53 within capitalism in which ‘‘the initiative of questioning
no longer gravitates towards production’’54 but instead focuses specifically
on expanding access to the consumption of culture. By dematerializing the
means of production and thus allowing ‘‘every receiver of a message to [also]
produce a message,’’ he argues, the same technological developments ‘‘con-
found the principles of capitalism.’’55 He writes,
In industrial technology, reproduction of commodities was the exclusive privilege
and capability of the producer. Producer and consumer stood apart and were
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differentiated precisely by this distinction. . . . But now all of this has changed.
Information technologies place into the hands of the consumer the capacity to
become a producer of cultural objects. The line dividing the two functions
increasingly is blurred.56
What is ‘‘blurred’’ is said to be the status of private ownership. In fact,
Poster argues that the production and circulation of knowledge commodi-
ties such as shareware and freeware mark the emergence of a postcapitalist
age premised upon ‘‘an economy of sharing’’57 that ‘‘flies in the face of tradi-
tional free market enterprise economics.’’58 What we are witnessing, his
argument goes, is a deconstructive mode of accumulation in which the pro-
duction of knowledge commodities disrupts the profit motives of capitalism
by placing the means of representation into the hands of consumers, allow-
ing them to create their own commodities independent from the interests
of capital.
It is by severing the relationship between culture and class society that
Poster’s analysis of digital technologies re-articulates the status of represen-
tation and reflection as beyond the boundaries of economic determinacy,
thereby shielding digital culture from class critique. Specifically, Poster ar-
gues that if capitalism has changed in the ways he suggests, the role of
cultural studies must also shift to move away from questions of production
and class—which are based on a mode of cultural critique that relies on an
unreliable connection between economic and cultural developments—
toward an analytics of consumption and the production of difference. That
is to say, Poster extends this assumption of the ‘‘blurring’’ of property rela-
tions in capitalism’s ‘‘linguistic turn’’ to cultural studies to argue that digital
culture can no longer be read as a class society.
What Poster is proposing in the idea of social divisions as shaped not
by property but in terms of the question of access to the means of commu-
nication is the theory of class-as-lifestyle that has come to serve as the
most popular reading of class in cultural studies today. This is a theory of
class in which class is no longer understood relationally—that is, as the
relation between owners and workers at the point of production—but
rather differentially, as part of a vast, fluid network of identities that are
created by affinity (spirit) rather than economically (materially). Class-as-
lifestyle is a broad categorization that depends less on objective relations
than on subjective conceptions of social status. Such theories of class draw
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heavily from the work of Max Weber. What makes Weber’s theory of class
so appealing to the interests of capital is the way in which it ideologically
opens class to a more complex reading by broadening the definition of
class to include not only the relations of production but also income and
political differences. Weber writes that while the ‘‘factor that creates ‘class’
is unambiguously economic interest, and indeed only those interests in-
volved in the market,’’ what must also be accounted for is the fact that
‘‘the concept of ‘class-interest’ is an ambiguous one: even as an empirical
concept it is ambiguous as soon as one understands by it something other
than the factual direction of interests following with a certain probability
from the class situation.’’59 That is, although the property relation can
account in some instances for the ways in which people act in certain situa-
tions, it is not the prime factor. Weber writes that ‘‘class does not in itself
constitute a community’’ and, in turn, that status groups—in which the
rich and the poor might join side by side—play as big a part in organizing
social life as any economic relations that might exist. People who think of
themselves as, for example, American or middle class have the potential,
according to Weber’s analysis, to share the same class position.60 In short,
class, according to Weber, is most effectively understood as a plural and
fluid designation of one’s lifestyle.
One of the most famous examples of the theory of class-as-lifestyle is
Stuart Hall’s account of the ways in which oppressed peoples have taken
over and remade the signs of the oppressive culture. Based upon his reading
of ‘‘New Times’’ in which he argues that ‘‘the fact is that greater and greater
numbers of people (men and women)—with however little money—play the
game of using things to signify who they are,’’61 Hall reads the Rastafarian
culture as an example of people constructing a space of resistance to hegem-
ony from the inside through cultural reappropriation. He writes:
In the case of the Rastafarians in Jamaica: Rasta was a funny language, borrowed
from a text—the Bible—that did not belong to them; they had to turn the text
upside-down, to get a meaning which fit their experience. But in turning the text
upside-down they remade themselves; they positioned themselves differently as
new political subjects; they reconstructed themselves as blacks in the new world:
they became what they are.62
According to Hall’s analysis, what makes an individual a member of a
group is whether that individual perceives him- or herself as a member of
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the group. The Rastafarians are said to refigure their identities through a
kind of resistance consumption, an argument that we see repeated end-
lessly today in relation to emerging cultural forms of remixing, blogging,
and uploading videos to YouTube. However, just as with Jameson’s theory
of capitalism without a norm, we are once again left with no way of mak-
ing sense of the reasons why the hegemony that the Rastafarians were
resisting existed in the first place except a vague sense of power relations
without determination. In other words, without understanding the eco-
nomic history of slavery and colonialism, we are left with a reality that has
no history.
What links all of these arguments is the idea that it is not property but
the ways in which people think about property relations that determine
their class. Class is, in other words, now shaped by perception (virtual),
not property (material). But, as Lindsey German points out in response
to similar arguments, ‘‘none of these subjective approaches really help in
defining class, because they start with distribution and consumption, with
the outcome of an unequal class society, rather than what creates class
society in the first place.’’63 That is to say, what writers like Eisenstein,
Hall, and Poster assume as their starting point is a society that is already
divided at the point of production and, instead, seek to mitigate those
circumstances through the ways in which commodities are consumed.
However, as German goes on to argue, ‘‘the actual class position of indi-
viduals [depends] not on what they feel about which class they are in, but
whether they are forced to sell their labor power in order to survive.’’64 In
other words, ‘‘Going to the cinema, or on a trip to a theme park, or play-
ing computer games, seems to appeal across the class divide,’’65 but in
reality ‘‘even if a worker cuts across class stereotypes by, for example,
listening to opera, there is something more fundamental which defines
him or her than one particular leisure pursuit’’66—namely, that the work-
er’s ability to survive depends entirely upon an ability to sell his or her
labor on the market. Class, in short, is an objective relation. It is deter-
mined not by the consumption of materials—whether, for example, both
the lord and the serf eat from the same harvest and thus think of them-
selves as part of the same community or whether the owner and the work-
ers spend their free time gaming online and consider themselves members
of a gaming clan—but rather by the relationship to property that exists
between these social groups.
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Technology and Determination
In the contestation between the theory of class-as-lifestyle and that of class-
as-property-relations there is also a deeper question about the role of tech-
nology and whether advances in communications, production, and trans-
portation have rendered labor superfluous to the production of value. That
is to say, the idea that production has been replaced by consumption de-
pends upon a reading of the development of production in the postwar
period as essentially deconstructing itself. It is the idea that capitalism has
undergone a fundamental transformation from a Fordist industrial economy
of mass production and class inequalities to a post-Fordist informational,
cyber-economy of signs and the pluralizing of differences beyond class. For
example, John Frow writes that with the ‘‘increased integration of the aes-
thetic in economic production,’’67, ‘‘the structure of a linear hierarchy’’ such
as class ‘‘no longer seems applicable.’’68 Similarly, Yochai Benkler argues in
The Wealth of Networks that ‘‘the change brought about by the networked
information environment is . . . structural,’’69 representing a ‘‘new mode of
production’’70 in which ‘‘individuals are free to take a more active role than
was possible in the industrial economy of the twentieth century.’’71
What defines these arguments is the idea that the primary focus of capi-
talism has become the production of knowledge commodities and that as a
consequence of the shift from a Fordist to a post-Fordist society the bound-
aries between owners and workers, producers and consumers, and econom-
ics and culture have all broken down because of the ways in which culture
itself has been incorporated into the production process. As John Allen ex-
plains, ‘‘the concept of ‘Fordism’ captures all things modern about an econ-
omy: it is associated with scale, progress, science, control, technology,
rationality, including the sea of disciplined workers that poured through the
gates.’’72 ‘‘Fordism,’’ he goes on to write, ‘‘is conceived of an era of mass,
standardized goods produced for mass markets, created by an intervention-
ist state which gave people the spending power to make mass consumption
possible’’73 in which ‘‘it is manufacturing which acts as the ‘engine’ of growth
within an economy’’ and ‘‘it was this connection, between mass production
and mass consumption, that was taken to be one of the hallmarks of the
modern era.’’74 On the contrary, the shift to post-Fordism, which is under-
stood roughly as emerging in the period after 1945 and is marked most
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often by the mass introduction of microchip technologies, is characterized
by a growing importance of ‘‘information technologies and networked of-
fices rather than by coal or steam power and sprawling workshops.’’75 Allen
states:
Opening up before us, it is claimed, is an altogether different kind of economy;
one which is organized around flexible forms of production, in both the technol-
ogies used and in the kinds of work expected. In contrast to mass production and
mass markets, it is argued that flexible production techniques are becoming
increasingly important as a means of responding to the greater diversity of con-
sumer demand and fragmented market tastes.76
The growth of the productivity of labor throughout the twentieth century,
the argument goes, reduced the necessity of labor required to maintain pro-
duction to such low levels as to be inconsequential to the overall accumula-
tion that was generated, while at the same time it freed up formerly
productive workers for the expansion of avenues of consumption. Alvin Tof-
fler, for example, defines this shift in terms of his theory of the ‘‘prosumer’’77
for whom the new productive market becomes a means for individualized
consumption and ‘‘the consumer, not merely punching the button that sets
this entire process in action, will become as much a part of the production
process as the denim-clad assembly line worker was in the [industrial/sec-
ond wave] world now dying.’’78 Similarly enthusiastic futurist Nicholas Ne-
groponte declares that in ‘‘the post-information age, we often have an
audience the size of one. Everything is made to order and information is
extremely personalized.’’79 In such declarations we find the precedent for
the contemporary arguments about the iPod and the Internet as opening
new spaces for individual self-fulfillment and the notion that consumption
has become central to the global economy.
The theory of technology as the solution to socioeconomic problems
does not have to take the hard form of theorists such as Jacques Ellul, who,
from a conservative Christian position, argues in response to the changes
of the postindustrial economy that ‘‘it is useless to rail against capitalism.
Capitalism did not create our world; the machine did.’’80 Rather, much of
cultural theory today takes the form of a soft technological determinism that
nonetheless continues to read technology as a space independent of the
current economic conditions of capitalism in which labor is exploited, and
this is the reason why it simultaneously operates as a site of what Constance
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Penley and Andrew Ross call ‘‘popular refunctioning’’ to resist cultural
norms.81 One of the central figures in the development of this logic is Dan-
iel Bell, whose work on the ‘‘Post-Industrial Society’’ in the 1970s has be-
come foundational in establishing this reading of the role of science and
technology in the economy. What has made Bell’s analysis so influential is
the way in which it works to incorporate technological progress into the
analysis of culture in such a way as to insulate the relationship between
technology and labor from critique.
Taking as its starting point the argument that the failure of Marx’s analy-
sis of capitalism is the idea that ‘‘the mode of production (the sub-structure
of a society) determines and encompasses all other dimensions of a soci-
ety,’’82 Bell first moves to separate the development of technology from the
analysis of economic conditions, which he describes as a ‘‘false confronta-
tion between two different conceptual schema.’’83 In its place, he shifts the
development of history away from labor and onto a spiritual theory of tradi-
tions. He argues that ‘‘societies are not unified entities. The nature of the
polity—whether a nation becomes democratic or not—rests not on the eco-
nomic ‘foundation’ but on historic traditions’’84; further, he writes:
The most grievous mistake in the social sciences is to read the character of a
society through a single overriding concept, whether it be capitalism or totalitari-
anism, and to mislead one as to the complex (overlapping and even contradictory)
features of any modern society, or to assume that there are ‘‘laws of social devel-
opment’’ in which one social system succeeds another by some inexorable
necessity.85
To prove his point that traditions (that is, culture) and not economics deter-
mine the development of society and the uses of technology, Bell argues
that ‘‘the same forces of production (i.e., technology) exist within a wide
variety of different systems of social relations’’ such that ‘‘one cannot say
that the technology (or chemistry or physics) of the Soviet Union is differ-
ent from the technology (or chemistry or physics) of the capitalist
world.’’86 Bell is also quick to remark that the division of the world at the
time he was writing—locating the United States and the Soviet Union on
the developed side of an ‘‘axis of technology’’ with countries such as Indo-
nesia and China on the undeveloped side—is simply one of a range of
possibilities.87 As long as ‘‘one does not claim that the particular schema
is exhaustive, and subsumes all others,’’ he writes, ‘‘we can also specify
different schemata of social development: feudal, capitalist, and socialist;
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or pre-industrial, industrial, and post-industrial; or within the Weberian
framework of political authority, that of patriarchal, patrimonial, and
legal-rational bureaucracy.’’88
Although in this formulation Bell appeals to social complexity and chal-
lenges ‘‘the claim that the mode of production always determines the ‘su-
perstructure’ of society,’’89 it becomes clear that what is at stake in the kind
of pluralistic approach to sociology he opens with is developing a means of
reading technology that situates technological development as independent
from and equal to all other forces in shaping social life. That is to say,
regardless of Bell’s claim that his emphasis on technology ‘‘does not mean
that technology is the primary determinant of all other societal changes,’’90
by isolating technology from economic, political, and cultural factors while
simultaneously revising the history of human society in terms of its relation-
ship to technological development it becomes clear that it is technology,
divorced from historical conflict, that becomes the foundation of change in
Bell’s analysis. This becomes even more clear as he begins outlining the
history of society:
A pre-industrial sector is primarily extractive, its economy based on agriculture,
mining, fishing, timber and other resources such as natural gas or oil. An indus-
trial sector is primarily fabricating, using energy and machine technology, for the
manufacture of goods. A post-industrial sector is one of processing, in which tele-
communications and computers are strategic for the exchange of information
and knowledge.91
What is significant about this schema is not simply the way in which it
articulates the divisions between societies in terms of their mode of produc-
tion, an approach of which, as I have noted, Bell claims to be critical.
Rather, what is more important is that the changes he outlines—from ex-
traction, to fabrication, to processing—are differentiated in terms of the
level at which technology in society acts as a substitute for labor. It is pre-
cisely the displacement of labor by technology that Bell indicates marks one
of the ‘‘vastly different’’ elements that distinguishes ‘‘post-industrial’’ soci-
ety from the two previous modes of production.92 He argues, ‘‘if industrial
society is based on machine technology, post-industrial society is shaped by
an intellectual technology. And if capital and labor are the structural fea-
tures of industrial society, information and knowledge are those of the post-
industrial society.’’93 In other words, it is not that Bell is opposed to a reduc-
tive analysis of history in terms of the mode of production, for which he
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criticizes Marx.94 It is that he is opposed to any analysis that sees labor and
not technology as the source of social development. This becomes evident
when, having argued that ‘‘[n]o conceptual scheme ever exhausts a social
reality,’’95 he nonetheless concludes that ‘‘every society has existed on the
basis of knowledge.’’96
The centralization of information and knowledge as a substitute for labor
is thus the key to Bell’s analysis. It is, in fact, in describing the differences
between an industrial and a postindustrial economy that his work has be-
come most influential for the dominant theories of the digital condition,
particularly as it relates to the role of culture in the economy. He argues
that ‘‘industrial commodities are produced in discrete, identifiable units,
exchanged and sold, consumed and used up, as are a loaf of bread or an
automobile’’ and that ‘‘information and knowledge are not consumed or
‘used up’ ’’ but rather, ‘‘even when it is sold,’’ knowledge ‘‘remains with the
producer.’’97 In other words, what is fundamentally different for Bell about
the postindustrial society is the way in which the producer (worker) no
longer turns over his or her product to the owner or consumer but rather
retains control and thus, one could argue, cannot be considered exploited
in the ‘‘industrial’’ sense. This is the implication of his reading of the status
of labor in the postindustrial age. He writes:
In a pre-industrial world, life is a game against nature in which men wrest their
living from the soil, the waters, or the forests, working usually in small groups,
subject to the vicissitudes of nature. In an industrial society, work is a game
against fabricated nature, in which men become dwarfed by machines as they
turn out goods and things. But in a post-industrial world, work is primarily a
‘‘game between persons.’’ . . . Thus in the experience of work and the daily
routine, nature is excluded, artifacts are excluded, and persons have to learn how
to live with one another. In the history of human society, this is a completely
new and unparallel state of affairs.98
Although Bell’s analysis of technology and work is generally understood as
coming from a conservative political position, his reading in this passage of
a knowledge economy in which class is replaced by individual initiative and
exploitation is rendered obsolete because the nature of the commodity pro-
duced has become extremely influential in cultural studies, particularly
among those working in the post-Marxist tradition such as Aronowitz, Baud-
rillard, Deleuze and Guattari, Laclau and Mouffe, Lyotard, and Negri, to
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name only a few. To take as one example, Jean Baudrillard’s thesis in Sym-
bolic Exchange and Death rests on a similar assumption that capital has moved
from an economy based upon the production of goods to an economy based
upon the exchange of signs. He writes, ‘‘A revolution has put an end to [the]
‘classical’ economy of value, a revolution which, beyond the commodity
form, stretches value to its most radical form,’’99 bringing with it ‘‘the end
of labor, the end of production, and the end of political economy.’’100 While
Bell and Baudrillard differ on their terms—for Bell it is knowledge that
drives the economy; for Baudrillard it is the sign—what is significant is the
way in which knowledge is situated as the other of labor. Baudrillard’s the-
ory posits labor as a sign whose value depends upon its ability to stand in
for the reality of production that is displaced in the move toward ‘‘simula-
crum’’—the final stage in the history of modes of production in which ‘‘the
question of signs and their rational destinations, their ‘real’ and their ‘imagi-
nary,’ their repression, reversal, the illusions they form of what they silence
or of their parallel significations, is completely effaced’’101 Bell’s theory of
a ‘‘knowledge theory of labor’’ similarly assumes ‘‘it is the codification of
knowledge that becomes directive of innovation.’’102 However, despite these
differences in idiom, what both theorists share is the underlying assumption
of a soft technological determinism.
Technological determinism today is based upon the idea that there is a
force other than labor that is able to create surplus value and thus has be-
come the primary focus of the economy. While it is most commonly articu-
lated as knowledge or, as Henry Giroux argues, the idea that ‘‘information
has now become capital,’’103 such arguments are based upon the presupposi-
tion that it is ideas (what technology embodies) rather than labor that shape
the world. Of course, I am aware that in many instances this determinism
is projected onto Marxism, often in terms of a selective reading of Marx’s
statement that ‘‘the hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the
steam-mill, society with the industrial capitalist,’’104 for example in Robert
Heilbroner’s influential article ‘‘Do Machines Make History?’’ What is at
stake, however, in Marx’s analysis of this relationship between technology
and social change is precisely what differentiates a materialist analysis of
technology from the technological determinism that has become dominant.
In the passage in question, for example, Marx is arguing precisely against a
kind of technological determinism that erases the fundamental role of
human labor in social change. Marx writes, ‘‘the economist understands
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very well that men make cloth, linen, silk materials in definite relations of
production. But what he has not understood is that these definite social
relations are just as much produced by men as linen, flax, etc.’’105 In other
words, in contrast to the attempt merely to describe the conditions of pro-
duction as if they had emerged on their own and thus are beyond the power
of individuals to transform them, Marx argues that we must understand the
conditions themselves as the product of labor. It is in this sense that Marx
continues by arguing, ‘‘social relations are closely bound up with productive
forces. In acquiring new productive forces men change their mode of pro-
duction; and in changing their mode of production, in changing the way of
earning their living, they change all their social relations’’ before concluding
that ‘‘the hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill,
society with the industrial capitalist.’’106 What is central to this conclusion
is the fact that, as Marx argues, the acquisition of new productive forces—
whether it is the ‘‘hand-mill,’’ the ‘‘steam-mill,’’ or the computer chip—is
the result of human labor. In other words, it is the human labor in the past
which produces the conditions that exist in the present, and it is the human
labor in the present which makes possible the conditions that may exist
in the future. Without human labor, to put it crudely, the technological
developments do not exist, regardless of the level of development such ad-
vances have achieved.
Instrumentality and Labor
At the same time that technological determinism has emerged to isolate
technological developments from historical conditions, there has devel-
oped what appears, at first glance, to be a counter-reading of technology
which advances a kind of spiritual resistance to what is described as the
‘‘instrumental reason’’ of technology that seeks to resurrect a lost spiritual
wholeness that has been displaced by the crushing logic of the technologi-
cal and the scientific. The foundational theorist of this essentially religious
critique of technology is Martin Heidegger, whose essay ‘‘The Question
Concerning Technology’’ remains extremely influential in contemporary
cultural theory because of the way it lends the appearance of radicalism to
the notion that the problems of capitalism reside not on earth but at the
level of the idea.
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Heidegger opens the essay by drawing a distinction between technology
and its essence. He writes,
Technology is not equivalent to the essence of technology. When we are seeking
the essence of ‘‘tree,’’ we have to become aware that what pervades every tree, as
tree, is not itself a tree that can be encountered among all the other trees. Like-
wise, the essence of technology is by no means technological. We shall never
experience our relationship to the essence of technology so long as we merely
represent and pursue the technological, put up with it, or evade it.107
While this distinction is not limited to Heidegger—although on different
terms, dialectical theorists such as Hegel and Marx, for example, argue for
the distinction between an object’s appearance and its essence—what is sig-
nificant about Heidegger’s approach is that the purpose of drawing this
distinction is not to uncover the essence of technology as much as to dis-
place the essence that exists without substituting an alternative cause. For
Heidegger, the problem of technology is the dialectical logic of causality it
instills, and it is this critique of causality that remains so influential within
cultural theory.
When asking about the essence of technology, Heidegger argues, one
generally receives two answers:
One says: Technology is a means to an end. The other says: Technology is a
human activity. The two definitions of technology belong together. For to posit
ends and procure and utilize the means to them is a human activity. The manu-
facture and utilization of equipment, tools, and machines, the manufactured and
used things themselves, and the needs and ends they serve all belong to what
technology is. The whole complex of these contrivances is technology. Tech-
nology is itself a contrivance—in Latin, an instrumentum.108
For Heidegger, to read technology either as a product of human labor
(Marx) or as a product of human reason (Hegel) is to assume an instrumen-
tal approach to technology which reduces all possible meanings of technol-
ogy to causes that are justified after the fact by the effects that result. He
argues that the use of technology as the ‘‘means to an end’’ means that
the instrumental conception of technology conditions every attempt to bring
man into the right relation to technology. Everything depends on our manipu-
lating technology in the proper manner as means. We will, as we say, ‘‘get’’
technology ‘‘intelligently in hand.’’ We will master it. The will to mastery
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becomes all the more urgent the more technology threatens to slip from human
control.109
In other words, technology is symptomatic of a will to mastery over nature
that continually increases as what he proposes as the ‘‘real’’ essence of na-
ture is replaced by the ‘‘instrumental’’ essence of technology.
The will to mastery that Heidegger outlines here is what he defines as
the effect of the technological consciousness of instrumental reason. The
problem of this kind of mastery, he argues, is that it imposes on nature and
on humanity the very results it seeks to find. For example, he writes that
one of the problems of technology is that it ‘‘puts to nature the unreason-
able demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and stored as
such.’’110 As a result, ‘‘everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be
immediately on hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for
a further ordering.’’111 The reduction of things to ‘‘standing-by’’ means, for
Heidegger, the imposition of a false causality such that the thing in question
loses its ‘‘real’’ essence and, instead, becomes an object whose essence reflects
its instrumental purpose. He argues, on these terms, that the introduction
of a hydropower plant on a river turns the river into a water power station,
and, in turn, ‘‘what the river is now, namely, a water-power supplier, derives
from the essence of the power station.’’112 In short, the world comes to
appear as instrumental because this is the (false) logic through which the
world is being read.
Heidegger goes on to argue that the reduction of things to an instrumen-
tal essence concerns not only nature but human activity. He states, ‘‘The
forester who measures the felled timber in the woods and who to all appear-
ances walks the forest path in the same way his grandfather did is today
ordered by the industry that produces commercial woods, whether he
knows it or not.’’113 Heidegger, here, locates the alienation of the individual
in contemporary society not in capitalism but in the instrumental logic of
technology. He argues:
As soon as what is unconcealed no longer concerns man even as object, but
exclusively as standing-reserve, and man in the midst of objectlessness is nothing
but the orderer of the standing reserve, then he comes to the very brink of a
precipitous fall; that is, he comes to the point where he himself will have to be
taken as standing-reserve. Meanwhile, man, precisely as the one so threatened,
exalts himself and postures as lord of the earth. In this way the illusion comes to
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prevail that everything man encounters exists only insofar as it is his construct.
This illusion gives rise in turn to one final delusion: it seems as though man
everywhere and always encounters himself.114
The reduction of human activity to instrumental reason and, in turn, the
reduction of nature to the same logic is, for Heidegger, the real risk of
technological development: ‘‘the possibility that it could be denied to [hu-
manity] to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the
call of a more primal truth.’’115
What Heidegger proposes as the solution to the alienation of instrumen-
tality is a destructive mode of thinking that refuses to begin with or to draw
conclusions. He begins this project by outlining what he argues is the logic
of causality, writing:
Whatever has an effect as its consequence is called a cause. But not only that by
means of which something else is effected is a cause. The end that determines
the kind of means to be used may be considered a cause. Wherever ends are
pursued and means are employed, wherever instrumentality reigns, there reigns
causality.116
For Heidegger, causality and instrumentality are an approach to nature that
imposes an alternative use, rather than its essential purpose, primarily
through human activity (that is, through labor). He argues that in contrast
to this kind of causality—which he defines as the causa efficiens—there are,
in fact, three other kinds of causality: the causa materialis (or natural materi-
als), the causa formalis (the form or shape into which the materials are
crafted), and the causa finalis (the ritual or purpose that determines what
materials and which shape are to be used). Giving the example of a chalice,
Heidegger redefines causality in terms of indebtedness and responsibility.
He writes:
Silver is that out of which the chalice is made. As this matter (hyle), it is co-
responsible for the chalice. The chalice is indebted to, i.e. owes thanks to, the
silver for that which it consists. But the sacrificial vessel is indebted not only to
the silver. As a chalice, that which is indebted to the silver appears in the aspect
of a chalice, and not in that of a brooch or a ring. Thus the sacred vessel is at the
same time indebted to the aspect (eidos) of chaliceness. Both the silver into which
the aspect is admitted as chalice and the aspect in which the silver appears are in
their respective ways co-responsible for the sacrificial vessel.117
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What he is proposing in this reading of the chalice is a reading of produc-
tion in which human labor is only one aspect in a process to which he ulti-
mately gives determinacy to the ritualistic purpose to which that product is
used. He writes, ‘‘there remains yet a third something that is above all re-
sponsible for the sacrificial vessel. It is that which in advance confines the
chalice within the realm of consecration and bestowal. Through this the
chalice is circumscribed as sacrificial vessel.’’118 This is an attempt to address
the contradictions of exchange-value by placing the meaning of the com-
modity in the idea to which the commodity aspires. In other words, it spiri-
tualizes the meaning of the commodity in an attempt to solve a social
conflict that emerges when use value is subsumed under the logic of ex-
change value.
Having turned production into the process by which the ‘‘spirit’’ is mate-
rialized on Earth, Heidegger challenges the technological logic of instru-
mentality by substituting the logic of poiēsis. Heidegger takes up Plato’s
statement in the Symposium—‘‘Every occasion for whatever passes beyond
the nonpresent and goes forward into presencing is poiēsis’’—to argue for a
new understanding of technology not as instrumental but as ‘‘revealing’’
(alētheia). He writes, ‘‘The concept word [technology] stems from the
Greek. Tecknikon means that which belongs to technē.’’119 What is significant
about this relationship, he continues, is that ‘‘technē is the name not only for
the activities and skills of the craftsman but also for the arts of the mind and
the fine arts. Technē belongs to the bringing-forth, to poiēsis; it is something
poetic.’’120 In other words, in production one must recognize the creativity
of the laborer over the commodity produced. For Heidegger the worker (in
this case, the silversmith) becomes a causa efficiens not because he has been
reduced to an exploited wage laborer. Rather, the alienation of the worker
results from the logic of instrumentality, which imposes upon him the status
of means to an end. Instead, Heidegger argues that the silversmith must be
understood as part of the process of revealing the true essence of nature,
without imposing upon that essence the logic of ‘‘means.’’ It is only through
recognition of his role as part of a broader spiritual purpose that the worker
can overcome the alienation of capitalist society.
It is interesting to see the way in which Heidegger’s critique of techno-
logical instrumentality has itself become part of the ideology of the digital
economy. In spite of his existential critique of technē, as capital relies more
and more on technology, Heidegger’s existential resistance softens to the
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extent that Bernard Stiegler, one of Heidegger’s most perceptive critics
writes, ‘‘the meaning of modern technics is ambiguous in Heidegger.’’121
For example, in High Technē: Art and Technology from the Machine Aesthetic to
the Posthuman, R. L. Rutsky looks to Heidegger’s reading of technē as cre-
ative labor as a way of explaining the freedom provided to the individual in
the new virtual landscape of digital culture. He writes, ‘‘whatever changes
or mutations have occurred in contemporary cultures—whether one calls
these cultures postmodern or not—seem to be based less on changes in
technology per se than in the very conception of technology, of what tech-
nology is.’’122 What Rutsky believes is that in contrast to industrial technol-
ogies, digital technologies redefine labor as ‘‘a more general concept of
making or producing, including artistic production’’123 as articulated by
Heidegger. That is to say, in contrast to the industrial, which was ‘‘defined
in terms of an instrumental conception of technology, an instrumental or
technological rationality that allows modern ‘humanity’ to know and con-
trol the world,’’124 Rutsky argues that the digital economy, ‘‘with its empha-
sis on issues of representation, style, and design, seems to signal a
reemergence of [a] repressed aesthetic aspect within technology.’’125 He
continues, ‘‘Unlike modern technology, high tech can no longer be defined
solely in terms of its instrumentality or function—as simply a tool or a means
to an end. In high tech, rather, technology becomes much more a matter of
representation, of aesthetics, of style.’’126 It is the digital, Rutsky argues,
that finally allows the worker to be ‘‘free’’ from the instrumental logic of
capitalism.
Similarly, in Mass Mediauras: Form, Technics, Media, Samuel Weber fol-
lows Heidegger’s argument in suggesting that the ‘‘representational think-
ing’’ underlying modern conceptions of technology treats objects and
people as ‘‘calculable data, as information to be taken into account or ac-
counted for,’’127 and he concludes that for this reason the technical has
ceased to be ‘‘a way of bringing-forth’’ but has become instead ‘‘a driving-
or goading-forth’’ and the basis of ‘‘ex-ploiting, ex-tracting, ex-pelling, in-
citing.’’128 In contrast, Weber writes that just as Heidegger frees the creative
logic of poiēsis from ‘‘a dependency upon an object (the product) or subject
(a producer),’’129 we should no longer approach new technologies as estab-
lishing an ‘‘emplacement’’ that is fixed and determined. Instead, he argues
that just as ‘‘the more technics seeks to place the subject into safety the less
safe its places become,’’ that ‘‘places and placing can no longer be taken for
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granted. Rather, they must be taken as granted’’ as opening ‘‘a way that can
never be entirely secured.’’130 In other words, by characterizing the contem-
porary as ‘‘an age of increasing uncertainty, when the solutions and answers
that were taken for granted until recently no longer seem viable’’ and that
this new age allows us to ‘‘confront problems without demanding recipes of
salvation,’’131 Weber is essentially proposing, like Rutsky, that it is the very
nature of digital technologies and their creative abilities to transform the
ground of ‘‘certainty’’ that challenge the instrumental logic of the Industrial
Age.
Even a more radical political theorization of instrumentalism, as David
Golumbia advances in The Cultural Logic of Computation, ultimately ends up
reproducing the same idealist logic that it aims to criticize. Arguing against
‘‘messianic claims about sudden, radical, and almost salutary changes in the
fundamental fabric of politics, economics, and social formations,’’132 he pro-
poses that differences between manual and service workers ‘‘may be far less
salient to politics . . . than the degree to which members of a given institu-
tion in fact participate in the management of the organization or are instead
subject to strong, hierarchical rule’’133 and that ‘‘both represent a significant
separation of capital and responsibility from the human being operating
in the name of the corporation.’’134 According to Golumbia, however, this
economic division is symptomatic of an epistemological divide, rather than
a division of property. He proposes that the main problem of digital society
is that instrumentalism or ‘‘computation’’ is ‘‘not a neutral technology’’ but
‘‘a means of expanding top-down hierarchical power.’’135 In other words,
what emerges from his analysis is a reading of capitalism in which the con-
tradictions are not between capitalist and worker but between the powerful
and the powerless. Further, as with Weber and Rutsky, what is ultimately
privileged as resisting the homogenizing instrumentality of computation is
an ‘‘anti-realism’’ that embraces the ‘‘inexact, fuzzy, analog features of the
world that, while difficult to control and even at times to name, are never-
theless among the most vital facets of human life,’’136 such as ‘‘our primitive
need to play.’’137 He concludes, ‘‘Our societies function best when they are
balanced between what we call here rationalism and whatever lies outside of
it.’’138 In other words, while Golumbia is critical of the connections between
global capital expansion and instrumentalism, by simply embracing the
other of rationalism we are left with an epistemological conflict with little
direct attachment to the conditions in which people live. Instead, reality
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becomes an effect of ideas, and transforming social inequality is reduced to
embracing the uncertain rather than changing material relations.
What Heidegger, and following him Rutsky, Weber, and Golumbia,
presents as a ‘‘spiritual’’ renewal—creativity—is simply a recognition that it
is the labor power of workers that creates value. This does not so much
challenge the logic of exploitation as it places it on a higher plane, where it
can remain the natural logic of capitalism. The spiritualization of exploita-
tion shows only the extent to which the appearance of capitalism as an eter-
nal system has taken hold at the level of ideology. What is obscured in the
turning of labor into a spiritual act that can combat the materiality of the
technological is the fact that it is not technology that alienates the worker
but the appropriation of the worker’s labor by capital that makes technology
appear ‘‘as something alien, as a power independent of the producer.’’139 The
appearance that it is technology and not capital which causes the alienation
of the worker conceals the fact that ‘‘the alien being, to whom labour and
the product of labour belongs, in whose service labour is done and for
whose benefit the product of labour is provided, can only be man himself.
If the product of labour confronts him as an alien power, then this can only
be because it belongs to some other man than the worker.’’140 Heidegger and
other ‘‘anti-rationalists’’ thus provide a ‘‘solution’’ to the alienation of labor
that extends, rather than curtails, the logic of capitalism. His rewriting of
causality erases the economic relations between people and turns this
human relation, as is the ideology of capitalism, into a relationship between
ideas and things. The limit of capitalism does not reside in bad ideas, how-
ever; it resides in the fact that the productivity of labor is put towards the
limited ends of profitability.
In contrast to Heidegger’s analysis of the chalice, I want to turn to Len-
in’s reading of the drinking glass because it demonstrates what it means to
approach culture from the position that it is labor which takes place under
specific social and historical conditions that determines the status and
meaning of our reality. He writes:
A glass is undoubtedly a glass cylinder and a drinking vessel. But a glass not only
has these two properties, qualities, or sides, but an infinite number of other prop-
erties, qualities, sides, interrelations and ‘‘mediations’’ with the rest of the world.
A glass is a heavy object which may be used as a missile. A glass may serve as a
paperweight, as a jar to keep a captive butterfly in, a glass may have value as an
object with an artistic engraving or design, quite apart from the fact that it can
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be used as a drinking vessel, that it is made of glass, that its form is cylindrical,
or not quite so, and so on and so forth.141
What Lenin outlines in this passage is a dialectical analysis that approaches
an object not in terms of its formal characteristics but in terms of ‘‘all its
sides, all connections and ‘mediations.’ ’’142 What is particularly important
about Lenin’s examination of the glass is his insistence that in such an analy-
sis, ‘‘the whole of human experience should enter the full ‘definition’ of an
object as a criterion of the truth and as a practical index of the object’s
connection with what man requires.’’143 We cannot assume the meaning of
an object outside of the material conditions of its production, which are
social and historical. Thus, if we apply this analysis to Heidegger’s chalice,
we must ask not only whether its use corresponds to an instrumental or
natural essence but what the conditions in which the instrumental or the
natural are determined are. These are not simply abstract categories. Their
meaning is a reflection of social conflicts, and whether a glass is a chalice or
a paperweight is historically determined. In capitalist society, both the glass
and the chalice are commodities, produced for the purposes of exchange.
The object’s value is completely independent from its use. This is the spiri-
tualism to which Heidegger’s theory of the chalice ultimately appeals—it is
the logic of exchange value that capitalism imposes on the products of labor.
The iPod and the Fetishism of Consumer Resistance
The digital spirit of anti-instrumentalism reaches perhaps its highest point
in ‘‘the cult of iPod.’’144 The iPod has become synonymous with the cultural
freedom of the digital age and the idea that the freedoms of consumption,
which is really another way of saying the wage since it is the wage that
enables most people to purchase these items, is a more than fair exchange
for the sale of labor power. It is described as ‘‘a near-universal object of
desire’’145 that is ‘‘the symbol of the media’s future’’ in which ‘‘the gates of
access are thrown open, the reach of artists goes deeper, and consumers
don’t just consume, they choose songs, videos, and even their news their
way.’’146 Thomas L. Friedman, for example, uses the iPod as a prime exam-
ple of what he calls the ‘‘flat world,’’ a moment when capitalism turns from
a hierarchical to a vertical system in which value no longer simply flows
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from bottom to top, but outward in an expanding network of exchange. In
an anecdotal style that is intended to signify the ‘‘obviousness’’ of the new
digital landscape, Friedman describes the iPod as bringing about the trans-
ferring of the ownership and control of culture from large corporations to
the individual user. According to Friedman the iPod is empowering because
it enables someone to take control over what they want to listen to when
they want to listen to it. He writes, ‘‘Think about it: For decades the broad-
cast industry was built around the idea that you shoot out ads on network
television or radio and hope that someone is watching or listening. But
thanks to the flattening technologies’’ such as the iPod ‘‘that world is
quickly fading away.’’147
It is not that the economic logic that shapes the broadcast industry is
fading away in the digital age. In fact, the monopoly consolidation of the
entertainment industry means that four companies sell 90 percent of all
music, six companies control over 90 percent of revenue in the film indus-
try, the three largest publishers of textbooks control over 70 percent of
the U.S. market, and the two largest radio firms control more of the mar-
ket than the next twenty-three competitors combined.148 It is that as the
commodification of everyday life expands, the ability to see the labor in
the commodity becomes more difficult. The spiritual aroma of the iPod
which means that labor ‘‘disappears’’ at the level of ideas and is replaced
with consumption, is what Marx calls ‘‘commodity fetishism’’—the way
‘‘a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the
fantastic form of a relation between things.’’149 It is not accidental that
before its announcement the iPhone was often referred to as the ‘‘Jesus
phone’’ because of all it (supposedly) represented.150 It is the effect of the
transformation of all use values into exchange value, a process that makes
commodities appear transcendent of the relations of labor because of the
way in which the commercial value comes to dominate their social
value.151 That is, when their value as objects produced for the purposes of
private accumulation takes over for their value as objects of use. What
appears as transcendence is, in actuality, the reduction of all aspects of life
to the process of commodification.
What commodity fetishism means is that the more commodification be-
comes the dominant logic of society the more that commodities appear to
transcend commodification and the more that the role of labor is hidden
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behind the hieroglyphic of the commodity. A posting to a public technology
newsgroup is a prime example of this logic of consumer ‘‘freedom’’:
The iPod has become more than just an MP3 player; it is a fashion statement
and symbol of being ‘‘cool.’’ Certainly there are better MP3 players with more
functionality at lower prices, but that is no longer the point of owning an iPod.
The closest analogues are in clothing and cars. Sure, you could get ‘‘very func-
tional’’ clothes and cars, but some of us choose to buy more expensive items
because we have the money and the inclination to make a fashion statement.152
The description of the iPod as ‘‘more than just an MP3 player’’ but a ‘‘fash-
ion statement’’—that its meaning is not defined by use but by exchange—
demonstrates how the logic of exchange value has become the logic of the
everyday. It is this logic which explains the dominant readings of the iPod
as not just a commodity but an object of ‘‘technotranscendence’’ that, ac-
cording to Markus Giesler, allows consumers to ‘‘transcend the here and
now through the use of technology.’’153 The beauty of the iPod, according
to Giesler, is that it ‘‘reduces the complexity of consumption’’ while at the
same time shifting consumption from ‘‘materiality to information—the In-
ternet; from ownership to access—file sharing; and from pattern to random-
ness—the iPod.’’154 But this ‘‘simplicity’’ is an ideological effect of the
complexity of the division of labor, in which workers only encounter the
objects of production on the market, and thus the labor that has produced
this commodity is nowhere to be found.
What is supposed to make the iPod so different as a commodity is the
way in which it places the ability of the individual consumer to determine
the reality they want to live in. Other commodities might allow the individ-
ual to control their identities by projecting meaning outward, but they still
require the individual to inhabit a collectively determined public space. On
the contrary, the iPod is described as allowing the individual to retreat in-
ward, creating a private audioscape that enables them to take greater control
over reality by allowing them to define on their own terms how they inter-
act with the world. As Michael Bull argues, by allowing iPod users to ‘‘rein-
scribe mundane linear time with their own very personalized meanings,
transforming the intolerable into the tolerable’’ the iPod empowers the user
‘‘to wrest back some control from the multiple and invasive rhythms of daily
urban life.’’155 In this sense, the iPod is said to ‘‘confound the traditional
distinction between work and leisure time as users construct a seamless au-
ditory experience from work to home.’’156
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What this erases, however, is that work time and leisure time are not
simply ahistorical givens, their development and their meaning is an effect
of developments in the means of production and take on the shape of the
mode of production. As Ernest Mandel writes, ‘‘The producer in a primitive
society does not usually separate his productive activity, ‘labour,’ from his
other human activities.’’157 Far from being a peaceful integration of labor
and leisure, this level of society is defined by the ‘‘tyranny’’ of nature over
the productive development of human labor. In other words, ‘‘This high
degree of integration of his whole life is more an expression of the poverty
of society and the extreme narrowness of his needs than a conscious effort
towards the all-around development of all human potentialities.’’158 It is the
productivity of labor that enables humanity to transform the natural into
the social and ‘‘as the productive forces increase, mankind frees himself
more and more completely from the tyranny of the forces of nature.’’159 Yet,
as society moves from ‘‘absolute poverty’’ to ‘‘relative scarcity,’’ what
emerges is the simultaneous movement from ‘‘a society harmoniously
united to a society divided into classes.’’160 In other words, ‘‘As man frees
himself from the tyranny of natural forces he falls more and more under the
tyranny of blind social forces, the tyranny of other men (slavery, serfdom),
or the tyranny of his own products (petty commodity production and capi-
talist production).’’161 What this means is that the appearance of daily life
as a struggle between leisure time and work or ‘‘alienated’’ time is, in reality,
a struggle between those who have been freed from having to work by ap-
propriating the work of others and those whose work has been appro-
priated. It is the consequence of a system of production in which workers
lose all control over their labor because they must sell it piecemeal to the
capitalist in order to acquire the means of survival. It is the reflection of a
society in which ‘‘everything is bought and sold.’’162
The iPod is a mass-produced commodity. Its value resides in the fact
that it is an object produced for exchange. Whatever appearances it takes
on at the level of culture, it remains a commodity and thus the embodiment
of labor power that has been appropriated by capital for the purposes of
private accumulation. Although Apple has long asked its users to ‘‘Think
Different,’’ the iPod produces surface differences that cover the primary
difference of class. The more iPods are sold the more the owners of Apple
are able to realize the surplus value of the labor they have appropriated
from their workers in the form of private profits. No matter how ubiquitous
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the iPod becomes, it cannot but expand the economic division between cap-
ital and labor.
However, in contrast to a society of alienation that requires individuals
to retreat into their own private worlds as the only way of tolerating their
lives, what is becoming possible as a result of the productivity of labor is
the material conditions for bringing about the end of an alienated society
in which only a few have been ‘‘freed from the burden of having to work
for a living.’’163 Instead of a world in which the majority must live as ‘‘pris-
oners of the same dull fate, shut up within the same restricted horizon by
the same wages, dressed in the same mass-produced clothes, reading the
same sensational newspapers, relaxing in the same sports stadiums or in
front of the same television programs,’’164 the freeing of labor from the
restrictions of commodity production would mean that everyone, and not
just those who own and control the means of production, would eliminate
the alienation that currently exists between work and leisure. Freedom from
the confines of wage labor means that ‘‘human energy will be concentrated
in art and science, in education and in physical and mental well-being.’’165
No longer will social differences result in economic inequality. Rather, the
end of the private ownership of the means of production will allow each
individual to develop fully the differences of their talents and aspirations.
The contradictions of the digital condition are neither technological nor
spiritual. The class contradictions that have resulted in increasing, rather
than lessening, inequality have as their cause the development and use of
technology in a system based upon private ownership of the means of pro-
duction. Under capitalism a few own and control the means of production
while the majority who are without the means to meet their needs must sell
their labor for a wage. This is what Marx defines as the ‘‘working day’’—the
conditions under which the entire being of a person is reduced to that of a
commodity, traded on the market like all other commodities without any
security for the seller that their labor will be purchased and, having no other
means by which to meet their needs, that they will be able to earn enough
in wages to support themselves and their families. However, as Marx ex-
plains, what differentiates labor power, defined as ‘‘the aggregate of those
mental and physical capabilities existing in a human being,’’166 from all other
commodities, including technological developments in manufacturing, is
that it ‘‘not only produces its own value, but produces value over and above
it.’’167 Unlike other commodities, because labor power is sold by time and
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not by what it can produce in that time, labor power produces value over
and above its cost and thus is the basis for producing surplus value. In a
system in which the primary drive is the accumulation of profit, it is the
purchasing of labor power by the owners from the workers who have noth-
ing else to sell that drives the system.
Capitalism differs from all prior modes of production because it is a dy-
namic system based on increasing the productivity of labor and thus increas-
ing the rate at which the worker is able to produce surplus value to be
accumulated by the capitalist. As Marx argues in the first volume of Capital,
the drive to accumulate an increasing amount of surplus value from the
purchased labor power of the worker results in the necessity of constantly
driving down the costs of production: ‘‘The starting point of Modern In-
dustry is . . . the revolution in the instruments of labor.’’168 The role of
technological advancement in capitalism is to create the conditions for in-
creasing the production of surplus value by increasing the productivity of
the worker, thereby reducing the time it takes to produce a commodity
while simultaneously driving down the cost of labor power by lowering the
cost of the commodities needed by workers reproduces their labor power
for another day. It is the drive to further exploit the productivity of labor
that requires from the beginning that capitalism become a ‘‘revolutionary’’
system:
Modern Industry never looks upon and treats the existing form of a process as
final. The technical basis of that industry is therefore revolutionary, while all
previous modes of production were essentially conservative. By means of
machinery, chemical processes and other methods, it is continually causing
changes not only in the technical basis of production, but also in the functions of
the laborer, and in the social combinations of the labor-process. At the same
time, it thereby also revolutionizes the division of labor within the society, and
incessantly launches masses of capital and of workpeople from one branch of
production to another.169
What a materialist theory of technology enables is an approach to techno-
logical development that analyzes technology not only in terms of the
changes in its concrete forms—from hand-mills to computer chips—and
how these changes have impacted people’s lives, but more importantly why
such developments take the forms that they do. The image of a postclass,
postproduction, postexploitative society in which technology alone will
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eliminate social divisions by eliminating labor, thus ignores that the very
production of technology depends upon a division of labor between those
who own and control the means of producing new technologies and those
whose labor actually produces technology. Technology cannot replace labor
because technology is a product of labor and as long as there exists a division
between those who labor and those who live off of the labor of others,
technology will only work to heighten this contradiction. As Marx argues,
the more capitalism develops, and the more the productive forces are put
to the restricted use of private accumulation, the more ‘‘the law that sur-
plus-value does not arise from the labour-power that has been replaced by
machinery but from the labour-power actually employed in working with
the machinery asserts itself.’’170 What we are witnessing in the development
of the digital economy is not the superseding of production by consumption
nor the discursive breakdown of older modes of thinking, but rather the
restriction of the tremendous advances in production that are concentrated
and centralized in the hands of a few and used for the purposes of private
accumulation.
To posit technological development as in itself transforming the relations
of production, as existing somehow beyond the class struggle over the
means of production, is to invert the relationship between technology and
labor in order to provide an ideological alibi for exploitation. As Marx ar-
gues, under capitalism,
almost all the new inventions were the result of collisions between the worker
and the employer who sought at all costs to depreciate the worker’s specialized
ability. . . . [I]n short, with the introduction of machinery the division of labor
inside society has increased, the task of the worker inside the workshop has been
simplified, capital has been concentrated, the human being has been further
dismembered.171
Rather than representing a new theory for new times, the dominant theories
of the digital society are instead keeping up with the new technological
developments through which capital increases exploitation. In other words,
they are taking what is really a very one-sided view of technological
change—which does provide the benefits of increased cultural ‘‘freedom’’
for those who already have achieved economic freedom as a result of their
class position—and presenting it as if it were a universal condition, available
to all. While most theories of the digital condition claim, in other words,
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to be a theory of networks and connections—they are founded instead upon
a primary disconnection—the disconnection between the exploitation of
labor and commodity production. Only by reconnecting the study of cul-
ture and class will the field of cultural studies be able to grasp the contempo-
rary and act as a material force for social change.
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Global Networks and the Materiality of Immaterial Labor
This chapter focuses on one of the central issues in contemporary debates
over the status of labor in the digital economy: the issue of immaterial labor.
Writers such as Antonio Negri and Manuel Castells—who provide the basic
framework of assumptions for all contemporary theories of immaterial
labor—propose that digital technologies change the way in which value is
produced and, as a result, that the economy is shifting away from the pro-
duction of material commodities and toward immaterial commodities in-
cluding information and affect, as well as the terms of life itself. In effect,
they represent digital technologies as shifting the economic terrain of the
global economy away from issues of class and exploitation and toward a
new form of capitalism based upon immaterial labor. In contrast, I offer an
extended analysis of the contemporary global economy and explain why
we are actually witnessing the heightening of the economic contradictions
between labor and capital rather than their resolution.
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The Class Contradictions of Digital Globalization
Concepts are abstractions of the actual conditions of life and, for this rea-
son, historical maps of the social conflicts that determine which theories are
taken as accurate representations of reality and which are marginalized or
excluded as ‘‘terrorist’’ threats to the existing order1 In other words, al-
though concepts reflect the material developments of labor and therefore
must be understood in relation to what is, they are never simply neutral
reports of the existing but instead represent a divided space in which com-
peting classes ‘‘become conscious of the conflict’’ over the existing and
‘‘fight it out.’’2 It is in this context that since its first emergence in the 1980s,
globalization has become one of the primary—and at the same time highly
contested—concepts in cultural and social theory for describing the emer-
gence of a regime of capital accumulation that developed in the years fol-
lowing World War II, covering the period from what is known as the long
boom, through the period of global economic recession described as the
long downturn, and up to the contemporary moment.3
In mainstream and popular presses, globalization is championed as the
period of capitalism’s ultimate triumph over communism with the end of
the Cold War and, furthermore, the transcendence of its own internal con-
tradiction between capital and labor in the apparent centrality of cultural
production and immaterial labor to the digital ‘‘revolution’’ of society. For
example, according to Yochai Benkler in The Wealth of Networks, the emerg-
ing digital technologies are bringing with them a ‘‘new mode of produc-
tion’’4 that ‘‘allows people to reach across space and political divisions.’’5
Similarly, Clay Shirky proposes in Here Comes Everybody that ‘‘for the last
hundred years the big organizational question has been whether any given
task was taken on by the state, directing the effort in a planned way [social-
ism], or by businesses competing in a market [capitalism].’’6 However, with
the advent of digital technologies, he writes, there is now a ‘‘third alterna-
tive’’—namely, ‘‘action by loosely structured groups, operating without
managerial direction and outside the profit motive.’’7 While this representa-
tion of a world remade in the image of digital technologies has become, in
the words of Chris Harman, a ‘‘new orthodoxy’’ that is ‘‘used to mean that
the world economy has reached a new stage, which governments and work-
ers alike are virtually powerless to withstand,’’8 the reality is that what is
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presented in contemporary theory as a seamless transition to a new digital
and global world functions ideologically to banish any discussion of the
exploitation of labor that is at the core of capitalist production by substitut-
ing changes in how something is produced or where production takes place
for a transformation in the fundamental logic that governs production
under capitalism.
In order to understand the centrality of exploitation to the global expan-
sion of capitalism it is important to examine the way in which the digital
reading of globalization is based upon the presupposition that ‘‘more or less
everyone has learned to accept, if not necessarily love, capitalism—in much
the same way as they have democracy’’ and ‘‘at this time, no one can see
any effective alternatives to the combination of a market economy and a
democratic political system.’’9 This conclusion is generally dependent upon
two interrelated arguments. First, it is argued that globalization corre-
sponds to a ‘‘broad cultural shift . . . away from a dominance of production
over our everyday lives to a dominance of consumption,’’10 in the sense that
the primary source for the accumulation of new value is said to no longer
be labor or manufacture (material commodity production), but knowledge
and its embodiment in communications and other digital technologies. Ac-
cording to sociologist Helmut Willke, the shift to a digital economy means
that ‘‘digital goods are weightless and they move along the fiber optic lines
at the speed of light’’ and thus operate beyond the former political and
economic controls of industrial, national capitalism.11 It is on these terms
that the so-called digital globalization is understood to constitute a new
stage of capitalism based upon the seemingly inexhaustible resource of in-
formation, which, it is assumed, disrupts the economics of scarcity that is
manifest in the class inequalities of capitalism and removes the divisions of
ownership that constituted class identities in the predigital age by placing
the means of production in the hands of every creative person. As Mark
Poster argues, ‘‘there is no need for a capitalist market in the area of digital
cultural objects, and these objects need not become commodities . . . indeed,
digital cultural objects resist market mechanisms’’ and, in turn, transform
‘‘the nature of the producer and the consumer, blurring the boundary be-
tween them.’’12 Accordingly, the global expansion of a new regime of capital
accumulation based upon knowledge has the effect of creating spaces of
cultural heterogeneity and exchange in which the ‘‘fixities of nation, com-
munity, ethnicity and class,’’ as Jan Nederveen Pieterse states, ‘‘become
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fragments’’ dispersed in the flows of financial markets and cultural ex-
changes.13 Or, as Ulrich Beck concisely puts it, ‘‘the notion of a class society
remains useful only as an image of the past.’’14 The elevation of digital over
analogue production is therefore represented as ushering in a more ‘‘demo-
cratic’’ globalization because of the ways in which it supposedly re-maps
cultural and political institutions as spaces defined in the terms of individual
desire and personal lifestyles, rather than social need.15 As management the-
orists Klaus Görtz and Nadine Bleher write, ‘‘technological innovations
have enabled an increasing number of individuals to choose, create, and
cultivate transnational communities according to their personal interests,
values, habits, and attitudes.’’16
Second, it is argued that the development of postlabor means of produc-
tion creates the conditions for the expansion of capital globally, in turn
disrupting the traditional boundaries between nations, thereby creating a
‘‘flat’’ or ‘‘borderless’’ world of free cultural and financial exchange.17 What
flat or borderless signifies is an increased capitalization in the post–World
War II period of formerly socialist and Third World nations and their in-
corporation into the global system of production, either through the shift-
ing of manufacture from the global North (the United States, Canada, the
European Union, Russia, Japan, Australia, as well as Singapore, South
Korea and Taiwan) to the global South (Central and Southeast Asia, the
Middle East, Africa, Mexico, and South America) through outsourcing or
off-shoring or by becoming integral players in a postnational supply chain
that has been enabled by advances in communication as well as the opening
up of trade and financial barriers to free up the flow of formerly trapped
or unproductive capital.18 Proponents of the flat world thesis point to the
expansion of international trade which, according to the IMF, ‘‘has grown
five times in real terms since 1980, and its share of world GDP has risen
from 36 percent to 55 percent over this period.’’19 This ‘‘flattening’’ of the
global economy, in which it is said that the expansion of production and
trade relations between nations constitute the emergence of a level playing
field between formerly unequal or hostile nations, is essentially premised
upon a theory of a ‘‘universal evolution in the direction of capitalism’’ in
which there is no longer any ‘‘outside’’ to capitalism.20 In this reading, the
developed economies of the North have moved beyond the traditional eco-
nomic cycle, while transplanting the conditions of new growth and prosper-
ity to the underdeveloped nations in the South. As Martin Wolf writes, ‘‘In
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the post-war era, the most successful route to development seems to have
been via the export of labor-intensive manufactures, the route on which
China has followed Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea.’’21
The problem for the ideologists of capital and their image of globaliza-
tion as leveling the world is that insofar as concepts are abstractions of real-
ity the continuing existence of deep social and economic inequalities cannot
be solved at the level of ideas and thus still have to be explained. That is to
say, even though globalization has become synonymous in theory with the
end of the economic challengers to capitalism’s dominance, this does not
change the fact that the expansion of capitalism globally has corresponded
in actuality with a rising level of inequality and a sharpening of the class
divide, both between the so-called developing and developed national blocs,
as well as within the respective countries of each. This is because capitalism
is a system that depends upon the exploitation of labor. Regardless of
whether or not the primary location of production is the North or the
South, or whether the workers work in factories that are highly mechanized
or newly digitalized, it is the production of surplus value extracted from the
surplus labor of workers by owners that drives capitalism forward. That
exploitation remains even in the global factories of today is supported by a
2007 study from the World Bank which, despite touting the results of ‘‘free-
market’’ globalization as having reduced the number of people living in
poverty—defined as the ridiculously low, and ultimately arbitrary, sum of
less than $1 per day—by 260 million from 1990 to 2004, nonetheless also
showed that real inequality between the rich and poor has actually increased
during this time in forty-six of the fifty-nine developing countries sur-
veyed.22 Over the same period, a study by the International Monetary Fund
also found that ‘‘inequality has been rising in countries across all income
levels, except those classified as low income’’ and that overall ‘‘the income
share of the richest quintile has risen, whereas the shares of the remaining
quintiles have declined.’’23 That the two main representatives of capitalist
finance found rising inequality and a sharpening of the class divide despite
representing globalization as moving beyond class binaries is due to the fact
that the economic contradiction between capital and labor does not reside
at the level of the concept—that is, the conflict over globalization is not
simply a political or intellectual struggle over how to best define the term—
but rather in the property relations that enable the owners of the means of
production to accumulate capital at the expense of those who own only their
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labor power. As Marx argued more than one hundred fifty years ago and
which is proven once again by the increases in class inequality globally,
‘‘even the most favorable situation for the working class, namely, the most
rapid growth of capital, however much it may improve the material life of
the worker, does not abolish the antagonism between his interests and the
interests of the capitalist.’’24 Although developments of labor productivity
result in new, higher standards of living for some workers, these develop-
ments are always restricted under capitalism to the accumulation of surplus
value and thus it is always the directives of profit that will take precedence
over the needs of the working class.
Insofar as these social contradictions cannot simply be ignored if one is
to be taken seriously as a social critic, economic divisions have to be ex-
plained in terms that will be recognized institutionally as explanations of
the existing while at the same time reassuring everyone that the problem is
not with the economic status quo. This is the function of ideology: to make
the exploitation that is inherent in the exchange of labor for wages appear
as ‘‘fair’’ in the eyes of common sense. In this context, what one finds in the
most popular cultural and economic discourses is an inverted and distorted
representation of the existing social divisions which responds to actual de-
velopments in production but places the effects of exploitation in front of
the causes and substitutes a range of pluralizing concepts for social binaries
such as class. Instead of the rigid social structures of industrial/national/
analogue capitalism, we are told across a range of so-called progressive texts
that postindustrial /global/digital capitalism ‘‘transcends the ‘us’ versus
‘them’ dualism that prevails in cultural and political arenas,’’25 that ‘‘there
has been a sharp move . . . away from bipolarity and the coming into being
of a much more multipolar international circumstance,’’26 that ‘‘the notion
of class retains a material value which is indispensable to make sense of the
experience of concrete historical subjects’’ but ‘‘does not explain or make
sense of the heterogeneity and yet commonalities of Internet users,’’27 that
‘‘inequalities by no means disappear’’ but are ‘‘redefined in terms of an indi-
vidualization of social risks,’’28 that ‘‘class cannot be ignored’’ but that it ‘‘is
not the single, ultimately determining instance’’ of globalization,29 and if
class stratification still exists ‘‘that stratification pattern is now focused on
possibilities for consumption rather than production.’’30 Any theory of glob-
alization that situates the growing worldwide economic divisions as a result
of property relations at the point of production is defined as too reductive
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to effectively address the plurality of contesting forces engendered by the
process of globalization which ‘‘have arguably served to reinforce the sense
of the significance of identity and difference.’’31 Yet, class does not simply
disappear. Instead, class becomes in these discourses an amorphous and
fluid relation of power that has no recognizable ties in the mainstream read-
ings to capitalist exploitation. This is what has made the ideology of the
digital condition so effective for maintaining the status quo—it takes up
actual developments in production, but frames the entire debate and its
impact on global society as if there is no exploitation in the wage labor/
capital relation, and thus ultimately nothing wrong with the capitalist sys-
tem itself.
Globalization, particularly for many on the left, is situated instead as a
struggle for cultural hegemony between the homogenizing tendencies of
the global and the heterogeneous forces of the local.32 According to this
reading, the main problem with globalization is the dominance of the global
marketplace by Western commodities such as McDonald’s, the Gap, and
Coca-Cola and the threat that this cultural homogeneity poses to local di-
versity and difference. Against this corporate homogenization of culture,
the means for resistance are located in local acts of daily consumption that
take place in ‘‘the streets, the houses, the churches, the workplaces, the bars,
and the shops that lie beyond the business or tourist centers.’’33 George
Ritzer, for example, writes that ‘‘we live in an era in which, truly for the
first time, capitalism is unchained and free to roam the world in search of
both cheap production facilities and labor as well as new markets for its
producers.’’34 And yet, he concludes from this that ‘‘it is important not to
reduce all of this to (capitalist) economics alone.’’35 Instead, Ritzer argues
that too much attention has been paid to what he calls ‘‘productivism’’ when
the main battle today is between the homogenizing forces of ‘‘nothing,’’
which he defines as ‘‘centrally conceived and controlled social forms that
are comparatively devoid of distinctive substantive content,’’36 or ‘‘grobali-
zation’’37 and the resistance of ‘‘something,’’ defined as ‘‘a social form that
is generally indigenously conceived, controlled, and comparatively rich in
distinctive content’’38 or ‘‘glocalization.’’39 Based upon the reading of glob-
alization as the conflict between ‘‘grobalization’’ versus ‘‘glocalization,’’
Ritzer declares that to ‘‘go beyond capitalism’’40 is to find and celebrate a
series of ‘‘ethical’’ lifestyle choices of going to the ‘‘local farmers’ market,’’41
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‘‘flea markets, craft fairs, and co-ops,’’42 and above all becoming ‘‘craft con-
sumers . . . who single out parts, or a segment, of the available mountain of
nothingness and alter them, sometimes so dramatically that they become
virtually unrecognizable.’’43 According to Ritzer, it is the use of commodi-
ties by regular people, regardless of their class status, which shapes the
meaning of the commodity and thus provides the solution to corporate he-
gemony. It is, in short, a theory of spiritual values in the market place. What
matters is not the broader logic of production, but the local intentions of
the decidedly middle-class consumer. If those intentions are ‘‘ethical’’ or
‘‘creative’’—in other words, if they are spiritually just—then the problems
of inequality no longer carry material significance and class is simply one
difference among many. Differences, in this sense, are always local and re-
side on the surfaces of capital, in the spaces of cultural consumption.
On the right, one also finds economic differences rewritten as cultural
differences, and in many of the same terms, but the sides are reversed. In-
stead of the image of encroaching corporate homogenization led by the
United States imposing its cultural will on the local communities in the
South, it is precisely U.S. and European capital that is the guarantee of
heterogeneity and difference. As David Pryce-Jones writes in ‘‘Why They
Hate Us,’’ ‘‘Democracy means Us and Them. Yet nothing in the history or
the culture of Arabs and Muslims allows them to put this into any form of
political practice. From long ago they have inherited a cast-iron absolute
system, in which the ruler does as he pleases, and the rest have no redress,
indeed going to the wall.’’44 According to this logic, which has perhaps been
most popularly advanced in Samuel Huntington’s The Class of Civilizations,
global conflict is driven today by a cultural divide between the values of
‘‘democracy’’ and ‘‘free enterprise’’ in the West and authoritarian, closed,
anticapitalist regimes in the East. Huntington writes, ‘‘In the post–Cold
War world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideolog-
ical, political, or economic. They are cultural.’’45 It is in these terms that
Huntington rewrites social differences as cultural ones. He argues, ‘‘In this
new world the most pervasive, important, and dangerous conflicts will not
be between social classes, rich and poor, or other economically defined
groups, but between peoples belonging to different cultural entities.’’46
Again, sharpening global divisions are constructed as those between homo-
geneity and heterogeneity in which the West represents a heterogeneous
civilization of ‘‘democracy, free markets, limited government, human rights,
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individualism, the rule of law’’ with the ‘‘Rest’’ who are said to represent
homogenized societies opposed to such values.47 These divisions are then
naturalized as the source of capitalist development and expansion—an up-
dated version of Weber’s ‘‘protestant ethic’’ in which values and attitudes
produce reality, rather than reality as the source of ideas. Although Hun-
tington himself believes it to be ‘‘immoral’’ to impose Western cultural val-
ues on the East (for the ‘‘paternalistic’’ reason that the East is not
‘‘prepared’’ or ‘‘interested’’ in any form of ‘‘democracy’’ or ‘‘human rights’’)
others on the right, such as ‘‘anglobalization’’ historian Niall Ferguson, take
this thesis and argue that globalization is the means by which to spread
through a new colonial project the culture of democracy, free markets, and
individual liberty to what he describes as the ‘‘failed states’’ of the global
South that lack the ‘‘cultural values’’ of the global North.48
In the substitution of the discourse of culture and values for class rela-
tions what is placed outside the boundaries of ‘‘real’’ discourse by both the
left and the right is any theory of globalization as imperialism, in which the
drive of capital expansion is explained as a necessary effect of the material
conditions for the further accumulation of capital. This is what has made
globalization such an effective concept for global capital—it substitutes for
economic imperialism a world of spiritual conflicts and cultural bargains. In
this context, while a number on the right are calling for reconsideration of
imperialism as a way of spreading democracy, many on the left have simply
abandoned the theory of imperialism and argue, as Pieterse does, that ‘‘the
term imperialism may no longer be adequate to address the present situa-
tion . . . [which] is less coherent and less purposeful than imperialism.’’49
Or, as Hardt and Negri put it more succinctly, ‘‘imperialism is over.’’50
To draw connections between the global expansion of capitalism and rising
inequality is to be too reductive and trapped in the metanarratives of the
past. Instead, a digital world is described as ‘‘multidimensional,’’51 ‘‘without
borders and spatial boundaries,’’52 and ‘‘a complex, overlapping, disjunctive
order, which cannot be understood in terms of existing center-periphery
models.’’53 What is at stake for both the right and the left in deploying the
rhetoric of cultural difference as a substitute for class divisions is obscuring
the economic realities of imperialism in order to maintain the illusion of
the possibility of capitalism without exploitation.
In contrast to these narratives, which are what might be called superficial
readings in the sense of describing rather than analyzing recent economic
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developments and therefore remaining on the surfaces of society instead of
addressing its fundamental logic, I argue that by going global capitalism has
become more itself, not less, and that the most effective means for under-
standing the role of new digital technologies for global interests of capital
remains the historical materialist theorization of imperialism. While the
dominant approach to the issue of globalization obscures any discussion of
the material conditions in which global society is currently being produced
by inverting the relationship between culture and the economic, what is
represented as the emergence of a fundamentally new moment in capitalism
based in communication technologies, cultural and economic networks, and
immaterial labor is best understood as the global mode of accumulation
corresponding to the stage of monopoly capitalism as explained by Lenin
in Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism: namely the increasing con-
centration and centralizing of production in monopolies, the subsequent
development of finance capital and the export of capital to regions in the
Third World required by the rising level of organic capital in the First
World, and the division of the world’s markets and resources between the
economic monopolies. What makes such a view so controversial today is
that while theories of globalization have increasingly had to attend to the
growing contradictions of global capitalism—marked, for example, by the
recent publication of four different books entitled Globalization and its Dis-
contents, including books by Joseph Stieglitz, Saskia Sassen, Roger Burbach
(with Orlando Nunez and Boris Kargarlitsky), and Stephen McBride and
John Wiseman—it still remains almost universally accepted, even among
more radical social theorists who argue that capitalism is a global system of
exploitation, that the labor theory of value, which Marx and Lenin argue is
essential to understanding why capital must expand globally and why it can
be transformed into socialism, no longer has any explanatory value.54 In-
stead, as Žižek claims, ‘‘the rise of ‘intellectual labor’ . . . to a hegemonic
position’’ effectively ‘‘undermines the standard notion of exploitation, since
it is no longer labor-time which serves as the source and ultimate measure
of value.’’55
In contrast to the dominant cultural readings of globalization in which
the culture, politics, and economics of globalization exist in ‘‘overdeter-
mined’’ relation to one another, I argue that it is necessary to return to the
work of Marx and Lenin to explain why globalization is a social theory
whose meaning is determined by property relations, in the division between
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those who own and control the means of production and those who own
only their labor power, and furthermore to show that this view is supported
by the actual developments of the global economy in the post–World War
II period. What one finds is that in contrast to the end-of-imperialism nar-
rative, capitalism has in actuality become even more universal than ever
before. In order to develop this thesis, I address two aspects of mainstream
globalization theory in which digital technologies play a particularly central
role. First, I address the digital theory of networks, and in particular the
theories of Manuel Castells and Thomas L. Friedman, because of the way
in which the image of the network increasingly operates as both the meta-
phor for, as well as the new managerial logic of, global capitalism. Following
this, I take up the theory, advanced most prominently in the work of Mi-
chael Hardt and Antonio Negri, that global capitalism is increasingly de-
pendent upon immaterial labor and that this new economic source of value
brings about the blurring of the class divide. What I show is that the devel-
opment of mass production and exchange on a global scale, which is central
to the arguments that network capitalism has replaced imperialism as the
logic of globalization, cannot in itself constitute a break from the funda-
mental structures of capitalist society such that production and labor are
replaced by consumption and immaterial labor, nor is this break supported
statistically. Through an analysis of the arguments that the culmination of
the globalization lies in the production of a postclass, postcapitalist, postim-
perialist network economy, I argue that what is at stake in reading globaliza-
tion is the question of the organization of production in society: whether
society will continue to be divided in terms of owners and workers or, on
the contrary, whether the inequality of class society will be transformed
through the collectivity of the international working class.
The Ideology of New Economic Formations
The dominant ideology today is that the labor theory of value has lost its
explanatory effectivity because globalization represents a fundamental
transformation in the relations between capital and labor resulting from the
shift from an industrial, to a postindustrial, and now to a digital economy
in which value is created not through the exploitation of labor but the gen-
eration of knowledge and the consumption of commodities. More specifi-
cally, the emergence of globalization as ‘‘the concept, the key idea by which
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we understand the transition of human society into the third millennium’’56
is said to correspond to the development of a new economic dynamic de-
fined by the evaporation of social boundaries of nationality, ethnicity, class,
and region and the opening of cultural flows across all borders. This view
is shared by cultural theorists and management theorists alike. In The Global
Market, for example, management theorists John Quelch and Rohit Desh-
pande differentiate between globalization and previous forms of interna-
tional and transnational production on the grounds that ‘‘globalization
implies economic activity in the absence of national boundaries, whereas
internationalization implies an increasing number of transactions across the
borders of nation-states.’’57 Similarly, Mike Featherstone describes global-
ization in the introduction to Global Culture as ‘‘cultural integration and
cultural disintegration processes which take place not only on an inter-state
level, but processes which transcend the state-society unit and can therefore
be held to occur on a trans-national or trans-societal level.’’58
Perhaps the most influential of the early postnational theorists of global-
ization is management guru Kenichi Ohmae who in The Borderless World
and The End of the Nation State argues that the expansion of capital globally
effectively draws a close to the historical necessity of the nation-state. Ac-
cording to Ohmae, capitalism is increasingly organized around regions
rather than states and, in turn, nation-states ‘‘need to cede meaningful oper-
ational authority to the wealth-generating region states that lie within or
across their borders.’’59 This is because, Ohmae argues, ‘‘in terms of real
flows of economic activity, nation states have already lost their role as mean-
ingful units of participation in the global economy of today’s borderless
world.’’60 Instead, in his work as a management theorist and consultant to
global corporations, Ohmae proposes that capital needs to move towards an
‘‘interlinked’’ economic model in which goods and companies ‘‘change
hands across borders as easily as paintings, patents, and real estate.’’61 This
postnational economy is premised upon the ability to generate more value
outside of the imperialist model of globalization in circuits of trade and
exchange, if imperialism is understood solely in terms of direct colonialism.
‘‘Wealth,’’ he writes, ‘‘is now created in the marketplace rather than in colo-
nies and in soils that contain natural resources.’’62 What the ‘‘borderless’’
theory of globalization is responding to is the reorganization of production
globally in the post–World War II period, in which the global integration
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of production and markets that exists at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury and which sharply declines with two intra-imperialist wars and the col-
lapse of the colonial division of the world begins to re-emerge in the 1950s
and which receives a sharp boost postcolonial, post–Cold War era of the
twenty-first century. This theory ideologically disconnects the expansion of
global capital from the logic of exploitation in order to represent as new
what is necessary for capitalist production—the constant global search for
cheaper sources of labor and raw materials.
The fact that capital is a global system is not new. As Marx and Engels
wrote more than one hundred fifty years ago, ‘‘The need for a constantly
expanding market chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the
globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections
everywhere.’’63 What we are witnessing, then, is not a new social formation,
but a heightening of the inherent tendencies of capitalist production. It is
at the beginning of the twentieth century that, while the logic of capitalism
does not change, one starts to see the global logic of capital as theorized by
Marx and Engels become the dominant mode of organizing production. As
Chris Harman describes,
Until the 1880s most industries consisted of a multiplicity of small producing
units. This began to change at the end of the century with the concentration of
production within each major company into trusts and combines which set out
to conquer world markets from rivals abroad.64
Similarly, Hirst and Thompson mark that from the emergence of manufac-
turing multinationals in the second half of the nineteenth century, ‘‘interna-
tional business activity grew vigorously in the 1920s as the truly diversified
and integrated MNC matured, but it slowed down during the depressed
1930s and war-torn 1940s.’’65 Although global capital expansion slows in
the middle of the twentieth century as a result of the capitalist World Wars,
in the 1960s the levels of international integration of production and trade
start to return to the pre–World War I levels.66 What happens in the post–
World War II period, emerging first in the United States and later in Eu-
rope and Japan, is a restructuring of the global economy enabled by
investment in technology during the war, increasing productivity, and the
availability of capital for investment abroad. The first evidence of this global
restructuring emerges during what is known as the long boom, the period
between between 1950 and 1973 when ‘‘the advanced capitalist world expe-
rienced record rates of growth’’67 and investment in developing new areas
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of production outside of the home market surged. For example, ‘‘between
1957 and 1968, manufacturing investment by majority-owned foreign affil-
iates of US companies in new plant and equipment overseas grew at an
astonishing annual rate of 15.7 per cent.’’68 As the long boom gave way to
global economic downturn after 1973, due more to a falling rate of profit
and subsequent crisis of overproduction than the oil crisis alone as Duménil
and Lévy convincingly argue,69 it is in the 1980s that capital once again
begins to restructure and return to the development of global manufacture,
aided in part by advances in computers and telecommunications that ‘‘made
possible unprecedented levels of coordination between geographically sepa-
rated productive units.’’70 For example, in a sector of the economy not nor-
mally considered part of the digital revolution but nonetheless effected by
it, ‘‘ocean freight costs per short ton, in 1990 U.S. dollars, have come down
to less than $30 in 2000, having been $100 in 1930’’ because of ‘‘the devel-
opment of new technologies in transport and telecommunications.’’71
The developments in digital technologies (computing and telecommuni-
cations) and a slow growth in both levels of productivity and the rate of
profit during the 1970s results in the necessity for finding the most effective
use of technology and capital reserves for expanding capitalist production.
It is in this climate that one begins to find in the 1980s the emergence of
‘‘borderless’’ theories of organizing production on a global scale. As devel-
opments in technology enable corporations to advance the global division
of labor, what becomes necessary is the development of economic and social
theories that can theorize how to put labor, technology, and capital reserves
to their most productive use. It is in this sense that contemporary cultural
theory reflects the development of new forms of organization of labor. The
concept of the network has emerged to explain the global expansion of capi-
tal, the importance of digital technologies to this growth, as well as the
means by which this growth is separated at the level of ideas from the grow-
ing levels of inequality between capital and labor that have developed over
the same period.
Networks, Supply Chains, and the Labor Theory of Value
The concept of a network structure is defined as ‘‘a collection of links be-
tween elements of a unit.’’72 In simple modes of organization, such as those
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between the elements or parts of an atom, it is argued that a hierarchical or
static set of relations is adequate to account for the connections between
elements. ‘‘When matter becomes more complex,’’ however, network theo-
rists argue that it becomes necessary to develop more complex forms of
organization that can ‘‘produce order out of chaos’’ by linking the elements
in a more dynamic fashion.73 That is to say, a network is a conceptual struc-
ture in which, rather than a hierarchical or vertical organization of agents
or information, the system consists of semiautonomous but interconnected
nodes, each with a productive, yet transitional, relation to the whole. The
image of society as a network has become so popular, in fact, that one finds
it not only within the discourses of digital culture and corporate manage-
ment theory, but also as the basis of a new historiography (Mattelart’s Net-
working the World, 1794–2000), a new biology (Johnson’s Emergence: The
Connected Lives of Ants, Brains, Cities and Software), and a new sociology (Bar-
abási’s Linked: How Everything Is Connected to Everything Else). What links
these accounts of contemporary society is the idea that the history of human
society is best conceptualized as increasingly driven by an overdetermined
set of social interactions in which politics, culture, and economics exist in an
interrelated and interconnected web without any determinacy. As Tiziana
Terranova argues,
To think of something like a ‘‘network culture’’ at all, to dare to give one name
to the heterogeneous assemblage that is contemporary global culture, is to try to
think simultaneously the singular and the multiple, the common and the unique.
When seen close up in detail, contemporary culture (at all scales from the local
to the global) appears as a kaleidoscope of differences and bewildering heteroge-
neity . . . each with its own identity and structure, they appear to us as a mesh-
work of overlapping cultural formations, of hybrid reinventions, cross-
pollinations and singular variations.74
For Terranova, the network represents the emergence of a new social for-
mation in which binaries such as the local and the global, the past and the
future, the inside and the outside, and owner and worker have lost their
material force and instead are replaced with a constantly changing series of
relations without a singular organizational principle. The attractiveness of
such a concept for organizing production is that it corresponds to the ability
capital has acquired in the digital age to move resources more effectively to
where they can be put to the most profitable use. As Chwo-Ming Joseph
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Yu writes, ‘‘a network approach, focusing on patterns of relationships that
surrounds a firm, has captured the attention of academics and business writ-
ers’’ because of the way in which ‘‘vertically disaggregated and spatially con-
centrated production networks are sometimes a more viable and often
desirable alternative to the vertically integrated corporation.’’75 With this
new form of capital and market integration, it is argued that a network logic
calls into question all hierarchical social relations as well as deeper class
divisions and replaces them with a rhizomatic series of interconnections
without any singular organizing logic such as exploitation.76 In other words,
the development of network capitalism is supposed to mean the end of a
binary class relation between capital and labor and, in turn, the conditions
of monopoly capital that result in imperialist conflict.
In his book The Rise of the Network Society, foundational network theorist
Manuel Castells advances the idea that developments in information tech-
nology are transforming ‘‘the material basis of society’’77 from the industrial
age of labor and production to an informational age of knowledge and cul-
tural exchange. As a result of the application of new scientific developments
in communication and management technologies to production, he writes,
‘‘a new economy has emerged in the last two decades on a worldwide scale.
I call it informational and global to identify its fundamental distinctive fea-
tures and to emphasize their intertwining.’’78 Although Castells writes that
‘‘for the first time in history, the capitalist mode of production shapes social
relationships over the entire planet’’79—meaning that the social and politi-
cal changes we are witnessing are, in essence, the effects of the economic
motives of capitalism—he also argues that what differentiates the new ‘‘in-
formational’’ stage of capitalism80 from previous modes of production is the
way in which information has become ‘‘the key ingredient of our social
organization’’ and ‘‘flows of messages and images between networks consti-
tute the basic thread of our social existence.’’81 According to Castells, the
social and cultural changes resulting from technological advances in pro-
duction and communication represent not just a development within capi-
talist relations, but a more fundamental social restructuring in which
‘‘money has become almost entirely independent from production’’ and
‘‘the social relationships between capital and labor are profoundly trans-
formed.’’82 That is to say, the organization of production according to the
logic of networks means not only new ways of managing business. It is
ushering in a fundamental change to social relations in which capitalism
PAGE 65................. 18088$ $CH2 08-04-11 13:44:08 PS
66 Global Networks and the Materiality of Immaterial Labor
itself becomes virtually unrecognizable. While, he argues, capitalism in the
pre-Industrial and Industrial Age depended upon a strict property relation
between owners and workers, he proposes that network capitalism blurs
such class divisions by opening the production of capital to the flows of
finance and thus to a more plural theory of ownership in which anyone with
access to culture (and credit) can participate in the shaping of its meaning.
‘‘In the new informational mode of development,’’ Castells writes, ‘‘the
source of productivity lies in the technology of knowledge generation, in-
formation processing, and symbol communication’’83 and value is ‘‘mainly
generated by innovation.’’84 For Castells, then, what is significant about the
emergence of global economic networks is the way in which they destabilize
class relations by creating new sources of value in cultural exchange that,
insofar as they are ‘‘enacted by informational networks in the timeless space
of financial flows,’’85 no longer depend upon the extraction of surplus value
from the labor of workers. Instead, the new universality of capitalism is
founded on the interconnection of informational networks and the global
flows of messages and images; in short, on expanding the avenues of con-
sumption after production. On these terms, instead of a class conflict over
the control of the means of production, Castells describes global capitalism
as a cultural struggle over consumption between the ‘‘interacting,’’ who, he
argues, are able to ‘‘selec[t] their multidirectional circuits of communica-
tion,’’86 and the ‘‘interacted,’’ who are limited to ‘‘a restricted number of
prepackaged choices.’’87 As a result, he concludes, ‘‘the new economy can-
not be characterized as being centered any longer on multinational corpora-
tions, even if they continue to exercise jointly oligopolistic control over
most markets . . . because corporations have transformed themselves into
a web of multiple networks embedded into a multiplicity of institutional
environments’’88 and that ‘‘who are the owners, who the producers, who the
managers, and who the servants, becomes increasingly blurred in a produc-
tion system of variable geometry, of teamwork, of networking, outsourcing,
and subcontracting.’’89 In a posthierarchical organization of production and
exchange, Castells writes, ‘‘who are the winners and the losers changes by
the year, the month, the day, the second . . . ’’90 because,
under the new technological, organizational, and economic conditions . . . the
capitalists . . . are certainly not the legal owners of the means of production, who
range from your/my pension fund to a passerby in a Singapore ATM deciding
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to buy stock . . . yet neither are the corporate managers . . . for managers control
specific corporations, and specific segments of the global economy, but do not
control, and do not even know about, the actual, systematic movements of capital
in networks of financial flows, of knowledge in the information networks, of
strategies in the multifaceted set of network enterprises.91
It is this ‘‘blurring’’ of social relations, particularly within the social division
of labor, which is said to be the defining characteristic of network capital-
ism. While, on the one hand, the network is theorized by Castells as the
thousands of business and communities linked up in a vast global communi-
cations systems, he also situates it as something more: The primary feature
of a network society is an increasingly decentralized set of relations without
a determining locus or center. ‘‘A network architecture,’’ he writes, ‘‘cannot
be controlled from any center, and is made up of thousands of autonomous
computer networks that have innumerable ways to link up, going around
electronic barriers.’’92 It is,
a culture of the ephemeral, a culture of strategic decision, a patchwork of experi-
ences and interests, rather than a charter of rights and obligations. It is a multi-
faceted, virtual culture, as in visual experiences created by computers in
cyberspace by rearranging reality.93
The key to understanding the logic of this argument is the way in which
the fluid, ephemeral nature of the network—in which any connection, re-
gardless of how big or how small its initial capital, has the opportunity to
generate new and innovative ideas without having to depend upon either
the productivity of labor—is said to bring an end to the domination of the
more hierarchical modes of organization and the rise of more flexible and
adaptable modes of organization which can ‘‘survive and prosper in a fast
changing environment.’’94 In other words, the network society is under-
stood to be a more flexible mode of economic and social organization be-
cause it creates a structure that can more quickly adapt to local changes.
According to this logic, because the network expands horizontally rather
than vertically anyone can enter and thus fundamentally transform the
structure of the network because the structure of the network is never finally
determined and is therefore not bound to any particular formal arrange-
ment. In the new economic model of network capitalism, this argument
goes, property relations are no longer determinant of who controls the
economy—class is no longer an objective relation determined at the point
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of production, but rather a matter of access to knowledge and thus, in the
most basic terms, all that matters is a good idea. Or, as Steve Lohr argues,
the network society represents ‘‘a big step in the democratization of infor-
mation technology’’ because:
The old story of technology in business was a trickle-down affair. From tele-
phones to computers, big companies came first. They could afford the latest
innovations, and they reaped the benefits of greater efficiency, increased sales
and expansion into distant markets. . . . Now that pattern is being challenged by
a bottom-up revolution . . . a cost leveling that puts small companies on equal
footing with big ones, making it easier for upstarts to innovate, disrupt industries
and even get big fast.95
The most popular version of this narrative is advanced by Thomas L. Fried-
man, the foreign affairs columnist for the New York Times and winner of
three Pulitzer prizes for his work on globalization. What has made Fried-
man’s work so popular is the way in which it normalizes economic rela-
tions by presenting them in an anecdotal fashion, thereby making the
unnatural relations of capitalism appear more natural because we are
meant to read his stories as front-line reports unmediated by the abstrac-
tions of theory. Yet, the fact that he essentially vetted his book The World
Is Flat with leading capitalists such as Bill Gates, Michael Dell, and the
strategic planning committee of IBM before publishing it, demonstrates
clearly that despite his rhetorical populism, his discourse is firmly on the
side of capital.96
In The World Is Flat, Friedman puts forward his take on network capital-
ism as the ‘‘flattening of the world.’’ He observes, ‘‘we are now connecting
all the knowledge centers on the planet together into a single global net-
work, which—if politics and terrorism do not get in the way—could usher
in an amazing era of prosperity and innovation.’’97 In particular, Friedman
advertises the emerging network society as creating a capitalism that is more
than ever working in the interests of the individual because more than ever
the individual is in control of their labor. The network society, he states, is
dependent upon ‘‘the new found power for individuals to collaborate and
compete globally . . . Individuals must, and can, now ask where do I fit into
the global competition and opportunities of the day, and how can I, on
my own, collaborate with others globally.’’98 And, reminiscent of Castells’
argument, Friedman maintains that this new structure means the end of
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rigid and unequal social hierarchies: ‘‘Everywhere you turn, hierarchies are
being challenged from below or transforming themselves from top-down
structures into more horizontal and collaborative ones.’’99
At the center of Friedman’s theory of the flat world is the supply chain,
which he describes as ‘‘a method of collaborating horizontally—among sup-
pliers, retailers, and customers—to create value.’’100 The importance of the
supply chain for Friedman is that it combines the technological develop-
ments of the digital age with the open borders of the post–Cold War period.
The primary example he uses is Wal-Mart, ‘‘the biggest and most profitable
retailer on the planet.’’101 Over the past two decades, Friedman argues, Wal-
Mart has been at the forefront of the network society:
In 1983, Wal-Mart invested in point-of-sale terminals, which simultaneously
rang up sales and tracked inventory deductions for rapid supply. Four years later,
it installed a large-scale satellite system linking all of the stores to company head-
quarters, giving Wal-Mart’s central computer system real-time inventory data
and paving the way for a supply chain greased by information and humming
down to the last atom of efficiency . . . Now Wal-Mart, in its latest supply-chain
innovation, has introduced RFID—radio frequency identification microchips,
attached to each pallet and merchandise box that comes into Wal-Mart [ . . .
which . . . ] allows Wal-Mart to track any pallet or box at each stage in its supply
chain and know exactly what product from which manufacturer is inside.102
What the supply chain represents, according to Friedman, is a more open
and democratic way of organizing capitalist production, one that benefits
both workers and owners equally. On the business side, supply chains pro-
mote the universalization of the most effective productive practices for
capital:
Supply-chaining is both enabled by the flattening of the world and a hugely
important flattener itself, because the more these supply chains grow and prolif-
erate, the more they force the adoption of common standards between compa-
nies (so that every link of the supply chain can interface with the next), the more
they eliminate points of friction at borders, the more the efficiencies of one com-
pany get adopted by the others, and the more they encourage global
collaboration.103
On labor’s side, even if Friedman finds that Wal-Mart is an example of
extreme corporate ‘‘ruthlessness’’ in its treatment of workers,104 he writes
that supply chains are the great global equalizer ‘‘because they deliver us all
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sorts of goods—from tennis shoes to laptop computers—at lower and lower
prices.’’105
Ultimately, the theory of a ‘‘flat world’’ is most dismissive of the theory
of imperialism. In the example of Wal-Mart, Friedman describes how trade
between Japan and the United States was first established at the end of a
bayonet, but has since become a more ‘‘co-operative’’ exchange. He writes,
‘‘Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry opened a largely closed Japanese
society to the Western world on July 8, 1853 when he arrived in Edo
(Tokyo) Bay with four big black steamships bristling with guns.’’106 Of
course, as might be expected given Friedman’s defense of corporate global-
ization generally and his importance as a popularizer of this reading for
capital, this forced exchange was not really a problem because it ‘‘led to an
explosion of trade between Japan and the United States, helped open Japan
to the Western world generally, and is widely credited with triggering the
modernization of the Japanese state, as the Japanese realized how far behind
they were and rushed to catch up.’’107 Leaving aside the irony that Fried-
man’s theory of the supply chain was, in fact, first developed in Japan and
was initially seen as a threat by U.S. capitalists to their economic domi-
nance,108 what is more significant at the moment is how supply chain de-
mocracy differs from even the ‘‘beneficial’’ imperialism of an earlier age.
Friedman writes, ‘‘Unlike Commodore Perry, Wal-Mart did not have to
muscle its way into Japan with warships. Its reputation preceded it, which is
why it was invited in by Seiyu, a struggling Japanese retail chain desperate
to adapt the Wal-Mart formula in Japan.’’109 This image corresponds more
broadly with the peaceful integration of markets that Friedman argues will
emerge from network capitalism. He argues, ‘‘No two countries that are
both part of a major global supply chain . . . will ever fight a war against
each other as long as they are both part of the same global supply chain.’’110
It is this image of network capitalism as a postclass, postcapitalist, post-
imperialist, and postconflict stage of production that is most useful for capi-
tal today because of the way in which it addresses the surface developments
of capitalism—relative growth in cross-border trade, the emergence of out-
sourcing as a result of advances in technology and communications, and the
formation of international finance treaties—while isolating these develop-
ments from the underlying logic of capitalism itself, claiming that whatever
happens in the economy—whether it is the re-emergence of global conflict
or the rising levels of inequality—is not connected to the exploitation of
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labor which drives the capitalist engine. That is to say, what Friedman and
Castells promote as the ‘‘control’’ over their labor that network capitalism
offers more workers than ever is in reality the same control that capital has
always offered workers; namely, the ‘‘freedom’’ that is offered under the
condition of survival to sell their labor power for a wage. If this form of
control is available to more workers around the world, as Castells and Fried-
man argue, this does not mean that capitalism no longer requires exploita-
tion to generate profit. Rather, it means that capital now exploits the labor
of more workers than it ever has before. In contrast to Castells’ and Fried-
man’s popular reading of globalization, which promotes the ideology of the
‘‘fairness’’ in the relation between capital and labor, I argue that it is neces-
sary to return to the theory which so many on both the left and the right
argue is outdated—namely Lenin’s theory of imperialism—because it will
enable us to go beneath the surfaces of globalization to counter the first
argument that globalization has nothing to do with the imperialism of the
past.
Globalization as Imperialism
Imperialism, as Lenin explained, is the competition of transnational capital-
ists in their attempts to monopolize social resources and to establish their
dictatorship of the free market around the world. The monopolization of
capital emerges from within the capitalist mode of production as a logical
outcome of the division of property between owners of the means of pro-
duction and owners of nothing but labor power and the private accumula-
tion of capital that this relation engenders. The problem with the idea
advanced by network theorists that the relation between capital and labor is
transformed through the introduction of new means of production that not
only extend the capitalist system across the globe but transform it from an
exploitative system to a fluid system of oscillating power relations is that
capitalism is defined neither by the kinds of technique used in the produc-
tion of commodities nor by the geographic distribution of production.
These are features of changes in the modes of accumulation used to extract
surplus value but not in the underlying logic of how and why labor relations
under capitalism result in the production of surplus value. As Marx explains
in Capital, what differentiates labor power, defined as ‘‘the aggregate of
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those mental and physical capabilities existing in a human being,’’111 from
all other commodities is that it ‘‘not only produces its own value, but pro-
duces value over and above it.’’112 In the most basic terms of the free market,
capitalists hire workers to work for a set period of time, regardless of the
value their labor produces. While on the surface it appears a fair exchange,
it is not. Rather, the ability of the worker to produce more than the cost of
the wage during the period of his or her daily employment means that the
capitalist is able to appropriate the additional value the worker produces
in manufacturing new commodities from the raw and semimanufactured
materials which the capitalist has purchased. This period of time Marx calls
the ‘‘working day,’’ the division of time between the period for which the
worker produces to reproduce the conditions of labor that is received in the
wage and the period for which the worker produces surplus value which is
appropriated by the capitalist. As such, it is in the capitalist’s best interest
to increase the rate of exploitation—the amount of surplus over necessary
labor time—so as to increase the production of surplus value. This is accom-
plished two ways: first, by lengthening the time in which the labor force
works (‘‘absolute surplus value’’) and, second, by increasing the productivity
of labor through the introduction and development of new means of pro-
duction (‘‘relative surplus value’’). As the capitalist introduces new technol-
ogies, the productivity of labor increases, enabling the capitalist to produce
more commodities and, in turn, capture a larger share of the market as long
as the relative technological advantage is maintained. When a market is
relatively new and the competition among capitals has not fully developed,
the rate of profit is high because the amount of capital necessary to establish
the production process is low and the amount of labor employed in produc-
tion is high. However, other capitalists do not remain stagnant and either
adopt the technological improvements of their rivals, or are purchased by
their more productive and more profitable competitors. As competition in-
creases, each capitalist is forced to introduce new technologies, which, al-
though they drive down the cost of labor by intensifying production, also
have the consequence of increasing the costs of production and introduce
the simultaneous effect of eliminating the primary source of value—labor.
In fact, the contradictions between labor and capital are actually exacer-
bated and not lessened by increased technological development because
technological advances in production are the means by which capitalism
increases the productivity of labor and thus the rate of exploitation. The
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computer does not change the logic of wage-labor, in other words, merely
the speed and productive ability of the workers using it. In addition, it is
precisely because the exploitation of labor is the source of surplus value
under capitalism that developments in production also enable the geograph-
ical reorganization of production—what Castells calls capitalism’s ‘‘variable
geometry’’113—so as to maximize profits through such labor practices as
outsourcing and subcontracting which are designed not only to create com-
petition between workers to prevent them from collectively organizing
against capital across national boundaries but to find or create cheaper
sources of labor as a means of maximizing profit. Just as the development of
capitalism on a ‘‘national’’ scale meant brutal competition to gain monopoly
control over production and thus take ‘‘more or less complete possession of
the industry of their own country,’’114 Lenin’s analysis of monopoly capital
explains why the increasing development of capitalism means the inevitable
drive of capitalists to compete globally for access to cheaper sources of labor
and thus to control the rate of exploitation.
Imperialism, as Lenin outlines, is the direct effect of the necessity of
capitalism to counter a falling rate of profit through the exploitation of
cheaper sources of labor power and securing monopoly prices over social
resources. He writes:
The principal feature of the latest stage of capitalism is the domination of
monopolist associations of big employers. These monopolies are most firmly
established when all the sources of raw materials are captured by one group, and
we have seen with what zeal the international capitalist associations exert every
effort to deprive their rivals of all opportunity of competing, to buy up, for
example, ironfields, oilfields, etc. Colonial possession alone gives the monopolies
complete guarantee against all contingencies in the struggle against competitors,
including the case of the adversary wanting to be protected by a law establishing
a state monopoly. The more capitalism is developed, the more strongly the
shortage of raw materials is felt, the more intense the competition and the hunt
for sources of raw materials throughout the whole world, the more desperate the
struggle for the acquisition of colonies.115
If it is to increase profits, capital must constantly search for new markets to
find cheaper sources of raw materials, increase and develop production, and
drive down the costs of labor power. Imperialism is thus the necessary out-
come of the development of the productivity of labor under the conditions
of private ownership, in which ‘‘the uneven and spasmodic development of
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individual enterprises, individual branches of industry and individual coun-
tries’’116 necessarily leads to an accumulation of ‘‘an enormous ‘surplus of cap-
ital’ ’’117 in the hands of the ruling class that becomes more profitable by
moving to less developed areas than it does by remaining in highly developed
and monopolized areas of production. In other words, as history has shown,
capital can achieve higher rates of profit by moving to areas in which ‘‘capital
is scarce, the price of land is relatively low, wages are low, [and] raw materials
are cheap’’118 than it can by remaining in highly developed and monopolized
areas of production. This goes back to the discussion of surplus value and
what Marx theorizes ‘‘the tendency of the rate of profit to fall.’’119 As the level
of constant capital—the amount needed to invest in production—rises in a
particular industry, the lower the amount of variable capital—the amount in-
vested in labor—that is necessary. Marx called this ratio of constant to vari-
able capital the ‘‘organic composition of capital.’’ Improvements in the means
of production enable a particular capitalist to (momentarily) undercut his
competitors by producing more for the same price, thereby driving them
from the market and gaining a monopoly share. Yet, at the same time, the
more productive labor becomes and the more the cost of investment in fixed
capital rises, the more commodities the capitalist must sell in order to achieve
the rates of profit that existed prior to intensification of production. Thus,
while any one capitalist may be able to accumulate a larger mass of surplus
value than before by gaining monopoly control of the market, the rate of
profit available in the industry declines overall. Furthermore, when the rate
of profit is high in a particular industry, eventually investment capital comes
flooding in, leading to a leveling of the competitive advantage of the early
adopter of new technologies and a saturation of the market. Both of these
factors combined—the rising organic composition of capital and the direct
competition between capitals over control of the market—ultimately leads to
a crisis of overproduction driven by a reduction in the rate of profit.
This process which requires the holders of accumulated, but unproduc-
tive capital, to find new avenues of production—and the accumulation of
new value—has two primary factors. First, as Lenin writes, ‘‘The necessity
of exporting capital arises from the fact that in a few countries capitalism
has become ‘over-ripe’ and . . . capital cannot find ‘profitable’ investment’’
at home and thus must go abroad.120 Second, it leads to development of
what Lenin defines as ‘‘finance capitalism’’ which is the combination of
banking and industrial capital that results from an increase in the capital
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accumulated through advances in production and the need to find new ave-
nues for the profitability of unproductive capital. As Ernest Mandel ex-
plains, ‘‘The export of capital and the colonialism associated with it are
monopoly capital’s reaction to the fall in the average rate of profit in highly
industrialized metropolitan countries, and to the reduction in profitable
fields of investment of capital in these countries.’’121 That is to say, having
divided ‘‘the home market among themselves and obtained more or less
complete possession of the industry of their own country’’ capital must ex-
pand outside of the home market to find new avenues for profitability
abroad.122 This expansion is what Lenin defines as the logic of imperialism:
Imperialism is capitalism at that stage of development at which the dominance
of monopolies and finance capital is established; in which the export of capital
has acquired pronounced importance; in which the division of the world among
the international trusts has begun; in which the divisionof all territories of the
globe among the biggest capitalist powers has been completed.123
Despite his disagreement with the labor theory of value and the idea that
rising levels of organic capital lead to a fall in the rate of profit124, Robert
Brenner’s analysis of capital expansion in the twentieth century in The Eco-
nomics of Global Turbulence nonetheless demonstrates precisely this logic at
work in spite of his objections. Beginning from the start of the period
known as the long boom, we find that ‘‘between 1940 and 1945, the rate of
profit for the private economy was, on average, some 50 percent above its
level in 1929 and 60–70 percent higher than the average for the years 1900–
1929.’’125 This ‘‘epoch-making’’ level of profitability, in turn, was driven by
and resulted in the massive investment in developing the means of produc-
tion, so as to increase the productivity of labor. In fact, ‘‘over the years
1938–1950, gross investment in both the private economy and the manufac-
turing sector grew at an average rate of around 11 percent’’ meaning that
‘‘output per hour increased 2.7 per cent in the private business economy
and in manufacturing—3.8 per cent and 5.5 per cent for these sectors, re-
spectively, in the four years between 1946 and 1950.’’126 In other words, a
high rate of profit at the start of the cycle led to increasing investment
which, in turn, had the effect of increasing the productivity of labor, the
source of new value. Yet, as the labor theory of value and the tendency for
the rate of profit to fall explain, this level of productivity and profit cannot
be indefinitely maintained. First, the massive growth in productivity during
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this period and the rising level of investment required to maintain this level
of productivity meant that U.S. corporations found less return in investing
at home rather than investing in the rebuilding markets of Germany and
Japan. As the long boom unfolded, U.S. capital was, according to Brenner,
‘‘increasingly attracted to the superior opportunities for profit-making
overseas, especially in Europe, where they could combine relatively cheap
labour with relatively advanced technology and produce against relatively
weak competitors in rapidly growing markets,’’127 leading to an increase in
the export of capital abroad and, eventually, the establishment and disband-
ing of the Breton-Woods agreement in 1973. Second, as the productivity of
labor in Germany and Japan grew as a result of the newly imported capital
and technology, the corporations in these countries then flooded the market
with even cheaper commodities, further driving down the rate of profit.
The declining rates of profit globally and the subsequent crisis of overpro-
duction is what ultimately led to the long downturn, the period from 1973 to
the mid-1990s. From 1973–1984, as Duménil and Lévy show, the rate of
profit declined in the United States from 20.6 percent to 15.4 percent, and
in Europe from 18.1 percent to 13.8 percent.128
The emergence of what is most commonly recognized as globalization
in the 1990s is again demonstrating the importance of Lenin’s theory of
imperialism. The development of new forms of production, communica-
tion, and transport has enabled capital to renew its global expansion, while
at the same time sharpening the division between classes. This becomes
clear when we examine some of the central tenets of network theory and
the image of global capitalism as ‘‘post-imperialist’’: the development of
supply chain systems of production and the opening of new avenues for the
circulation of capital have the effect of displacing global conflict while creat-
ing the conditions for decreasing inequality.
The relative rebounds in productivity and the rate of profit which first
appear in the middle of the 1980s and reach their peaks at the end of the
1990s is the result of two interrelated factors, both of which support the
Marxist theory of imperialism. To take the example of the U.S. economy,
which is most often held up as the primary example of profitability of net-
work capitalism, the declining rates of profit and the rise of international
competition, particularly from the emerging economies in Asia, required
the rethinking of the organization of labor in order to create the conditions
for increasing the conditions of exploitation and thus the rate of extracting
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surplus value. In order to address these conditions, at the end of the long
downturn investment begins to shift, and takes a particularly sharp jump in
the years between 1978 and 1983, towards the improvement of information
technologies in an attempt to solve the economic crisis through an intense
rationalization of industry.129 In other words, capital sought to increase its
efficiency in ‘‘the capacity to organize production, distribution, and finan-
cial operations and to reduce costs.’’130 What efficiency means here is the
process of further streamlining production and to make the most effective
(again, profitable) use of labor so as to increase productivity, decrease the
costs of labor, and restore rates of profit to precrisis levels. This is where
network theory originates. The theory advanced by Ohmae, Friedman, and
Castells to organize production around a central hub, with temporary nodes
of production positioned in areas where profitability can be achieved, re-
flects the needs of capital to apply the new technological developments in
production in a way that provides the greatest return. In fact, these develop-
ments enabled the United States during the period 1990–2000 to claim
growth rates in productivity above the 1973 level, as well as above its closest
economic competitors in Europe, which achieved significantly lower rates
of growth in productivity and output over the same period of time.131 At the
same time, the United States remained attractive to investment because of
the attacks on labor that led to a stagnant growth rate in the costs of wages,
to the point where the real value of the minimum wage is actually lower in
2005 than it was in the late 1960s, even when adjusted for inflation.132 As
Brenner notes, ‘‘US capital had become profoundly dependent on close to
zero wage growth inside manufacturing to help counter intense competition
from their leading international rivals.’’133
Once again, as explained in Marx’s theory of the tendency of the rate of
profit to decline, a rising level of profitability resulted in the factors which
lead to the concentration and centralization of capital and the monopoliza-
tion of the marketplace as more productive capital swallowed up their com-
petitors, a reality borne out by the fact that ‘‘between 1980 and 1989 there
were 31,105 mergers and acquisitions, totaling in value $1.34 trillion dol-
lars.’’134 What we see then in the period immediately following is a renewal
of expansion of capital abroad to find more profitable avenues for invest-
ment, a point that can be traced out in the growth of Foreign Direct Invest-
ment (FDI). FDI is defined as ‘‘investment in which a firm acquires a
substantial controlling interest in a foreign firm (above a 10 percent share) or
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sets up a subsidiary company in a foreign country.’’135 Although it is the case that
most FDI flows between the industrialized countries,the level of investment
in developing countries has nonetheless increased in the period 1990–2000,
from a level of 25.4 percent in 1982–1987 to 31.6 percent in 2001,136 and
from $50 billion to a high of $1 trillion in 2000.137 In this sense, the export
of capital increasingly takes on the characteristics of monopoly capitalism.
The large amount of capital invested in the so-called developed countries
reflects the high organic composition of capital and the higher costs of
labor, as well as the ability to produce in relatively stable economic environ-
ments, while the lower level of investment in developing economies reflects
the increasing productivity of labor in these areas and the attempt to main-
tain low production costs by locating production in nations which suppress
wage levels below that of the home market: ‘‘FDI improves the overall effi-
ciency of the resource allocation via the transfer of capital, technology, and
managerial and marketing know-how.’’138 In other words, as per Lenin’s
theory, capital can still move production to lower wage areas to achieve at
least average, if not above average, rates of profit for lower levels of invest-
ment than are required in the home market.
In addition, the idea that FDI results in a ‘‘flattening’’ of the world, or a
more ‘‘peaceful’’ integration of capital, is not evident either. The theory of
a ‘‘peaceful’’ imperialism actually emerges in the beginning of the twentieth
century, when the world market had reached a similar level of integration
as the current period. Karl Kautsky, as the most prominent left theorist of
the ‘‘peaceful’’ imperialist movement, argued that capitalism had reached a
stage of ‘‘ultra-imperialism’’ in which the expansion of capital globally and
the development of interconnected networks of production and trade would
ultimately require that nation-states would be forced to unite into cartels or
federations that would no longer compete with one another. Kautsky writes:
There is no economic necessity for continuing the arms race after the World War,
even from the standpoint of the capitalist class itself, with the exception of at
most certain armaments interests. On the contrary, the capitalist economy is
seriously threatened by the contradictions between its States. Every far-sighted
capitalist today must call on his fellows: capitalists of all countries, unite!139
For Kautsky the need to export capital abroad requires the stabilization of
political factors and ultimately the organization of capitals into noncompet-
itive cartels. He writes, ‘‘the result of the World War between the great
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imperialist powers may be a federation of the strongest who renounce their
arms race.’’140 While on the surface Kautsky’s theory of ‘‘ultra-imperialism’’
would seem to describe the emergence of transnational economic agree-
ments such as the European Union and trade agreements such as NAFTA
and GATT, as Lenin demonstrated at the time the ability to export capital
to other markets is dependent upon the existence of unequal levels of devel-
opment, not only between the so-called center and the periphery but also
between nations in the center as well. Capital cannot reach a peaceful bal-
ance because the creation of new values and the accumulation of capital
cannot help but to expand, rather than shrink, the division between nations.
‘‘As long as capitalism remains what it is,’’ Lenin argues, ‘‘surplus capital
will never be utilized for the purpose of raising the standard of living of the
masses in a given country, for this would mean a decline in profits for the
capitalists; it will be used for the purpose of increasing profits by exporting
capital abroad to the backwards countries.’’141 The very competition be-
tween capitalists towards the monopolization of the market could not but
ultimately pit capitalists against one another and, in turn, the nations that
represent them, as was manifest in World War I and World War II. To
take only one example from the contemporary moment, the rising tensions
between France and Germany that emerged in the European Union during
the current global financial crisis over the economic instability of the
‘‘piigs’’ (the racist term used by economic commentators in the imperialist
powers to refer to the countries of Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and
Spain) demonstrates how quickly antagonisms between supposedly unified
nations can emerge. As the editors of The Economist, who compared prog-
nosticating the EU’s future to ‘‘staring into an abyss,’’ write, ‘‘Will the Eu-
ropean Union make it? The question would have sounded outlandish not
long ago. Now even the project’s greatest cheerleaders talk of a continent
facing a ‘Bermuda triangle’ of debt, demographic decline and lower
growth.’’142 Under capitalism, the only unity that exists among capitalists is
their unified agreement to exploit working people to the fullest extent of
their powers.
The state is not magically eliminated by the network because, as Ernest
Mandel writes, the state ‘‘is a product of the social division of labor.’’143 It
is the legal manifestation of the mode of production. Under capitalism, the
state is the political arm of the owning class that is used to ensure that the
exploitation of labor can continue unabated by protecting the property
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rights of owners. In the age of imperialism it serves as the means by which
individual capitalists attempt to control the global market through the use
of political and military power. This was recognized by U.S. President
Woodrow Wilson at the beginning of the twentieth century:
Since trade ignores national boundaries and the manufacturer insists on having
the world as a market, the flag of his nation must follow him, and the doors of
the nations which are closed against him must be battered down. Concessions
obtained by financiers must be safeguarded by ministers of state, even if the
sovereignty of unwilling nations be outraged in the process. Colonies must be
obtained or planted, in order that no useful corner of the world may be over-
looked or left unused.144
The reemergence of the theory of ultra-imperialism in Ohmae’s theory
of regionalization or Friedman’s theory of supply chain capitalism—and in
the theory of network capitalism more broadly—sharply contrasts with the
economic realities of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Far from in-
tegrating markets in a flat or borderless chain, capital remains concentrated
and centralized in the hands of a few capitalists who then compete with one
another for control of the world markets, while relying upon their national
governments to protect their economic interests both at home and abroad.
Despite the arguments for a borderless economy, the 2008 Forbes list of the
top 500 most profitable companies shows that capital accumulations remain
centered in the so-called developed countries, as 162 are in the United
States, 67 are in Japan, 38 are in Germany, 37 in France, and 33 in the
United Kingdom. In addition, while productivity in the developing nations
has often increased faster than that of the developed economies, ‘‘countries
with worse endowments of physical and human capital at the outset might
never converge with the more developed economies, which have a greater
capital stock, thanks to increasing returns of scale of this stock and the posi-
tive externalities derived from scientific and technical knowledge for the
rest of their factors of production.’’145 This means that the supply chain is
not about developing countries, but establishing relative control over labor
abroad. This explains why the industrialization of the global South through
the export of capital from the global North, while resulting in a relative
raise in the level of wages, has nonetheless increased inequality between and
within nations. Smaller amounts of capital exported abroad are able to
achieve average rates of profit compared to domestic production, but insofar
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as the primary purpose of this production is for export, the majority of the
surplus value produced returns to the company’s home country. Network
theory provides the theoretical means to effectively organize capital in
this manner, while simultaneously representing the exchange between de-
veloped countries as fair and equal. Far from being equal, however, the
decline of wages in the countries as the center of the global economy
(the United States, Canada, and the European Union) and the growing
inequality in the peripheral economies (India, Asia, and Africa) demon-
strate that what is at the core of network theory is creating a more effec-
tive climate for subjugating the workers of the world to the interests of
capital in private accumulation.
Productive, Unproductive, and Immaterial Labor
The second aspect of contemporary globalization theory concerns a corre-
sponding development in the organization of labor to the export of capital
abroad: the decline of industrial manufacturing in the North and its devel-
opment in the South. For most commentators on the left and the right, the
decreasing levels of industrial manufacturing and the rise of the retail and
service sectors in the so-called developed nations serves as another example
of the undoing of the labor theory of value, which, I argue, remains indis-
pensible for understanding the digital condition. This premise has been ad-
vanced in various forms in the post–World War II period, from the
arguments that we are entering a postindustrial service economy which
emerged in the 1970s in the work of writers such as Daniel Bell (The Coming
of Post-Industrial Society) to the arguments that we are now entering a digital
economy based upon knowledge proposed in the writings of Richard Flor-
ida (The Rise of the Creative Class) and Mark Poster (Information Please). What
is at the core of this argument is that the shift in the forms of production
corresponds to a shift in the logic of production. As capital supposedly
moves towards a digital economy, what is said to matter most are issues of
exchange, representation, and consumption rather than property owner-
ship, production, and exploitation.
The most popular proponents of this argument today are Michael Hardt
and Antonio Negri, who draw on network theory and the work of Castells
in particular, as the basis of their now foundational reading of globalization
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as the site of political struggle between the forces of empire and the multi-
tude. They write, ‘‘Along with the global market and global circuits of pro-
duction has emerged a global order, a new logic and a structure of rule—in
short, a new form of sovereignty.’’146 That is to say, as a result of the way in
which ‘‘the primary factors of production and exchange—money, technol-
ogy, people, and goods—move with increasing ease across national bound-
aries,’’147 they argue that we are witness to the emergence of empire as
‘‘something altogether different’’148 from both earlier capitalist relations as
well as from the critiques of these relations as imperialism because ‘‘the
foundation of the classic modern conception of private property is . . . to a
certain extent dissolved in the postmodern mode of production.’’149 While
traditional theories of capitalism assume the division of the world around
ownership and control of the means of production, empire is, instead, said
to consist of ‘‘a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule’’150 in which
‘‘the international divisions and flows of labor and capital have fractured
and multiplied so that it is no longer possible to demarcate large geographic
zones as center and periphery, North and South.’’151 In other words, what
is fundamentally ‘‘new’’ about the global economy, they maintain, is that
‘‘the assembly line has been replaced by the network as the organizational
model of production’’152 and, as a result, ‘‘the nature of labor and wealth
accumulated is changing.’’153 ‘‘Today,’’ they conclude, ‘‘productivity,
wealth, and the creation of social surpluses take the form of cooperative
interactivity through linguistic, communicative, and affective networks.’’154
Their theory of globalization-as-empire is premised on the theory of
immaterial labor, or labor ‘‘that produces an immaterial good, such as a
service, a cultural knowledge or communication.’’155 The main argument of
the proponents of immaterial labor theory is that, unlike labor employed in
the production of material commodities, immaterial labor cannot be quanti-
fied and therefore falls outside of the framework of the labor theory of
value. Instead, capitalism is defined as a primarily political system in which
what matters is the control of the ‘‘bio-power’’ of labor rather than its ex-
ploitation. The theory of network capitalism as driven by the political con-
trol of immaterial labor is most extensively developed in Antonio Negri’s
reading of Marx’s economic notebooks, particularly the passage known as
‘‘the fragment on machines.’’ Central to Negri’s argument is the idea that
in the development of the forces of production—the replacing of living
labor with dead labor—central to the capitalist mode of production, the
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theory of value which explains why labor is central to capital as the source
of surplus value loses its explanatory force because of the diminishing role
of labor in the production process as compared to machines and to science.
This conclusion is based upon his reading of Marx’s argument:
To the degree that labour time—the mere quantity of labour—is posited by cap-
ital as the sole determinant element, to that degree does direct labour and its
quantity disappear as the determinant principle of production—of the creation
of use values—and is reduced both quantitatively, to a smaller proportion, and
qualitatively, as an, of course, indispensable but subordinate moment, compared
to general scientific labour, technological application of natural sciences, on one
side, and to the general productive force arising from social combination [Glied-
erung] in total production on the other side—a combination which appears as a
natural fruit of social labour (although it is a historic product). Capital thus works
towards its own dissolution as the form dominating production.156
For Negri, this passage indicates the process by which capital is self-
defeating. According to his reading, through the requirements of techno-
logical advances to production as a means of increasing the rate of surplus
value, productive capital expands into the process of reproduction and cir-
culation such that the labor theory of value is reversed from its original con-
ception. In Negri’s words:
Capital seeks a continual reduction in necessary labor in order to expand the
proportion of surplus value extorted, but the more it succeeds individually with
workers taken one by one, the more necessary labor benefits the collectivity and
is reappropriated by absorbing the great collective forces that capital would like
to determine purely for its own account.157
Put differently, the shift from an industrial to a postindustrial society is, for
Negri, not simply the shift in kinds of labor—from manual to knowledge,
or from factory to service. The development of immaterial forms of labor
is said to be a reflection of the crisis of capitalism at the level of value itself.
According to Negri’s reading, what Marx describes as the way in which
capital moves towards its own dissolution is actually capital’s attempted ap-
propriation of immaterial labor—the labor of the reproduction of capital—
which can occur only outside of the boundaries of surplus value. He writes,
when the theory of value can not measure itself by a quantity of labor time or by
an individual dimension of labor, when a first displacement leads it to confront
social time and the collective dimension of labor, at this moment the impossibility
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of measuring exploitation modifies the form of exploitation [ . . . and . . . ] does not
suppress the law of value but reduces it to a mere formality.158
Once it appropriates immaterial labor, Negri argues, the boundaries of
the working day—the division between necessary and surplus labor time—
become difficult, if not impossible, to measure. This is because immaterial
labor is said to be labor whose primary function is to establish the reproduc-
tion of labor elsewhere, thus operating independently of the priority of
value that capital establishes. As such, it is precisely by freeing workers from
work—through the creation of free time resulting from increased produc-
tivity created by technological advances, as well as the growing segment of
labor that does not participate in the production process—that Negri argues
the law of value is rendered inoperable and capitalism is transformed from
an exploitative system to an entirely political system of command and con-
trol of labor by capital, in turn leading to the possibilities for revolutionary
transformation through the ‘‘self-valorization’’ of the working class. Labor,
in short, is no longer bound to capital except through the controlling func-
tions of its policing apparatuses. He writes, ‘‘The theory of value, as a the-
ory of categorical synthesis, is a legacy of the classics and of the bourgeois
mystification which we can easily do without in order to enter the field of
revolution.’’159 Thus, to go ‘‘beyond Marx’’ for Negri means understanding
that the theory of value works at the level of ideology to bind workers to
the forms of labor under capitalism rather than to see that the relationship
between capital and labor ‘‘are reduced to a relation of force.’’160 Instead, he
writes, ‘‘when production and reproduction are so closely mixed one with
the other, we can no longer distinguish productive labor from reproductive
labor’’161 and later, with Michael Hardt, ‘‘the old Marxist distinctions be-
tween productive and unproductive labor, as well as that between produc-
tive and reproductive labor, which were always dubious, should be thrown
out.’’162
It is on the logic of this theory of immaterial labor as the end of the
distinction between productive and unproductive labor that, according to
Hardt and Negri, the shift to the postmodern economy of empire from
the modern economy of industrial capitalism represents not just a political
reorganization of capital but a broader transformation in the mode of pro-
duction itself. As a result of a shifting focus within capitalism from material
production to immaterial knowledge, they argue that the role of labor has
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undergone a ‘‘radical transformation’’ from the production of material
goods to the creation of ‘‘relationships and ultimately social life.’’163 ‘‘The
hegemony of immaterial labor,’’ they write, ‘‘tends to transform the organi-
zation of production from the linear relationships of the assembly line to
the innumerable and indeterminate relationships of distributed networks’’
such that ‘‘exploitation under the hegemony of immaterial labor is no
longer primarily the expropriation of value measured by individual or col-
lective labor time, but rather the capture of value that is produced by coop-
erative labor.’’164 In this context, they argue that the theory of immaterial
labor goes beyond not just the Marxist theories of wage labor, but also the
early globalization theories of the 1970s and 1980s which celebrated the rise
of ‘‘service work, intellectual labor, and cognitive labor’’ because the theory
of immaterial labor is said to recognize the importance of all labor which
‘‘produces or manipulates affects such as a feeling of ease, well-being, satis-
faction, excitement, or passion.’’165 In other words, it includes all aspects of
human creativity, whether or not they are productive of surplus value.
Since, from their view, resources produced through the new forms of labor
(such as ‘‘affect’’) cannot ever be ‘‘fully captured’’ by capital166 because they
exceed the boundaries of the working day, the ‘‘multitude’’ whose labor this
represents is becoming ‘‘an autonomous agent of production’’ that is no
longer dependent on capital to set it in motion.167 Thus, the point of contes-
tation is not the extraction of surplus labor but rather the political control
of this multitude and their creative powers. For Negri and Hardt, insofar as
‘‘proletarian internationalism’’ represents the ‘‘outside’’ of an earlier, ‘‘na-
tional’’ stage of capitalism,168 the globalization of production means that
‘‘there is no longer an ‘outside’ to capital’’169 and thus workers whose sur-
plus labor is exploited as a collective are no longer the agents of change.
Instead, Negri and Hardt posit an ‘‘impure politics’’ of the multitude based
on finding ‘‘the potential for liberation that exists within Empire’’170 and,
despite the radical rhetoric, that all that is necessary in the end for the
development of what they describe as a ‘‘spontaneous and elementary com-
munism’’ is the formation of a counter-empire that only differs from the
current social relations politically but not necessarily economically.171
Of course, the argument that capitalism is on the verge of entering a
postindustrial, postwork, postclass, postexploitative regime of accumulation
in which the free circulation of knowledge and information replaces the
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exploitative relations of production is not in itself new, and reflects a long-
standing attempt within cultural theory to eliminate what was problematic
to the ideas of consumer capitalism in reality—the continuing exploitative
division between capital and the working class. For example, along with
conservative writers such as Daniel Bell and Alvin Toffler, left writers such
as Alain Touraine argue in the period of the long boom in the 1970s that:
In the programmed society, directed by the machinery of growth, the dominated
class is no longer defined in terms of property, but by its dependence on the
mechanisms of engineered change and hence on the instruments of social and
cultural integration. One’s trade, one’s directly productive work, is not in direct
opposition to capital; it is personal and collective identity in opposition to
manipulation.172
And during the technology boom of the 1990s, Stanley Aronowitz and Jer-
emy Rifkin separately advanced the theory that labor was being fundamen-
tally replaced by machines in a postwork economy driven by the fact that
‘‘knowledge itself, once firmly tied to specific labor processes such as steel-
making, now becomes a relatively free-floating commodity to the extent
that it is transformed into information that requires no productive
object.’’173
What differentiates network theories of immaterial labor from earlier
theories of unproductive labor is the way in which it tries to account for the
economic inequality produced by capitalist social relations as structurally
inevitable and fundamentality inescapable while opening new avenues of
economic opportunity to counter a monopolized global market through a
discourse of individualism and entrepreneurialism. Maurizio Lazzarato, in
his essay ‘‘Immaterial Labor,’’ clarifies this basic premise of the network
theory of capitalism. Defining immaterial labor as ‘‘the labor that produces
the informational and cultural content of the commodity,’’174 he writes,
‘‘waged labor and the direct subjugation (to organization) no longer consti-
tute the primary form of the contractual relationship between capitalist and
worker’’175 and that ‘‘immaterial labor finds itself at the crossroads (or rather
it is the interface) of a new relationship between production and consump-
tion.’’176 More specifically, Lazzarato argues:
I do not believe that this new labor-power is merely functional to a new historical
phase of capitalism and its processes of accumulation and reproduction. This
labor-power is the product of a ‘‘silent revolution’’ taking place within the
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anthropological realities of work and within the reconfigurations of its meanings.
Waged labor and the direct subjugation (to organization) no longer constitute
the primary form of the contractual relationship between capitalist and worker.
A polymorphous self-employed autonomous work has emerged as the dominant
form, a kind of ‘‘intellectual worker’’ who is him- or herself an entrepreneur,
inserted within a market that is constantly shifting and within networks that are
changeable in time and space.177
Far from representing a system based upon exploitation, according to
Lazzarato, capitalism has become an unstable system of power, and as such
open, fluid, and reversible. At the core of this theory of labor is the argu-
ment that the globalization of production and the expansive telecommuni-
cations and service industries calls into existence a regime of social relations
no longer based upon production and exploitation, but rather on consump-
tion. The claim of critics such as Castells, Lazzarato, and Hardt and Negri
is that immaterial labor represents the elimination of wage labor from within
capitalism as an effect of capitalism’s own drive to eliminate labor through
the automating of production, turning both owner and worker into contest-
ing consumers. What emerges from this theory of the social as a series of
reversible and fluid acts of consumption that defy the homogeneity of global
capital is the idea that it is no longer possible to challenge the central logic
of capitalism. Instead, workers are instructed to find and to celebrate the
rare moments of discontinuity, in which the ideology of capital and its inter-
ests seem to collide, as the only possibility for overcoming the alienation of
commodity production.
For example, as an instance of the way in which immaterial labor gives
rise to the entrepreneurial resistance of the self-valorizing working class,
Hardt and Negri contrast the ‘‘oligopolistic’’ mechanisms of broadcast sys-
tems which represent the ‘‘centralized production, mass distribution, and
one-way communications’’ of monopoly capitalism178 with the ‘‘demo-
cratic’’ mechanisms of the internet as a space in which ‘‘an indeterminate
and potentially unlimited number of interconnected nodes communicate
with no central point of control’’179 and result in the production of a com-
mon set of relationships and knowledges that represents the ‘‘incarnation,
the production, and the liberation of the multitude.’’180 And, it is on similar
terms that Castells also locates the possibilities of digital culture as opening
a space of agency independent of the economic. It is useful, at this point, to
quote Castells at some length:
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the new economy cannot be characterized as being centered any longer on multi-
national corporations even if they continue to exercise jointly oligopolistic con-
trol over most markets. This is because corporations have transformed
themselves into a web of multiple networks embedded in a multiplicity of institu-
tional environments. Power still exists, but it is randomly exercised. Markets still
trade, but purely economic calculations are hampered by their dependency on
unsolvable equations overdetermined by too many variables. The market’s hand
that institutional economists tried to make visible has returned to invisibility. But
this time, its structural logic is not governed by supply and demand but also
influenced by hidden strategies and untold discoveries played out in the global
information networks.181
According to Castells, what makes power ‘‘randomly exercised’’ such that
it can exceed the economic and ologopolistic control of the market by trans-
national capital is the innovative power of the individual whose desires can-
not be reduced to economists’ rigid mathematical equations. He goes on to
write, ‘‘what characterizes the new system of communication, based upon
digitized, networked integration of multiple communication modes, is its
inclusiveness and comprehensiveness of all cultural expressions’’182 and it is
on the basis of this inclusive culture that the individual becomes the creator
(and owner) of symbolic value. Castells argues, ‘‘while the media have be-
come indeed globally interconnected, and the programs and messages cir-
culate in the global network,’’ the fact that ‘‘not everybody watches the
same thing at the same time, and that each culture and social group has a
specific relationship to the media system’’ means ‘‘we are not living in a
global village, but in customized cottages globally produced and locally
distributed.’’183
For network theorists, the significance of the increasing integration of
the exchange mechanisms of global society is two fold. First, developments
in communications and production technologies have enabled information
and commodities to travel, in the words of Thomas L. Friedman, ‘‘father,
faster, deeper and cheaper than ever before.’’184 Second, and more impor-
tantly, the technological developments that increase the speed of produc-
tion and the circulation of commodities and ideas represents a fundamental
shift in the framework within which these exchanges occur and in the ways
in which the productive forces of society are organized, creating an oppor-
tunity to move beyond the corporate stage of globalization through individ-
ual customization. Increasing social interconnection is thus represented as
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the onset of a new stage of capitalism in which the economic, political and
cultural forces of what is called informational or knowledge capitalism that
emerged in the industrialized nations of the United States, Europe, and
Japan in the wake of World War II as a result of the advances in production
and communication technologies have begun spreading beyond the bound-
aries of the nation-state. In the process, network globalization is said to
transform the whole of global society from the hierarchical to the individual
and, as such, requires a new discourse that substitutes for concepts such as
class, labor, production, and imperialism the more fluid concepts of multi-
tude, immaterial labor, consumption, and empire.
Despite their local differences what links all of these theories of global-
ization is that they represent globalization as largely constituted by cultural
processes which, through technological advances, have escaped the determi-
nacy of the economic. In doing so they suggest that the main terrain of
struggle and freedom for workers rests in the legal, political, and cultural
surfaces of capitalism rather than in changing the underlying economic rela-
tions that determine class inequality. The main crux of their argument is to
deny the continued existence of exploitation and therefore to deny the his-
torical relation of globalization to class society by making it appear that
changes in the culture of the workplace—for example, the shift from the
rigid structures of Fordism to the flexible structures of post-Fordism—bring
about a fundamental material change in the class position of workers.
Digital Capitalism and the Labor Theory of Value
The debate over productive and unproductive labor is not new, but is cen-
tral to understanding the limits of the theory of immaterial labor. It is im-
portant because this distinction is necessary if one is to understand the
mechanisms by which capital not only accumulates value, but requires pro-
ductive labor to produce new values to accumulate. As Marx explains in the
second volume of Capital:
The transformation of the forms of capital from commodities into money and
from money into commodities are at the same time transactions of the capitalist,
acts of purchase and sale . . . Just as the circulation time of capital is a necessary
segment of its time of reproduction, so the time during which the capitalist buys
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and sells and scours the market is a necessary part of the time in which he func-
tions as a capitalist, i.e. as personified capital. It is a part of his business hours.185
The significance of buying and selling is that the circulation of capi-
tal—M-C-M (Money–Commodity–Money Plus Return)—requires that the
capitalist sells the commodities produced by the labor he has purchased in
order to buy new materials to restart the cycle. However, what is also sig-
nificant is that the value of the commodities does not reside in this ex-
change. Marx writes, ‘‘To effect a change in the state of being [from
commodity to money or from money to commodity] costs time and labor
power, not for the purpose of creating value, however, but in order to bring
about the conversion of value from one from into another.’’186 It does not
matter whether the capitalist is able to sell for above or below the average
price, this exchange does not change the amount of surplus value available.
It changes only the distribution of this value and the amount of profit real-
ized by the capitalist. The role of the merchant or retailer is to facilitate the
ability of the capitalist to realize a portion of the surplus value produced as
profit and to return part of this acquired value to the production process.
That is to say, insofar as ‘‘a certain amount of labour power and labour time
must be expended in the process of circulation’’187—since the capitalist must
sell the commodities produced in order to realize the accumulated surplus
value as profit—it is in the interests of the capitalist to shorten this time as
it constitutes part of the costs of circulation that will have to be deducted
from any potential future profits. This is where the merchant or retailer
comes into the process by agreeing to purchase the commodities from the
capitalist for a share of the surplus value contained in the commodity. While
the retailer is able to pressure the capitalist into selling below what he might
have been able to achieve on the market, it is still less expensive than if the
capitalist had to run this part of the production cycle. The retailer therefore
reduces the circulation costs of the capitalist and allows the capitalist to
return newly acquired capital back into the production process faster than
if the capitalist were required to sell the commodities directly. In fact, in
mapping out the relationship between the productive and distributive wings
of capitalism, Marx’s analysis anticipated the development of the major re-
tail chains such as Wal-Mart:
If by a division of labor a function, unproductive in itself although a necessary
element of reproduction, is transformed from an incidental occupation of many
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into the exclusive occupation of a few, into their special business, the nature of
this function itself is not changed. One merchant . . . may, by his operations,
shorten the time of purchase and sale for many producers.188
Insofar as the labor theory of value explains the economies of scale that
correspond to the rise of monopoly capitalism, it also explains why a busi-
ness can also monopolize a particular aspect of the reproduction process.
However, this does not mean that Wal-Mart dictates the direction of the
economy. Rather, the retailer ‘‘should be regarded as a machine which re-
duces useless expenditure of energy of helps to set production time free.’’189
A business like Wal-Mart dominates the market because it uses an economy
of scale to drive down the costs of reproduction to the commodity producer,
but it could not exist without them. It is in a similar context that Marx talks
about the growth of banking capital. It renders the ‘‘relation between the
capital originally advanced and the capitalized surplus value’’ more intricate,
but does not create new value except, perhaps, indirectly as it becomes the
means by which a new production cycle might begin. It emerges when, as a
result of increases in production, there develops a ‘‘hoard’’ of accumulated,
yet unproductive capital that cannot be reinvested into production because
of its effect on the rate of profit. This capital thus becomes available for
investment elsewhere. As Marx explains:
For instance from not having sufficient capital of his own at the very outset for
this purpose, A borrows from banker C a portion of the productive capital with
which he starts in business or continues it during the year. Banker C lends him a
sum of money which consists only of surplus value deposited with the Banker by
Capitalists D, E, F, etc. As far as A is concerned there is as yet no question of
accumulating capital. But with regard to D, E, F, etc., A is, in fact, nothing but
an agent capitalizing surplus value appropriated by them.190
The role of the retail and financial industries are thus extensions of the
circulation cycle in which surplus value is capitalized and made available for
investment in new commodity production. While appropriating part of the
surplus value that the initial capitalist has extracted from the surplus labor
of his workers, neither industry can add new value. If, for example, the
banker is able to charge a high interest rate, this is paid as part of the costs
of production by the borrowing capitalist based upon the expectations of
future profits. If the capitalist does not realize these profits, then the money
is not repaid and the bank is out whatever money was lent.
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This addresses one aspect of the argument that unproductive labor has
replaced productive labor as a source of value in network capitalism. As we
saw in arguments of Thomas L. Friedman, the growth of Wal-Mart into
the world’s largest company in terms of generated revenues and employees
is said to mark a new kind of profitable enterprise, in which value comes
from exchange rather than production. However, Marx’s main point here is
that both retail and banking are dependent upon the existence of productive
labor in that they take over aspects of the production process initiated by
productive capital in return for a share of the surplus value that is created.
The capitalists invested in these enterprises expect the average rate of profit,
and often institute the same mechanisms for ensuring that their workers
spend more time capturing the surplus value in the form of profit than
wages, but whatever profit is generated comes out of the original surplus
value that was created when the commodity was produced. Even insofar as
it does not distinguish between profits based upon production and those
based upon services, according to the 2008 Fortune 500, profits in the gen-
eral retail industry rank significantly lower (38th) than those achieved in
the extraction of raw materials (1st), pharmaceuticals (2nd), network and
communication equipment (4th), household products (16th), and farm and
industrial equipment (21st) to name only a few. In addition, the appearance
of so many financial services points precisely to the falling rate of profit and
the contradictions of overproduction that have plagued capital since the
1970s. As Duménil and Lévy write, ‘‘During the 1980s finance more di-
rectly took back the initiative concerning competition . . . giving rise to a
vast movement of restructuring of the productive system, of concentration,
of takeovers, and, in a more general way, of strengthening property net-
works.’’191 Even as productivity increased, capital has not been able to
achieve the rates of profit that existed prior to the period of the long down-
turn and so increasing amounts of capital have become unproductive and
available for investment, which strengthens the finance industry devoted to
managing this hoard of unproductive capital. In fact, even during the cur-
rent global financial crisis when billions of dollars of public monies were
channeled worldwide to the banking industry to make up for the loss of
expected profits, it has been reported that ‘‘nonfinancial’’ U.S. corporations
are sitting on $1.8 trillion dollars of cash and liquid assets rather than lend-
ing them to banks or putting them into the stock market only to receive less
than average rates of return from the new production that would result from
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such investment.192 The point is, if capital were to shift entirely to services,
there would be no commodities produced, and therefore no surplus value
to realize. Likewise, if capital completely ignored services, then the surplus
value in the commodities might not be realized without additional circula-
tion costs and a lower rate of profit. As such, Marxism does not deny that
unproductive labor plays an important role in the circulation of capital, only
that it cannot produce new values simply by changing the state of the com-
modity into money or money into a commodity. On these terms, instead of
viewing the growth of the immaterial sectors of the economy as the dis-
placement or erasure of productive labor, or the blurring of the boundaries
between productive and unproductive labor, Mandel offers a counter-read-
ing which explains the explosion of such industries in the world’s economic
centers. According to Mandel:
As long as ‘‘capital’’ was scarce, it normally concentrated on the direct produc-
tion of surplus-value in the traditional domains of commodity production. But if
capital is gradually accumulated in increasingly abundant commodities, and a
substantial part of social capital no longer achieves valorization at all, the new
mass of capital will penetrate more and more into areas which are non-productive
in the sense that they do not create surplus-value.193
The point is that one cannot simply look on the surfaces of capital—in this
case, the shift in the division of labor between manufacturing and services—
and assume that the underlying logic of capital has changed. The growth of
the services and retail industry corresponds to the tremendous growth in the
productivity of labor in the post–World War II period and a decline in the
rate of profit over the same period. Rather than the class equalizer that
Friedman portrays it as, Wal-Mart is an expression of the fundamental con-
tradictions of capital that result from the private ownership of the means of
production. The problem, to be clear, is not the consumer habits of working
people—the problem, as some ethicists portray it, is not whether or not to
shop at Wal-Mart. The problem is exploitation. Wal-Mart is a manifesta-
tion of the growing productivity of labor which is put towards the private
accumulation of capital rather than the meeting of needs.
The second aspect of the debate over productive and unproductive labor
concerns the forms of labor that play a part in the reproduction of capital.
Commentators often point to the declining numbers of manufacturing
workers in relation to service workers as indicative of a shift towards a ser-
vice or immaterial economy as well as the transformation in the law of value
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as outlined in the discussion of Negri’s Marx Beyond Marx. As Guillermo
de la Dehesa points out, ‘‘In 1950, the average for industrial employment
in Europe stood at 41 percent of the total. By 1998, this figure had fallen to
28 percent’’ whereas the developing economies in Asia ‘‘have moved in the
opposite direction and increased their percentage of industrial employment,
from 14 percent to 27 percent.’’194 The same process is occurring in the
United States, as the number of manufacturing workers declined from 30
percent in 1950 to 15 percent today.195 In response to these numbers there
are two important points that need to be made. First, it is often the case
that the relation between manufacturing and services are blurred in such
accounts, as software and utility companies are many times combined with
retail workers under the banner of service. Second, and more importantly,
as Chris Harman points out, ‘‘Marx’s distinction was not between material
production and ‘services’ ’’ but rather between productive and unproductive
labor.196 In his introduction to the second volume of Capital, Mandel
explains:
When Marx classifies certain forms of labour as productive and others as unpro-
ductive, he is not passing moral judgement or employing criteria of social (or
human) usefulness. Nor does he even present this classification as an objective or
a-historical one. The object of his analysis is the capitalist mode of production, and
he simply determines what is productive and what is unproductive for the func-
tioning, the rationale of that system, and that system alone.197
In this context, productive labor is defined as ‘‘labour productive for capital
as a whole’’ and thus as labor that ‘‘increases the total mass of surplus-value’’
whereas ‘‘no new surplus-value can be added in the sphere of circulation
and exchange, not to speak of the stock exchange or the bank counter; all
that happens there is the redistribution or reapportionment of previously
created surplus-value.’’198 For example, while a doctor might be socially
‘‘productive’’ in the sense of maintaining the health of the community, it is
‘‘unproductive’’ labor from the point of view of capital. On the other hand,
the production of ‘‘dum-dum bullets, hard drugs, or pornographic maga-
zines’’ might be socially ‘‘useless’’ in terms of ‘‘morality,’’ but as commodi-
ties ‘‘the surplus-labor in them is realized’’ when they are purchased ‘‘and
capital is reproduced and expanded.’’199
The implications of this distinction for understanding the limits of the
theories of immaterial labor for understanding the economic logic of con-
temporary capitalism are perhaps best reflected in the debates over the role
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of so-called intellectual workers in the digital economy and, more specifi-
cally, the status of teachers in the knowledge factories of the global North.
While there is no shortage of books detailing the ways in which institutions
of higher education have increasingly taken on the corporate logics of
global capitalism—from The Knowledge Factory by Stanley Aronowitz to The
Last Professors by Frank Donoghue to How the University Works by Marc
Bousquet, to name but a recent few—there remains an underlying assump-
tion that the pressures on higher education are a reflection of a structural
transformation in the very logic of capitalism away from productive labor
towards the further incorporation of unproductive and immaterial labor
under the control of capital. For example, in the introduction to their col-
lection Knowledge Workers in the Information Society, Catherine McKercher
and Vincent Mosco argue that while ‘‘the social relations of production,
if increasingly organized around communication and information, remain
distinctly capitalist’’ the ‘‘enormous and accelerating capacity to create
communication and information networks challenges capitalism’s capacity
to manage and contain them’’200 and that ‘‘the meaning of knowledge labor
is not measured simply by external criteria, but by how it is subjectivity
experienced by the workers themselves.’’201 In his essay, ‘‘Value production
and struggle in the classroom: Teachers within, against, and beyond capi-
tal,’’ David Harvie consolidates these assumptions in arguing that while
‘‘Marxists have long recognized that educators play a key role in the repro-
duction of capitalist relations of production in general, and of that special
commodity, labour power, in particular,’’202 the new economic structures of
digital capitalism, which are characterized by ‘‘the rise of immaterial or af-
fective labour,’’203 mean that the labor theory of value as theorized by Marx
is unable to ‘‘recognize the ways in which teachers’ existing practices already
rupture, and even go beyond or transcend, the capital relation.’’204 Instead,
what Harvie proposes is that under the emerging structures of digital capi-
talism, the division between productive and unproductive labor is not deter-
mined by its relation to the production of surplus value, but rather by
whether or not labor struggles against the conditions of control imposed by
corporate interests. This argument is premised upon a theory of labor
power in which labor power is not defined, as Marx proposes, as the ability
to do work but as ‘‘the willingness to do so under another’s control, regard-
less of whether this control is direct or indirect, and whether it is exercised
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by a private capital or by a social capital.’’205 In this way, despite his acknowl-
edgment that it ‘‘may not even be possible’’ to prove the Marxist distinction
between productive and unproductive labor as it relates to the primary
status of the production of surplus value to capitalist economies to be
‘‘somehow wrong or incorrect,’’206 Harvie nonetheless argues that the limit
of the Marxist distinction between productive and unproductive labor is
that it focuses the discussion of value too much on ‘‘one of its common
forms of appearance, money’’207 instead of realizing that the expansion of
capitalist economic conditions into every aspect of life means that value is
better understood as ‘‘lived experience’’ and, following the arguments of
Hardt and Negri, that capitalism is ‘‘a specific social form of imposing work,
rather than as simply a system geared towards profit-making.’’208 He states:
In some labor powers, the ability to kill other human beings efficiently is a desir-
able characteristic, while others call for tenderness and caring abilities. Although
all of these characteristics have always existed in human beings, one cannot say
that capital has simply appropriated certain of them without changing and devel-
oping them.209
Drawing upon the work of Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Selma James (The
Power of Women and the Subversion of the Community) and Leopoldina Fortu-
nati (The Arcane of Reproduction), who argue that Marx’s theory of productive
labor excludes the social contribution of immaterial labor such as domestic
work, Harvie is proposing that it is the work training labor for the market-
place which incorporates teachers and other intellectual laborers into capi-
talism. In other words, by incorporating the issue of control into the
definition of labor power, Harvie is proposing that labor power is not an
essential or inherent quality, but is dependent upon the labor of teachers to
shape it into the socially appropriate form, thereby explaining its importance
to the production process.
Harvie goes even further and argues that to fully understand the impor-
tance of teachers, it is necessary to expand the concept of value. More spe-
cifically, he declares that what he calls ‘‘teaching labor’’ is ‘‘directly value-
producing’’ because value should be determined not by the productivity of
the worker, but rather by the extent to which the labor a worker does is
‘‘abstract’’ and ‘‘alienated.’’210 He writes, ‘‘Value is embodied labour that is
also abstract labour’’ and, if ‘‘abstract labour is the substance of value,’’ then
‘‘we can say that any labour in capitalist society that has a two-fold nature,
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being a unity of abstract labor as well as concrete labour, is also productive
labour.’’211 But, according to Harvie, what makes it productive is that it is
both ‘‘abstract’’ and ‘‘alienated,’’ or work that ‘‘appears to the worker as an
external power, outside his or her direct control.’’212 Thus, insofar as teach-
ers are forced to work increasingly generalized tasks under conditions that
they don’t define for themselves, he concludes that they become part of the
capitalist structure.
At first glance, it might seem to some that in revising value as an effect
of ‘‘abstract’’ and ‘‘alienated’’ labor, Harvie effectively expands the concept
of the working class to account for new social formations by opening the
concepts of labor and value. However, I argue that by erasing the distinction
between productive and unproductive labor, he actually obscures the very
framework of what defines capitalism as an economic system—namely, the
exploitation of labor—and, in turn, presents a solution that extends, rather
than challenges, the fundamental logic of capitalism. This becomes clear
when he suggests that teachers operate ‘‘beyond capitalism’’ by being ‘‘un-
productive as a result of the struggles of teachers themselves: against neolib-
eralism; to resist measure; to create alternative educational practices and
relationships.’’213 According to Harvie, being ‘‘unproductive’’ includes not
only teacher strikes and student walkouts,214 but also ‘‘individual and invisi-
ble’’ forms of struggle such as ‘‘teaching from a textbook’’ rather than devel-
oping dynamic lessons that take a lot of time and ‘‘refusing the labour of
writing comprehensive and reliable student references.’’215 In other words,
‘‘productive’’ and ‘‘unproductive’’ are entirely separated from the question
of exploitation and instead become ‘‘more or less’’ measures of the extent
to which one ‘‘struggles’’ against the control of capital over one’s life.
But capitalism is not simply about control; it is based upon exploitation.
Or, rather, the control that capitalism enacts is based upon what Marx de-
scribed as the ‘‘dull compulsion of economic relations [which] completes
the subjection of the labourer to the capitalist.’’216 What gives the capitalist
control is ownership over the means of production. In this sense, differenti-
ating between productive and unproductive labor is central, I argue, because
it gets to the core logic of the capitalist system and what is necessary to
transform it; namely, ending the private accumulation of surplus value
through the exploitation of labor. In other words, the distinction between
productive or unproductive labor is not a matter of morality or lifestyle, nor
does it define who is really a member of the working class, as the critics of
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Marxism charge. It is about the basis of capitalism in the production and
extraction of surplus value and the need to change this relation if capitalism
is to be transformed. If we revise capitalism from an economic system to a
system of control, we move away from ending exploitation and towards
modes of resistance that ideologically extend the very logic of capitalism.
When Harvie states that classes are defined by the extent to which they
struggle against capitalism, it remains entirely unclear what they are strug-
gling against and why. The problem is that by privileging independence
from control as the measure of productivity, Harvie, Negri and other imma-
terial labor theorists essentially replicate the very ideology of capitalism
which promises the worker freedom in their everyday life in exchange for
the wage. Virtually all of the rhetoric surrounding the digital condition rep-
licates this same version of freedom in the promise that new technologies
will give the consumer more control than ever over what they watch, wear,
eat, or drive. In fact, it is this very logic which is now being used by digital
evangelists such as Mark C. Taylor to argue that tenure should be abolished
because it offers ‘‘no leverage to encourage a professor to continue to de-
velop professionally or to require him or her to assume responsibilities like
administration and student advising’’ and instead universities should act
even more like corporations by imposing mandatory retirement and seven-
year contracts which ‘‘reward researchers, scholars and teachers who con-
tinue to evolve and remain productive while also making room for young
people with new ideas and skills.’’217 The more technology gives teachers
freedom in the classroom, this argument goes, the more restrictive the insti-
tutional system of controls such as tenure become. Of course, corporate
theorists like Taylor can openly call for the end of tenure because their
endless defenses of the system mean that they need no protection from
political retribution. However, for the numerous teachers, retail and service
workers, domestic workers, and other forms of immaterial labor working
under increasingly precarious and restrictive conditions without the kinds
of backing that Taylor has, the issue is not gaining limited freedom from
management. The fact that private schools are primarily concerned with
turning a profit, while public universities are turning towards corporate log-
ics as a way of coping with less and less financial resources because of regres-
sive tax policies that favor the rich over the poor, does not reflect a change
in the relation of productive and unproductive labor. Instead, these changes
are a reflection of the fact that all aspects of life are being turned towards
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realizing as much of the surplus value expropriated during production into
capitalists’ profits as possible. As such, it is not new technologies or control
over how one works that will change this. The solution is transforming the
economic relations which create these conditions. What is necessary for
real transformation, in short, is freedom for all from a system driven by the
private accumulation of surplus value.
Returning, then, to the role of technology in relation to the production
of surplus value, it is precisely the role of technology under capitalism as a
means of increasing the rate of exploitation that is at the basis of Marx’s
analysis in ‘‘the fragment on machines’’ that Negri opportunistically uses as
the source of the theory of immaterial labor. That is, contrary to the conclu-
sions Negri presents, what Marx outlines in this passage is the way in which
technological development appears to reduce the role of labor by ideologi-
cally representing the social division between capital and labor as an increas-
ingly technological relation between labor and machines. In other words,
how technological development, because of the division of labor at the point
of production, ideologically appears to mediate the relation between labor
and capital while actually expanding the commodification of daily life that
the profit motive of capitalism requires.
Following the passage that is central to Negri’s analysis—that through
technological developments capitalism ‘‘works towards its own dissolution
as the form dominating production’’—Marx explains why technological de-
velopment in itself cannot overturn the labor theory of value but rather
comes to take on the appearance of a force independent of labor as a reflec-
tion of the role of the capitalist who owns it. He writes that as a result of
the way in which capitalism must, in the interests of profit accumulation,
develop technologies that shorten the portion of the working day paid in
wages, ‘‘the transformation of the production process from the simple la-
bour process into a scientific process, which subjugates the forces of nature
and compels them to work in the service of human needs, appears [emphasis
added] as a quality of fixed capital in contrast to living labor.’’218 In other
words, the appearance of technology as becoming the driving force of social
relations in spite of labor, which, Marx writes, ‘‘ceased altogether to appear
[emphasis added] as productive’’ and ‘‘posited as external to labour and as
existing independently of it’’ is an ideological effect of the division of prop-
erty between the capitalist and the worker.219 Instead, as Marx explains:
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Fixed capital, in its character as means of production, whose most adequate form
[is] machinery, produces value, i.e. increases the value of the product, in only two
respects: (1) in so far as it has value; i.e. is itself the product of labour, a certain
quantity of labour in objectified form; (2) in so far as it increases the relation of
surplus labour to necessary labour, by enabling labour, through an increase of its
productive power, to create a greater mass of the products required for the main-
tenance of living labour capacity in a shorter time.220
In other words, technological developments produce value only in the
sense that they are products of labor and therefore contain an amount of
extracted surplus value, and that they are used to increase the productivity
of labor within the working day, thereby indirectly contributing to the pro-
duction of future surplus value. Machines do not produce value in them-
selves but only as instruments of human labor. As Marx explains, ‘‘Nature
builds no machines, no locomotives, railways, electric telegraphs, self-acting
mules etc. These are products of human industry; natural material trans-
formed into organs of the human will over nature, or of human participa-
tion in nature. They are organs of the human brain, created by the human
hand; the power of knowledge, objectified.’’221 Technology, in short, is not
an autonomous object body, but a product of labor and thus whose use is
determined by the historical mode of production. As such, while Negri is
correct in drawing from Marx that the contradiction between the forces and
relations of production, in the words of Marx, ‘‘are the material conditions
which threaten to blow [the limited] foundation [of capitalism] sky high,’’222
this transformation cannot occur from within, in the renegotiation of the
terms of the market or through the independent development of technol-
ogy, as the development of the forces of production is tied to the interests
of profit. As Marx explains, ‘‘Capital employs machinery, rather, only to the
extent that it enables the worker to work a larger part of his time for capital,
to relate to a larger part of his time as time which does not belong to him,
to work longer for another.’’223 Rather than being judged on the priority of
social necessity, technological advancements are judged on their ability to
valorize capital. By denying the exploitation of labor as the source of the
capitalists’ wealth, network theory acts as a negative knowledge of capital-
ism by cleansing from globalization its historical and material relation to
capitalism, thus blocking the production of a red theory of globalization
necessary for organizing the collective struggles of the international work-
ing class.
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Postcyberpunk and the Hip Ideology of Middle-Class Values
The growing popularity of the network theory of globalization can be seen
in the way in which it is reflected not only in high theory, but also in popular
cultural forms. That is to say, theoretical reflections of production ulti-
mately find their way into the discourses of the everyday. By analyzing an
exemplary cultural representation of the network theory of globalization—
William Gibson’s Pattern Recognition—I will show why, in contrast to the
theoretical accounts of network culture as overcoming the capital-labor re-
lation, network theory in actuality works at the level of ideology to secure
the social contradictions of capitalism by representing a free-market agenda
as a challenge to the corporate model of globalization.
Cyberpunk fiction emerged in the 1980s as a literary movement commit-
ted to combining the theoretical insights of postmodern theory with the
technological developments that would lead to the digital economy of net-
work capitalism. Initially organized around the figure of the alienated anti-
hero lost in the new technological world, cyberpunk writers were linked by
the assumption that the development of digital technologies were blurring
social binaries between high and low art, reality and fiction, and production
and consumption. In the introduction to Mirrorshades, the foundational col-
lection of short stories which set the terms through which cyberpunk was
to be read, Bruce Sterling writes, ‘‘Traditionally, there has been a yawning
cultural gulf between the sciences and the humanities: a gulf between liter-
ary culture, the formal world of art and politics, and the culture of science,
the world of engineering and industry. But the gap is crumbling in unex-
pected fashion.’’224 Through the work of writers such as William Gibson,
Bruce Sterling, and Neal Stephenson, cyberpunk quickly established the
discursive framework through which the emerging digital society was to be
read—introducing concepts such as the matrix and cyberspace into the popu-
lar lexicon—to the point that Frederic Jameson famously declared cyber-
punk ‘‘the supreme literary expression if not of postmodernism, then of late
capitalism itself.’’225 Cyberpunk was thus situated as the manifestation of a
‘‘global point of view’’ and part of an era of ‘‘reassessment, of integration, of
hybridizing influences, of old notions shaken loose and reinterpreted with a
new sophistication, a broader perspective’’ that privileges ‘‘decentraliza-
tion’’ and the in-between play of ‘‘interzones’’ over ‘‘hierarchy.’’226
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What is particularly interesting in the relationship between the theories
of globalization and immaterial labor is the current transition from cyber-
punk to so-called postcyberpunk, a term first introduced by Lawrence Per-
son in his 1998 essay ‘‘Notes Towards a Postcyberpunk Manifesto.’’227 In
this essay, Person argued that cyberpunk no longer reflected the develop-
ments of the new global economy. Instead of the alienated antihero who
sought to ‘‘topple or exploit corrupt social orders,’’ postcyberpunk was fo-
cused on the middle-class who ‘‘seek ways to live in, or even strengthen, an
existing social order, or help construct a better one.’’228 This view of the
world is, according to Person, what enables postcyberpunk to ‘‘explore
themes related to [a] world of accelerating technological innovation and
ever-increasing complexity in ways relevant to our everyday lives’’ without
losing the ‘‘sense of wonder that characterizes science fiction at its best.’’229
What is particularly interesting here is not only the underlying narrative
about radicalism being an adolescent interest that one gives up in order to
grow up into adulthood, which is itself a kind of cliché of ideology. More
significant is the way in which postcyberpunk reflects the managerial logic
of network capitalism and, in turn, translates this narrative into a new dis-
course that can both address the growing inequalities of the economic sys-
tem while simultaneously separating these inequalities from issues of
exploitation and class.
In the United States, culture is largely geared towards the production of
a middle-class reality. By reality, I do not mean the actual conditions in
which people live. Rather, I am referring to the ways in which the economic
conditions that shape people’s lives are made to appear in popular culture
as transhistorical, without reason, and thus natural, inevitable, and beyond
social transformation. The image of the middle-class that one finds repeated
endlessly in films, television shows, novels, and music until it becomes the
sign of the ‘‘real’’ is premised on the idea that the middle-class represents a
postcapitalist space in-between the class antagonisms of owners and work-
ers. That is to say, the ‘‘in-betweenness’’ of the middle-class lifestyle—the
ability of working families to afford (a few) commodities previously accessi-
ble only to the wealthy, from homes and cars to DVD players and iPods—is
taken as proof that as technological advances increase the productivity of
labor, ‘‘there is a lessening of class polarization and class contradictions.’’230
The function of middle-class culture is, in other words, ideological. Its pur-
pose is to make the exploitation of wage labor under capitalism appear to
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be a fair and free exchange. In this sense, the ideology of the middle-class
represents the consumerist framework of the so-called American way of
life—democracy as shopping.
Globalization, technology, and consumption are at the center of William
Gibson’s postcyberpunk novel Pattern Recognition. Described by The Econo-
mist as ‘‘the best exploration yet of the function and power of product bran-
ding and advertising in the age of globalization and the Internet,’’231 Pattern
Recognition has become in a short period of time a canonic cultural reading
of the cultural changes occurring as a result of globalization. The novel tells
the story of a knowledge worker who has become disillusioned with corpo-
rate brand culture. What has made Gibson’s novel so appealing, I argue, is
the way in which it is able to translate the complex economic theories of
writers such as Peter Drucker, Daniel Bell, Antonio Negri, and Manuel
Castells into a more popular discourse and to establish this discourse as
the correct representation of the real by filtering it through a postpolitical,
postideological, postcyber reading of the contemporary, giving the condi-
tions of exploitation a ‘‘postcool’’ digital edge.
Immanently speaking, the novel, set in the contemporary moment, rep-
resents a slight shift in Gibson’s work. One of the founders of cyberpunk
fiction,Gibson, instead, turns in this novel to the present. Pattern Recognition
is an attempt to find meaning in the heightening contradictions of global-
ization in the period immediately following September 11, an event de-
scribed in the novel as ‘‘an experience outside culture.’’232 The central
character in the novel is Cayce Pollard, a freelance ‘‘coolhunter’’ whose job
is to travel the world in search of emerging cultural trends before they reach
the mainstream for advertising agencies that use these trends for developing
new ad campaigns. At first glance, it would seem that as a knowledge worker
who has reaped all of the benefits of the supposedly postindustrial world of
immaterial labor, Cayce represents precisely what both left and right theo-
rists of globalization such as Thomas L. Friedman (The World Is Flat) and
Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt (Multitude) celebrate as the cultural en-
gine of the new global economy. That is to say, her job in reading and
interpreting the quickly changing cultural landscape of globalization—part
of the ‘‘pattern recognition’’ of the title—means that she not only works
within the up-to-the-minute reality of network capitalism, but serves as one
of the primary cultural architects who enable corporations to ‘‘pivot into
the new century.’’233
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However, as the novel opens and Cayce arrives at her music video direct-
ing friend’s stylish apartment in Camden Town, the market district of Lon-
don, where she has taken a job with a ‘‘post-geographic’’ corporation called
Blue Ant to review a new sneaker logo, we get a very different reading than
that of a group of cyberhipsters working at the boundaries of culture. Un-
like early cyberglobalization novels such as Douglas Coupland’s Microserfs,
Pattern Recogniation does not celebrate technology and consumer society.
The protagonist, Cayce, is described as feeling trapped in globalization’s
‘‘dire and ever-circling wolves of disrupted circadian rhythm’’ and, despite
staying in an apartment full of the very kind of consumer goods she helps
advertisers to market more effectively, Cayce finds that this commodity-
filled apartment is unable to meet her ‘‘reptilian demands for sex, food,
sedation.’’234 That is to say, although the apartment appears to be filled with
the kind of commodities that are supposed to represent the full freedom of
choice available to Western consumers—a ‘‘German fridge,’’ an ‘‘Italian
floor lamp’’ and ‘‘electric kettle,’’ and an ‘‘imported Californian Tea Substi-
tute’’—they are said to be ‘‘as devoid of edible content as [their] designers’
display windows in Camden High Street.’’235 Rather than representations
of the exciting life of the new global elite, the accoutrements of consumer
society she is surrounded by are described as ‘‘very clean and almost entirely
empty,’’236 unable to fulfill the promises of maintaining the comfortable life
through consumption that has come to be associated with the middle-class
lifestyle. Furthermore, in what is described as ‘‘an experience outside cul-
ture,’’237 we later learn that Cayce’s father disappeared on September 11—
having been there ‘‘for no known reason’’238 and is presumed killed in the
attack on the World Trade Center. Thus, at the time of her arrival in
London,
her mortal soul is leagues behind her, being reeled in on some ghostly umbilical
down the vanished wake of the plane that brought her here, hundreds of thou-
sands of feet above the Atlantic. Souls can’t move that quickly, and are left
behind, and must be awaited, upon arrival, like lost luggage.239
By opening the novel with the sense of unease and cultural dislocation
that marks Cayce’s relationship to the images of a consumer society that
have seem to have lost all meaning after 9/11, Gibson establishes that she is
a character who is out of step with the commodified culture of globalization.
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The contrast between the apartment which is full of all of the signs of con-
sumer society and the spiritual emptiness these signs are now said to repre-
sent is symptomatic of a reading of the contemporary in which the images
of the middle-class as a leisurely life of consumption no longer seem to
correspond to the actual conditions of economic insecurity and political
alienation that most readers are now facing.
The irony of the opening is that despite the fact that her job depends
upon her ability to read the new cultural trends, what differentiates Cayce
from other coolhunters, and what has made her one of the most successful,
is precisely her inability to read the changing signs. Although she describes
her job as trying to ‘‘recognize a pattern before anyone else does,’’240 she
has succeeded as a coolhunter not by reading the codes but, instead, by
harnessing a kind of subliminal counter-response to brand names, described
in the novel as ‘‘a morbid and sometimes violent reactivity to the semiotics
of the marketplace.’’241 Gibson writes,
She is, literally, allergic to fashion. She can only tolerate things that could have
been worn, to a general lack of comment, during any year between 1945 and
2000. She’s a design-free zone, a one-woman school of anti whose very austerity
periodically threatens to spawn its own cult.242
In one scene, Cayce has an allergy attack after being confronted by a
Tommy Hilfiger display while walking through the menswear department
at Harvey Nichols, forcing her to face the possibility that globalization
means an increasingly virtual world in which the soul is obscured under
levels of simulacra. She states,
My God, don’t they know? This stuff is simulacra of simulacra of simulacra. A
diluted tincture of Ralph Lauren, who had himself diluted the glory days of
Brooks Brothers, who themselves had stepped on the product of Jermyn Street
and Savile Row, flavoring their ready-to-wear with liberal lashings of polo kit
and regimented stripes. But Tommy surely is the null point, the black hole.
There must be some Tommy Hilfiger event horizon, beyond which it is impos-
sible to be more derivative, more removed from the source, more devoid of
soul.243
Although Cayce’s outrage that others cannot see that contemporary cul-
ture is nothing but a diluted version of what has come before is meant to
mark her as different from the existing overly commodified culture, it is
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significant that this outrage does not mean much more than taking an ethi-
cal approach to shopping. That is to say, even though she is described as an
‘‘anti-consumer’’ who literally vomits at the sight of certain logos,244 Cayce’s
primary complaint about contemporary culture is that it is derivative. It is
such that she does not so much as turn away from consumer society, but
rather retreats into what is represented as its more authentic past. Her differ-
ence, in other words, is really not that different. It is simply a change in
terms. In her desire to avoid one commodified reality, she chooses another,
less familiar (because it is out-dated) form of commodified reality. In fact,
she is not even allergic to all of contemporary culture. For example, upon
her arrival in Japan, she ‘‘remembers’’ that ‘‘the way certain labels’’ such as
Gucci and Burberry ‘‘are mysteriously recontextualized’’ in Japanese cul-
ture means they ‘‘have no effect on her’’245 because of what she describes as
the ‘‘Japanese way’’ of production that makes ‘‘an imitation more real some-
how than that which it emulates.’’246 Furthermore, in a flashback to a day
spent in the former East Germany, communism is described as ‘‘manifestly
cruel,’’ ‘‘nasty,’’ and ‘‘petty,’’ because, she ‘‘protests,’’ it was not as aestheti-
cally pleasing as the cultural bounty available in the West.247 It is through
such examples that the reader begins to learn that it is not consumption that
is actually the problem, but the choices you make as a consumer. It is, in a
variation on Ritzer’s Globalization of Nothing, a question of cultural values.
The binary that Gibson establishes with Cayce’s decidedly modest out-
rage—you are a good consumer if you purchase outdated or hard-to-find
fashions and a bad one if you don’t—assumes that it is consumption and not
class that defines your position in society. What is presented as antifashion
and a means of resisting consumer society actually reproduces the ideology
of consumer society with a vengeance.
Cayce’s retreat from the hyper-market of globalization into an older
market semiotics leads her to what is represented as the ‘‘other’’ of the
derivative consumer culture: a series of video and still-image fragments that
are being mysteriously posted on various websites and internet newsgroups
without any indication of who is producing it, whether the scenes are old
or new, or why. Known as ‘‘the footage,’’ what makes these images so ap-
pealing to Cayce is that unlike contemporary culture, which is represented
as semiotically empty, the footage is semiotically neutral in that it appears to
lack any context. In one fragment, for example, the lack of visual cues mean
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that it is impossible to know whether the actor is ‘‘stepping onto a subma-
rine in 1914’’ or is ‘‘a jazz musician entering a club in 1957.’’248 Because
the footage seems to resist any singular interpretation, Cayce finds it to be
completely ‘‘masterful.’’249
Neutrality, however, is an ideological fiction. It erases the fact that the
meaning of any sign is determined historically, by the level of development
of production. By proposing that meaning is produced through the individ-
ual act of reading—reading as consumption—the image of neutrality main-
tains the idea of culture as an in-between space of personal desires that
corresponds to the ideology of a middle-class lifestyle. On the surface, in
other words, whereas the emptiness of the commodity form is attributed to
the reduction of all interpretations to the same one meaning through corpo-
rate advertising, the neutrality of the footage appears more open and demo-
cratic because it allows anyone to read (consume) it however they want. In
this way, interpretation becomes a metaphor for the free market and the
idea that consumption, rather than production, determines meaning. It is
for this reason that Cayce, an anticonsumer who is really a more sophisti-
cated consumer in disguise, becomes so obsessed with the footage. It allows
her the appearance of momentarily escaping the contradictions of consumer
society into an alternative community that is like going to ‘‘a familiar café
that exists somehow outside of geography and beyond time zones.’’250 Pat-
tern Recognition has become so popular because it makes the world appear
strange, but never different, and thus maintains the illusion that reading,
like consumption, is a personal act of meaning-making without any reliable
connection to reality.
Because the footage appears to Cayce to be irreducible to any one read-
ing, it comes to represent a new form of consumption with values and it is
on these terms that she accepts the offer by Hubertus Bigend, the owner of
the ‘‘post-global’’ advertising firm Blue Ant, to finance her search for the
maker of the footage. It is telling that during the search for the producer—a
search that takes her across the historical terrain of capitalism: from En-
gland to Japan to Russia—Cayce also begins to confront the reasons for her
allergies as well as possible solutions. That is to say, as she gets closer to
discovering the creator of the fragments, she begins to realize that she ‘‘is,
and has long been, complicit . . . in whatever it is that gradually makes
London and New York feel like each other, that dissolves the membranes
between mirror-worlds.’’251 However, this feeling of complicity is short
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lived—it is immediately dismissed as ‘‘a mood’’—and thereafter Cayce be-
gins to meditate on the meaning of life. While commodities can be easily
replaced, lives, she concludes, cannot: ‘‘However odd things seem, mustn’t
it be to exactly that extent of oddness that a life is one’s own, and no one
else’s?’’252 As Cayce has been firmly established in the narrative as the anti-
consumer, the reader is thus led to believe that despite whatever Bigend’s
intentions are Cayce’s desires are pure. As opposed to corporate figures
such as Bigend who seek to define the commodity for the consumer, she
refuses to impose any reading and thus embraces everyone’s individual de-
sires as they are. Her acknowledgment of complicity in that which makes
her ill is simply intended to mark her as a realist and thus, in spite of her
illness, a trustworthy reader of the contemporary. In an ideological twist,
then, Cayce’s search for the creator of the footage offers readers the illusion
that (even more) consumption is the only means of restoring lost values to
a world that previously had been criticized as having been emptied of value
by (too much) consumption. In other words, although Cayce is represented
as a defender of the ‘‘old’’ values, the dismissal of her momentary question-
ing of her role in expanding capitalism—the real effect of a politics of con-
sumption—as a ‘‘mood’’ is the effective elimination of any alternative to
capitalism. There is no revolution, in short, simply a new way of reading
the same. In this, Pattern Recognition turns consumption into an act of resis-
tance and makes anyone who thinks that a more fundamental social change
than changing one’s shopping habits is necessary to transform an unequal
and unjust economic system appear to be too out of touch with the new
reality.
The novel concludes with the discovery that the producer of the footage
is a young woman, Nora, who is a former filmmaker who has lost all ability
to communicate as the result of being injured during a mafia bombing in
Moscow. Cayce learns that the footage is taken from the closed circuit cam-
eras in the hospital where the woman stayed while recuperating and that it
is rendered for Internet distribution by the inmates of a prison established
and run by her oligarch uncle, described as ‘‘the richest man in Russia.’’
What makes the footage so special is that it has been Nora’s only form of
communication since a small piece of a claymore mine originally produced
in America became embedded in her skull. Gibson writes,
this one specific piece of ordinance, adrift perhaps since the days of the Soviet’s
failed war with the new enemies, had found its way into the hands of Nora’s
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uncle’s enemies, and this one small part, only slightly damaged by the explosion
of the ruthlessly simple device, had been flung into the very center of Nora’s
brain. And from it, and from her other wounds, there now emerged, accompa-
nied by the patient and the regular clicking of her mouse, the footage.253
In the end, Cayce learns that the footage is being used by Nora’s uncle
and Hubertus Bigend to develop an information distribution network, cre-
ated in part by the role Cayce has played in testing its security as she tracked
down the maker of the footage. What is significant about this is that despite
the fact that she has directly contributed to the opening of post–Soviet Rus-
sia to the global market, something which might have previously contrib-
uted to her anxiety because it ultimately means the further ‘‘branding’’ of
local and spontaneous forms of culture, Cayce nonetheless loses her aller-
gies and regains her ‘‘soul.’’254
Cayce regains her soul because she recognizes in Nora’s silence the pos-
sibility of a playful space in-between the daily routine of the working class
and the cultural homogeny of corporate globalization. Like Cayce, Nora
does not create anything new, but rather works within the existing to re-
package the everyday in unfamiliar ways. However, whereas Cayce’s resis-
tance was ultimately limiting because it could only ever be a nostalgic return
to the past, Nora’s silence—essentially a more severe form of Cayce’s al-
lergy that places her entirely outside of the semiotics of the marketplace—is
meant to be taken by the reader as the purest form of meaning-making
because its meaning is entirely personal. The footage is thus intended to
represent a more ethical form of capitalism for the twenty-first century in
which the meaning of a commodity is not imposed unilaterally through
corporate advertising but rather created individually by each consumer to
fulfill his or her personal desires. Cayce’s easy reconciliation with the system
that previously had made her violently ill reflects the fact that what the
novel is proposing does not actually challenge the underlying logic of capi-
talism—the exploitation of labor by capital. Instead, it teaches the middle-
class reader that the problem is not capitalism but advertising and thus that
all we need to do to resist corporate globalization is to adopt a more individ-
ual approach to consumption. That is, what matters are not the things we
own, but the values we have. By arguing that you can change the world
through shopping, Pattern Recognition is a lesson in finding moments of re-
sistance within the logic of the market.
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According to Jameson in a recent speculative meditation on the text,
‘‘Fear and Loathing in Globalization,’’ Gibson’s narrative of the footage
is written in the terms of Bloch’s ‘‘conception of the novel of the artist,’’255
which ‘‘projects the Utopian anticipation of a new art premised on ‘semi-
otic neutrality,’ and on the systematic effacement of names, dates, fashions
and history itself, within a context irremediably corrupted by all those
things.’’256 He argues, ‘‘the footage is an epoch of rest, an escape from the
noisy commodities themselves, which turn out, as Marx always thought
they would, to be living entities preying the humans who have to coexist
with them.’’257 However, while Jameson concludes that ‘‘Unlike the foot-
age, however, Gibson’s novel gives us homeopathy rather than anti-
dote,’’258 I argue that it is precisely in the idea of a ‘‘homeopathic’’
treatment—finding resistance only from within the very logic of exploita-
tion—that Pattern Recognition presents globalization as inescapable except
through momentary eruptions of subcultural agency. In other words, it is
a lesson in recognizing the ways in which the ‘‘soul’’—a code for a reading
of value as not determined within the working day, but rather in the af-
fective work of immaterial labor—can exceed but never fully escape the
logic of the market. It is based upon the assumption that capitalism has
formed an encompassing global network in which the only possible means
of resisting are from within through cultural reappropriation. As such, it
becomes clear that for Gibson, the significance of the footage is that it
ultimately cannot be commodified—it cannot become a source of surplus
value except through the secondary networks created to distribute it—
because it is entirely affective. It is created, we are told, only for the ap-
preciation of the artist, regardless of whether there is an audience. Cayce’s
cynical romanticism in searching for the ‘‘maker’’ thus becomes the nos-
talgic search for a capitalist market that is not monopolized, but remains
open and free. In this sense, the fact that she cannot help but extend the
capitalist network, despite her best intentions, is a reflection of the fact
that what is being proposed does not actually challenge the underlying
logic of capitalism—namely, the exploitation of labor—but rather seeks
to find new, ethical ways of resisting the more oligarchic aspects of mo-
nopoly capitalism by locating, as Castells and Hardt and Negri advocate,
the spaces from which information always leaks in unexpected ways from
the network.
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The End of the Network
What has ultimately made the theory of networks so popular, I argue, such
that the concept of the network society is embraced by a politically diverse
range of globalization theorists from Thomas L. Friedman to Manuel
Castells to Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri—and thus reaches the level
of ideological obviousness that places it beyond the common sense differ-
ences that traditionally define the boundaries of left and right—is precisely
because by substituting the form of the organization of capitalist production
for its underlying logic, network theory works to make natural highly unnat-
ural conditions and thus keeps in motion what Marx calls the social metabo-
lism of capitalism—the extraction of surplus value from the labor of the
working class.
The dominance of the technological in contemporary social theory is an
index, then, of the reality that advances in the means of production have
made the class struggle over whether developments in the forces of produc-
tion will be used for the production of profit or for meeting the needs of all
an issue impossible to ignore. That is to say—as the massive layoffs of the
workers in the dot-com sector following the 1990s tech boom in the United
States have demonstrated—it is through the development of the forces of
production that the laborer comes face to face with the objective fact that
their means of survival rests solely on their ability to sell their labor power.
As the editors of The State of Working America 2008/2009 indicate, the end
of the dot-com boom meant not only recession, but a future in which in-
creased productivity heightened the competition between workers and thus
a lever for the capitalists to further restrict or drive down the growth of
wages. They write:
The recession of 2001 was followed by nearly two years of continued job loss,
and it took an unprecedented four years to re-attain the number of jobs the
economy supported prior to the recession . . . The resulting lower rates of
employment and consequent lack of upward pressure on wages translated into
lost output and foregone increases in living standards. Poor job growth is one of
the important factors underlying the ongoing divergence of overall economic
growth and the wages and income of working families.259
And, we see the same pattern repeated in acknowledgments that the lat-
est economic recession will mean extended stagnation in the job market for
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several years after the recession is supposedly to have come to an end.260 In
other words, while the development of industry lowers the socially neces-
sary labor time, enabling more commodities to be produced, and creates
the potential for meeting the needs of all, under the capitalist system the
impetus of new machinery contradicts this possibility and, in the words of
Marx, ‘‘dispels all fixity and security in the situation of the laborer . . .
constantly threatens, by taking away the instruments of labor, to snatch
from his hands his means of subsistence . . . and in the devastation caused by
a social anarchy . . . turns every economic progress into a social calamity.’’261
Contrary to the objective contradictions of capitalist relations, the domi-
nant readings of network society in both popular media as well as cutting
edge theory represent the process of increasing productivity through the
intensification of the production process—in which capitalists accumulate
tremendous profits while workers are subjected either to increased domina-
tion by machinery or to the poverty of the industrial reserve army—as the
transformation from a system based upon the exploitation of labor to a net-
work of social relations in which work has been ‘‘liberated’’ through the
introduction of technology: a postcapitalist, postproduction era of endless
‘‘free time.’’ By locating the solution of capitalist exploitation in consump-
tion, network theory naturalizes the exploitation of wage labor that occurs
in the production of the commodity, privileging distribution and individual
consumption practices as the focus of analysis. Marxism, on the contrary,
by locating the fundamental basis of society in production, thus makes clear
that issues of distribution cannot be solved solely through the redistribution
of commodities because the cause of the initial inequality has not gone
away. Without transforming the system that produces inequality, no
amount of redistribution of social wealth will prevent inequality from
returning.
In this context, I argue that it is necessary to return to Marx’s theoriza-
tion of the labor theory of value and Lenin’s theory of imperialism in order
to understand globalization because it explains why capitalism does not
reach its limit either in the contraction of a noncapitalist outside with which
to trade—which is the presupposition of the network as the elimination of
geographic and economic boundaries—nor in terms of a cultural remaking
of the politics of oppression from within the logic of capital. More impor-
tantly, it explains why the working class remains the agent of social transfor-
mation—the capitalist system depends on the exploitation of their labor and
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this exploitation cannot be eliminated through technological development.
The limit of capitalism is that it is a system based upon a fundamental and
unequal relation to property in which some own and control the means of
production and others own nothing but their labor power, and, as Marx and
Engels write, capital ‘‘cannot increase except upon condition of begetting a
new supply of wage-labour for fresh exploitation.’’262 Thus it is in the inter-
ests of ensuring higher rates of accumulation that capitalism becomes a uni-
versal system, driven to conquer every corner of the globe.
As Lenin argues, ‘‘The export of capital greatly affects and accelerates
the development of capitalism in those countries to which it is exported’’
and thus ‘‘while, therefore, the export of capital may tend to a certain extent
to arrest development in the countries exporting capital,’’ as evident for
example in the crisis of public education, health care, housing and the envi-
ronment in the United States, ‘‘it can only do so by expanding and deepen-
ing the further development of capitalism throughout the world.’’263 In
other words, to propose that the technological developments that have en-
abled the network expansion of capitalism across the globe will, by them-
selves, eliminate the exploitative relations between owners and workers
without having to change the underlying property relations which define
capitalism is not simply historically naı̈ve or politically foolish, it is an ideo-
logical defense of global capitalism that works in the interests of the status
quo. Imperialism, in other words, represents ‘‘that stage of development in
which the domination of monopolies and finance capital has established
itself; in which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance;
in which the division of the world among the international trusts has begun;
in which the partition of all the territories of the globe among the great
capitalist powers has been completed.’’264 It is the attempt by capital to over-
come the contradictions that result from increasing costs of production and
decreasing rates of profit at home by finding underdeveloped sectors
abroad, regardless of whether this occurs through political annexation or by
the financial indebtedness of the policies enforced by the World Bank and
the IMF. It is in the context of finding new avenues of productivity that
network theories of globalization provide the theoretical resources for ex-
panding the use of technology to further the relations of exploitation. What
is presented as decentralization and individualization of the market—what
Castells and Hardt and Negri promote as the ability of cultural formations
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to act as a space of resistance to the oligopolistic mechanisms of the mar-
ket—does not actually represent a challenge to the underlying logic of the
market—the ‘‘freedom’’ of the wage laborers to sell their labor power for a
wage—merely the terms upon which this exchange occurs. As such, because
Castells and Hardt and Negri draw the conclusion that there is no outside
to capitalism and that property relations can be ‘‘blurred’’ through the re-
distribution of resources, rather than undermine market relations, such im-
ages reflect what Lenin calls the small producer’s ‘‘dream of taking a step
backward, of a return to ‘free,’ ‘peaceful,’ and ‘honest’ competition.’’265
What is particularly telling about the ideological aspects of this theory is
how a number of critics on the left critique Hardt and Negri for not going
far enough in eliminating the concepts of class and imperialism from radical
discourse. John Holloway, for example, writes that ‘‘there is a tendency to
treat capital as an economic category, reproducing in this . . . the assump-
tions of the Marxist orthodoxy which they so rightly attack.’’266 In turn, the
primary problem, according to Holloway is drawing class boundaries too
finely, when what is necessary is recognizing that ‘‘class struggle is a conflict
that permeates the whole of human existence,’’ that ‘‘we do not ‘belong’ to
one class or another,’ ’’ that the class divide is an antagonism that ‘‘exists in
all of us, tearing us apart.’’267 Similarly, Mark Poster writes that ‘‘Hardt and
Negri, beholden to a Marxist opposition of labor power and information
technologies, attempt to attribute to labor the qualities at play in new com-
munication systems’’268 and that, ‘‘a critical theory of globalization . . . must
look not for a revolutionary subject but for a matrix of dispositifs.’’269 How-
ever, the failure of Hardt and Negri is not that they still believe in class,
but, as Paul Thompson writes, that class becomes ‘‘power’’ in Hardt and
Negri’s autonomous theory of labor and, as such, independent of the eco-
nomic mechanisms of capitalism. Thompson argues, ‘‘at one stage we are
told that the biopolitical sphere is like a great hive in which ‘the queen bee
continuously oversees production and reproduction.’ As to who the queen
is and how she does it, we are none the wiser.’’270 In this respect, what
becomes clear is the relationship between Hardt and Nergi’s theory of em-
pire and the managerial theory that emerges in the 1970s and 1980s to
develop new ways of organizing production to maximize the extraction of
surplus value from labor, not to eliminate it. As Thompson argues,
what is striking is the similarity between Hardt and Negri’s arguments and those
of hyperglobalizers such as Ohmae (1990), who speak of boundaryless worlds.
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Despite the different language and gloss, both reify the market and posit a new
world order in which there are no intermediary institutions, no public space or
politics outside the power of the market.271
The problem is that even many on the left who are critical of the limits
of Hardt and Negri’s rejection of the Marxist theory of imperialism often
accept the premise that if we are to talk about imperialism today it means
moving beyond, or at least revising, the labor theory of value. The limits of
contemporary ‘‘radical’’ left thinking on imperialism are perhaps most evi-
dent in David Harvey’s recent critique of Hardt and Negri’s conclusion to
their ‘‘Empire’’ trilogy, Commonwealth. In a recent exchange in Artforum,
Harvey advances a useful immanent critique of Hardt and Negri’s declara-
tions that ‘‘overthrowing capitalist rule is not, in our view, the only mode
of revolutionary activity’’ and ‘‘there is a relative autonomy to the different
axes of domination and exploitation.’’272 such that there is little value any-
more in class analysis. As he points out, their turn towards Spinoza and his
belief in ‘‘experientia sive praxis, the principle of a truth formed by the activ-
ism of subjects who want to live a common life’’273 provides an idealist solu-
tion to the material contradictions of capitalism. Harvey writes, ‘‘it is
precisely because Spinoza did not have to be concerned with such mundane
things [as the economic contradictions of global capitalism] that his formu-
lations are so attractive [to them].’’274 He further goes on to argue that their
defense of the ‘‘love’’ of the ‘‘multitude’’ against the ‘‘evil’’ of the ‘‘Empire’’
essentially echoes the empty rhetoric of Dick Cheney’s declaration that ‘‘we
don’t negotiate with evil, we defeat it.’’275
Hardt and Negri, for their part, offer an extremely weak response in
which they attempt to push Harvey to their side against other critiques of
their revisionist approach to Marx. They write, ‘‘Marxists are renowned for
reserving their severest criticism for other Marxists, often proving their
points by twisting their opponents’ arguments or triumphantly pulling out
as trump cards technical terms that those uninitiated in the arcane of Marx-
ology find baffling’’ and thank Harvey for his ‘‘attentive reading’’ and
‘‘praise.’’276 Of course, it is precisely by representing the core theorizations
of Marxism as arcane technical terms in favor of theoretically empty but
‘‘feel-good’’ concepts that has made Hardt and Negri’s theory of empire so
influential among business pundits and cultural theorists alike. If Spinoza’s
theorizations of nature are less arcane than Marx’s theorization of the labor
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theory of value, it is only because what Spinoza calls ‘‘substance’’ is the
idealist logic of a reality that cannot ever be ‘‘totalized’’ or fully ‘‘deter-
mined’’ that one finds written throughout almost all of cultural theory
today. At the time of his writings, Spinoza’s critique of Cartesian idealism
and in favor of materialism represents a radical intervention and reflects the
developments in labor through which the world was being transformed.
However, to return to Spinoza’s theory of substance today as a revolution-
ary theory of the contemporary, as Hardt and Negri do, reflects the limited
logic of capitalism, which represents wage labor as a fair exchange and,
through the process of commodity fetishism that separates production and
consumption, turns the materiality of labor into the matterism of ‘‘things.’’
This is what governs their arguments about control over the commons hav-
ing replaced exploitation as the driving engine of capitalism—by isolating
consumption from production and thus transforming reality into substance,
they accept the historical conditions of production as given and only open
a space for debating how it should be distributed. This is the value of a
Spinozan critique of capitalism—it displaces labor as a revolutionary force
and, instead, attempts to make sense of reality as existing independent of
labor, thus bracketing the conditions of production from transformation.
At the same time, even though Harvey argues for the primacy of class in
understanding the contradictions of capitalism and that ‘‘no matter how
important race, gender, and sexual identity may have been in the history of
capitalism’s development, and no matter how important the struggles
waged in their name, it is possible to envisage the perpetuation of capitalism
without them—something that is impossible in the case of class,’’277 he
nonetheless accepts Hardt and Negri’s thesis that something has changed
within capitalism such that the concept of value has to be redefined to in-
clude the immaterial and nonmarket aspects of life and, ultimately, that
class, too, has to be understood in broader terms of power and control. He
writes, ‘‘What is certainly true, however, is that, as the market for things
becomes saturated, capitalism switches to immaterial forms of
production . . . Hence the turn to the commodification of affects, spectacle,
information, images, experiential moments, and the like.’’278 In addition, he
also indicates that he ‘‘can easily agree’’ with their argument that ‘‘value is
created when resistance becomes overflowing, creative, and boundless and
thus when human activity exceeds and determines a rupture in the balance
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of power.’’279 Like Hardt and Negri, Harvey redefines exploitation to in-
clude not only the extraction of surplus value, but the control and command
of what he calls the ‘‘urban commons’’ or ‘‘the social world of the city’’
which is created through people’s ‘‘daily activities.’’280
At the core of Harvey’s thesis is the proposal, which he expressed in the
2006 introduction to the recent reprint of his central theoretical work The
Limits to Capital, that Marx’s theory of ‘‘the falling rate of profit’’ doesn’t
fully account for the ‘‘deeper problem’’ that explains capitalism’s inherent
drive towards crisis, what he calls ‘‘the tendency towards overaccumula-
tion.’’ According to Harvey, overaccumulation represents ‘‘the ever increas-
ing quantities of surplus value that capitalists produce’’ which ‘‘cannot
profitably be absorbed’’ and, as he makes clear, that when he uses the term
‘‘profitably’’ that it ‘‘has nothing directly to do with the supposed law of
falling profits.’’281 More specifically, in The Limits to Capital, Harvey ad-
vances a theory of the economic contradictions of capitalism in which he
states that there are what he describes as three ‘‘cuts’’ in the capitalist proc-
ess—the drive to decrease socially necessary labor time through technologi-
cal advances that creates the conditions of the falling rate of profit as the
‘‘first cut,’’282 the financial and monetary affairs involved in the ‘‘realization
and consumption and distribution’’ of capital after production as the ‘‘sec-
ond cut,’’283 and the contradictions which emerge within the geopolitical
organization of space as the ‘‘third cut,’’284—an argument that is key to
understanding his influential readings of the broad economic transition in
the twentieth century from ‘‘Fordism’’ to ‘‘flexible accumulation’’ (The Con-
dition of Postmodernity) as well as his more recent analyses of the economic
and cultural contradictions of globalization (The New Imperialism). What
Harvey is ultimately suggesting, in other words, is that the extraction of
surplus value at the point of production is only one of three avenues through
which capitalists accumulate value. He writes, ‘‘The concept of value as
embodied labour time is not be construed . . . as a fixed and immutable
building block on which an analysis of the contradictions of capitalism can
be founded, but as a concept that undergoes perpetual modification in its
meaning the more we grasp what the socially necessary characteristics of
capitalism are.’’285 By rhetorically shifting the discussion of surplus value
in this passage from ‘‘socially necessary labor time’’ to ‘‘socially necessary
characteristics of capitalism,’’ Harvey here turns the discussion of capitalism
away from the exploitation of labor and towards a theory of accumulation
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as a multifaceted process that includes other forms of accumulation besides
exploitation. In this sense, although he agrees with Marx that exploitation
is central to the capitalist economy, he ultimately expands the concept of
accumulation to include ‘‘rent’’ and ‘‘interest’’ as equivalent forms of gener-
ating surplus value. For example, he argues that ‘‘far from the ‘euthenasia
of the rentier’ that Keynes envisaged, class power is increasingly articulated
through rental payments’’ and ‘‘the emergence of a global property market
and urbanization as an expanding conduit for capital accumulation has al-
lowed certain dynamic centres of capitalism, such as Hong Kong, to survive
on the basis of property development and rent extractions . . . as anything
else.’’286
It is on this basis that Harvey claims to make his most important contri-
bution to Marxist theory, what he calls the ‘‘spatial fix.’’ Arguing that ‘‘the
role of imperialism and colonialism, of geographical expansion and territo-
rial domination, in the overall stabilization of capitalism is unresolved,’’
Harvey proposes:
The central point I have sought to hammer home . . . is that the production of
spatial configurations is necessarily an active constitutive moment in the
dynamics of accumulation. The shape of spatial configurations and the means for
the annihilation of space with time are as important for understanding these
dynamics as are improved methods of co-operation, the more extended use of
machinery, etc. All of these features have to be assimilated within a broad con-
ception of technological and organizational change. Since the latter is the pivot
upon which accumulation turns as well as the nexus from which the contradic-
tions of capitalism flow, then it follows that spatial and temporal expressions of
this contradictory dynamic are of equal import.287
In other words, equivalent to the mechanisms upon which capitalism ex-
tracts surplus value from labor are the physical, geographical spaces in
which this extraction takes place. Harvey’s articulation of the ‘‘spatial fix’’
advances a theory of imperialism that draws more upon Luxemburg’s The
Accumulation of Capital and Arendt’s Imperialism than Lenin’s foundational
work. According to Luxemburg, ‘‘Accumulation is . . . primarily a relation-
ship between capital and a non-capitalist environment’’288 in that it is
through the appropriation of resources and markets of a ‘‘non-capitalist’’
periphery that the capitalist ‘‘center’’ is able to overcome what she argues is
the primary crisis of capitalism, namely a crisis of ‘‘underconsumption.’’ She
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proposes that in this way, ‘‘imperialism is the political expression of the
accumulation of capital in its competitive struggle for what remains still
open of the non-capitalist environment’’ and that ‘‘the more violently, ruth-
lessly and thoroughly imperialism brings about the decline of non-capitalist
civilizations, the more rapidly it cuts the very ground from under the feet of
capitalist accumulation.’’289 That is, the ultimate crisis of capitalism emerges
when there are no longer any ‘‘non-capitalist’’ areas of the world for capital-
ists to exploit through colonial and other means for the direct appropriation
of resources. Similarly, Arendt argues that what initiated the era of imperi-
alism was an awareness on the part of the bourgeoisie that ‘‘the original
sin of simply robbery, which centuries ago had made possible the ‘original
accumulation of capital’ (Marx) and had started all further accumulation,
had eventually to be repeated lest the motor of accumulation suddenly die
down.’’290 Although Harvey challenges Luxemburg’s theory of ‘‘undercon-
sumption’’ as the reasoning for capitalism’s outward expansion,291 he none-
theless accepts the premise of both Luxemburg and Arendt that Marx’s
theory of the primacy of accumulation through the extraction of surplus
value effectively relegated ‘‘accumulation based upon predation, fraud, and
violence to an ‘original stage’ that is no longer considered relevant’’ and
that, instead, ‘‘a general re-evaluation of the continuous role and persistence
of the predatory practices of ‘primitive’ or ‘original’ accumulation within
the long historical geography of capitalist accumulation is . . . very much in
order.’’292 Harvey calls this process ‘‘accumulation by dispossession’’ and
argues that it includes a range of alternative forms of capital accumulation
from ‘‘the commodification and privatization of land and the forceful expul-
sion of peasant populations’’ and ‘‘the suppression of the right to the com-
mons’’ to ‘‘usury, the national debt, and ultimately the credit system as
radical means of primitive accumulation.’’293
Marx, however, is clear as to why these forms of accumulation are sec-
ondary to what Harvey reduces to the ‘‘first cut’’ of three. In the third
volume of Capital, he writes that one of the limits of classical economy is
that ‘‘it has never even considered profit in its pure form as distinct from its
different, self-established components, such as industrial profit, commercial
profit, interest, and ground rent.’’294 In theorizing the tendency of the rate
of profit to fall, Marx argues instead that ‘‘we intentionally present this
law before going on to the division of profit into different self-established
categories’’ because ‘‘the profit to which we are here referring is but another
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name for surplus value itself’’ and thus that ‘‘the drop in the rate of profit,
therefore, expresses the failing relation of surplus value to advanced total
capital, and is for this reason independent of any division whatsoever of this
surplus value among the various categories.’’295 In other words, it is not, as
Harvey claims, that Marx was too caught up in classical economics and thus
failed to consider the implications of these other forms of accumulation.
Rather, Marx focuses on the production of surplus value at the point of
production because he is arguing that it is the central mechanism by which
capitalism produces new value to accumulate. In turn, it is the exploitation
of labor that thus comes to define the limits and possibilities of all of these
other modes of accumulation, which become dependent upon the surplus
value produced in production as the basis of their share of profits.
The consequence of this difference becomes clear when we turn to the
question of social transformation. Insofar as Harvey, like Hardt and Negri,
extends the theory of value to include forms of accumulation as equal to the
exploitation of labor, he proposes that ‘‘struggles against dispossession (of
land rights, of welfare, pension and healthcare rights, of environmental
qualities, of life itself ) are of a different character to struggles around the
labour process that have long dominated Marxist politics’’296 and that ‘‘the
class relation between capital and labor . . . is merely a starting point from
which to analyze the production of far more complicated class configura-
tions unique to capitalism.’’297 In other words, despite his hesitancy to em-
brace Hardt and Negri’s theory of the multitude by ‘‘expanding’’ the
concept of value as operating beyond production,298 we move away from an
economic analysis of class towards a theory of new social formations that, I
argue, actually fractures the basis of unity rather than generate new forms
of solidarity. As Lenin explains, capitalism in its monopoly stage represents
the expansion of capitalist relations not only across the globe but ‘‘into
every sphere of public life, regardless of the form of government and all
other ‘details.’ ’’299 The commodification of even the most basic social re-
sources such as water, food, healthcare, education, and shelter that mark the
economic reality of globalization has brought about a growing crisis that
spans across all social levels, making clear that the growing contradictions
of capitalism are indicative of the inequalities that, as Marx and Engels ar-
gued over one hundred fifty years ago, systematically arise and place the
entire capitalist system on trial. The declining social net of education,
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health care and housing, the spread of diseases such as AIDS and tubercu-
losis, the constant daily threat of starvation of almost one billion people,
the potentially irrevocable damage to the environment, and a growing per-
manent population of un- and under-employed people are the social back-
ground against which a new series of inter-imperialist wars to re-divide the
boundaries of control over the global labor market are now being launched.
What unites the working class is not a fractured framework of multiple
identities, but rather the fact that every aspect of life is being subsumed to
the profit motive. As Lenin’s theory of imperialism makes clear, the prob-
lem with the fuzzy concepts of a postimperial, postcapitalist, postclass net-
work capitalism is that while globalization is pronounced as a new stage of
capitalist development, the ongoing failure of capitalism to address the ma-
terial needs of the majority of the world’s population has not only become
increasingly difficult to ignore but, more importantly, is impossible to solve
without bringing about the transformation of a society based upon private
accumulation of surplus value to one founded upon meeting the needs of all.
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Reading and Writing in the Digital Age
One of the main arguments in cultural theory today is that the transition
from what is described as a closed print-based culture to an open digital
culture is part of a broader shift in how culture is produced and consumed.
It is argued that digital technologies turn consumers and readers into pro-
ducers and writers by giving them access to the necessary tools for remixing
and remaking culture for themselves. In this chapter, I locate the question
of cultural production within a broader historical debate over the status of
mimesis and propose that the theory of nonmimetic reflection, in which
culture is understood as shaped by social relations, provides the most effec-
tive framework for the study of digital culture.
Knowing versus Understanding
With the development of the digital economy, the contradiction between
what the productivity of labor makes possible and the property relations
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that confine all possibilities to the profit motive has never been sharper. In
the heightening of this contradiction, capitalism increasingly divides know-
ing—asking how things work—from understanding—asking why they work
the way they do—privileging the first over the second. This is because, on
the one hand, the complexity of living and working in the digital economy
requires the development of knowledge that provides the labor force with
the skills needed for working in a system of global production and exchange.
On the other hand, the growing division of labor serves as the basis for an
expansion of the negative knowledge described by Marx as ‘‘commodity
fetishism,’’ in which the social relations between people appear as the social
relations between things and the irrational economic relations of capitalism
come to seem ‘‘normal’’ and ‘‘everyday.’’1 In this context, what has emerged
in the academic institutions of the North as most effective for capital is a
highly sophisticated but local and historically empty discourse that displaces
the understanding of social relations and replaces it with a mode of knowing
that can maneuver in the global economy without having any need to un-
derstand why it works the way it does.
The knowledge that has proven most effective for capital in this respect
have been the theories that, since the end of the long boom, have focused
attention on the intricacies of language, representation, and meaning while
situating this process as an endless series of questions without conclusions.
This discourse, which originated in the post–World War II era as postmod-
ernism but which has since become the commonsense of the digital age and
thus no longer requires a distinct nomenclature, has proven so useful to capi-
tal because of the way in which it takes the economic contradictions of capital-
ism and turns them into texts that can be poured over, studied, debated,
disassembled, and deconstructed without any possibility of reaching a conclu-
sion. In other words, it is so effective for maintaining the ideology of the wage
as a ‘‘fair’’ exchange for labor power precisely because it does not ignore social
conflict and contradictions, but rather appropriates them and turns them into
spaces for interminable analysis that prove again and again the impossibility
of understanding their underlying economic logic. It turns class divisions into
divisions of power, and then represents power as that which ‘‘always reconsti-
tutes itself,’’2 erasing the possibility of any alternative to the existing.
This ‘‘knowing’’ discourse is nowhere clearer than in the emerging theo-
rizations of the so-called digital text. In the most basic sense, the digital is a
binary logic in which all actions are reduced to one of two positions, on or
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off, and which serves as the basic language of all computing. In contempo-
rary cultural theory, however, new technologies of reading and writing are
taken to mean more than what the digital makes possible in the ways in
which information is written, stored, and transmitted. As the editors of The
Literary Text in the Digital Age argue, in the ‘‘twilight of the Age of the
Printed Book,’’ we are at the beginning of a time of profound change, one
that will forever alter our notions of ‘literature’ ’’ as ‘‘fixed, linear, noninter-
active, and, most restrictive of all, essentially confined to a single medium.’’3
In this sense, the ability to digitalize text has become a sign for historical
difference—the idea that the present is unlike the past and, furthermore,
that the complexity of the present makes both itself and the past unreadable.
The digitalization of the text does not eliminate the binary, but renders the
binary indecipherable and makes this indecipherability the space of plea-
sure. According to the work of prominent literary and cultural theorists
working within digital textual studies, such as N. Katherine Hayles (Writing
Machines), Avital Ronell (The Telephone Book), George P. Landow (Hypertext
3.0), Alan Liu (The Laws of Cool), and Jerome McGann (Radiant Textuality),
the digital text means nothing less than a fundamental transformation in
the very structure of social life, requiring a move from an analytics of depth
to a postanalytic play of surfaces that complicates all binary relations, includ-
ing the relation between writer and reader, past and present, inside and
outside, production and consumption. For example, Alan Kirby writes in
Digimodernism that the digital text represents ‘‘a new form of textuality
characterized in its purest instances by onwardness, haphazardness, evanes-
cence, and anonymous, social, and multiple authorship’’4 such that what
he declares ‘‘digimodernism’’ goes beyond postmodernism in denying the
relevance of history. Kirby writes that whereas postmodernism ‘‘empha-
sized a new sense of history construed in the present’’ the ‘‘apparently real
and digimodernism are by contrast lost in the here and how, swamped in
the textual present; they know nothing of the cultural past and have no
historical sense.’’5
The digital, in this context, is no longer defined as the difference be-
tween on and off, but between open and closed. In this pairing, closed is the
sign of totality, of objectivity, of history, of understanding, and of critique.
The closed system is ‘‘a static and determined value which would inform
and enclose the genesis of Being and meaning’’ and thus prevent the play
of endless interpretation.6 In contrast, open is defined as the space of the
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‘‘bastard, hybrid, grafted, multilinear, and polyglot.’’7 Knowing, in this
sense, is ‘‘the infinite opening’’ that seeks out the eruptions of pleasure in
the ‘‘irreducible incompleteness’’ that renders closure impossible.8 It is a
form of knowing that assumes ‘‘what I can never understand, in a structure,
is that by means of which it is not closed.’’9 The binary, according to this
logic of open and closed, is not erased, but rendered unreadable and without
conclusion by positing that it is the excessive space of both/and/neither
without determination. It is, in short, the textualization of the digital, the
turning into narrative the historical conditions which produce the digital
economy and which limit its development, that is at work in this logic.
However, what is necessary today is a different reading of the digital, one
that begins not in terms of the surfaces of digital culture, but, following
Marx, ‘‘from the contradictions of material life.’’10 While theorists such
as George P. Landow argue that with the digital text ‘‘we must abandon
conceptual systems founded on ideas of a center, margin, hierarchy, and
linearity, and replace them by ones of multilinearity, nodes, links, and net-
works’’11 which have ‘‘no primary axis of interpretation’’ and ‘‘no center,’’12
the relationship between the emerging digital economy and its cultural rep-
resentations can only be understood by connecting what is inside the digital
text with what is outside of it. That is to say, what is necessary if we are to
understand the relation between the virtuality of digital representations and
the actuality of class inequalities is to return to the Marxist theory of nonmi-
metic reflection, which approaches cultural developments not simply in
terms of their overt forms but their underlying social logic. It is on this
basis that I propose that by employing the theory of nonmimetic reflection
one can understand why the argument that culture has become open and
postreferential—that is, not antireferential, fictional, or illusion, but always
plural, renewable, and without any determination—is itself a reference to
both the possibilities of digital culture and the contradictions that capitalism
finds itself in today. Through this analysis, one can begin to understand
why the digital condition is read as the eruption of space of an ‘‘in-between-
ness’’ that requires no finality, no theorization beyond how it works. It is a
response to the crisis of a falling rate of profit that has plagued capitalism
since the emergence of the long downturn by providing capital with new
ways for conceptualizing the organization of production globally. In other
words, the contradictions of capitalism are not the effect of closed narra-
tives. Whether culture appears open or closed, is not determined inside the
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text, but outside it in the class struggle over the relations of production.
The textualization of the digital, however, is the way of explaining the con-
tradictions of network capitalism—between the increasing productivity of
labor across the globe and the restriction of the productivity of labor to
the profit motive, which itself depends upon the fundamental contradiction
between those who own and control the means of production and those
who are forced to sell their labor-power to survive—as the effect of some-
thing other than the inherent inequality of capitalist property relations. By
rendering indecipherable the connection between the economic relations of
society and its cultural representations, I argue that the dominant theories
of the digital text actually fix history rather than open it to the plays of
language by reducing the contradictions of reality to a narrative without
materiality—an opening without closure that is the ‘‘condition of possibility
and a certain impossibility of every structure’’13—and thus work to extend
the economic relations of exploitation rather than against them.
The Open Ideology of Digital Textualism
In the theoretical tradition of the postmodern criticisms of Barthes, Der-
rida, Foucault, and Lyotard, digital theorists who take a textual approach to
social contradictions seek to destabilize history by positing that a fundamen-
tal break has occurred which undoes all previous assumptions about history
itself. In literary studies this break has come to be defined as the shift from
a culture based around the logic of print to a postprint culture of the screen.
According to this reading, print represents not just the material means by
which information is transmitted, but the broader cultural logic that reduces
writing to the recording of reality, and thus a pale copy of the real. In this
sense, print is defined as that which seeks to fix the play of meaning by
situating the objective as the source of meaning and the subjective as the
site of passive reflection. As such, the logic of print culture is said to be
the effect of the metaphysics of presence spanning the history of Western
philosophy from Plato to Hegel in which the text is assumed to be ‘‘merely
a pure and simple ‘copy’ of another existence, situated in an extra-structural
field, the ‘real.’ ’’14 That is to say, print here is understood to signify a stable
relation between text and reality in which what is inside the text is an unme-
diated reflection of what exists outside of the text. In contrast, the emer-
gence of the digital text is said to represent a turn away from what Derrida
PAGE 126................. 18088$ $CH3 08-04-11 13:44:06 PS
Reading and Writing in the Digital Age 127
describes in Paper Machine as ‘‘a certain totality’’ of the book,15 and what
Baudrillard portrays as the referentiality of ‘‘the map, the double, the mir-
ror, or the concept,’’16 towards what Peter Lunenfeld outlines in The Digital
Dialectic as ‘‘an era hostile to meta-narratives, a climate that resists the urge
to totalize.’’17 Or, to put this differently, the digital text is what in the con-
temporary resists conceptualization and exceeds all attempts to finalize the
meaning of any narrative. As Samuel Weber writes in describing the ‘‘virtu-
ality’’ of the writings of Walter Benjamin and thus of their relevance for the
modern age,
What defines the world in its heterogeneity—divine, human, non-human—is
precisely the diversity of translatability, which in turn entails the ability to
impart: to partition, to take leave of oneself in order to transpose a part of that
self elsewhere, thereby altering it. The world, thus described consists not of a
single, continuous medium, nor even of different media that resemble one
another, but rather of a network of media whose sole shared trait is the ability to
‘‘part with’’ in im-parting. ‘‘Differentiation,’’ perhaps, but not one that produces
anything like ‘‘global integration.’’ Rather, global disintegration.18
The digital is understood to be the expression of a culture of surfaces: a
culture that is posthistorical, postpolitical, and postanalytical and which can
no longer be understood as shaped by any metanarrative of progress, class
struggle, or social transformation that is claimed to take place ‘‘outside the
text.’’
It is on these terms that the digital text is said to require a new mode of
analysis that, according to the editors of Digital Media Revisited, is detached
from the ‘‘grand narrative of modernity’’19—which means abandoning con-
cepts such as production, causality, totality, and referentiality when making
sense of the text—and, instead, embraces a new way of reading in which,
‘‘the name of the game is tearing apart and weaving together, decoupling
and recoupling, analyzing and synthesizing, diverging and converging’’
without appealing to any final or definable outside of the text, whether this
outside is the ‘‘author’’ or ‘‘reality.’’20 As Robert Markley writes, ‘‘to histori-
cize and theorize virtual realities . . . is to enter into a wide-ranging investi-
gation of technology, mathematics, economics, gender politics, and
psychology that resists any simple narrative or conceptual closure.’’21 In
other words, the digital text is taken to be the sign of an open culture that
resists the closure of analysis and critique. It is a culture of tissues, traces,
and ghosts without any determination.
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It is not coincidental that what is now represented as the newness of the
digital text first emerges in the 1960s, at a time when the economic structures
which had been established to regulate the global economy in the post–
World War II period began to conflict with the need for capital to expand
globally. The Bretton Woods agreement, which pegged international cur-
rency rates to the U.S. dollar in an attempt to stabilize them as the European
and Asian markets recovered from the war, no longer made sense in a world
in which the economies of Germany and Japan had not only recovered, but
began to outpace manufacturing in the United States while at the same time
offering cheaper sources of labor, resulting in a higher rate of profit.22 The
decline in profit rates by 40.9 percent and 29.3 percent in the manufacturing
and private business sectors in the United States during the period 1965–73,
combined with the desire of capital to move to areas with more profitable
rates of return—marked by 50 percent faster growth in international invest-
ment by U.S. corporations as opposed to domestic investment in the period
1958–196523—were a reflection of the fact that Fordist ways of thinking
about the organization of production were increasingly in conflict with what
had become materially possible with the advances in labor productivity that
had only begun to be realized during the long boom. What begins to emerge
at this time are new ways of thinking about the economy as needing to be
more open and flexible than the closed economic structure of Keynesian eco-
nomics had allowed. At this time, the so-called open society philosophies of
Henri Bergson and Karl Popper, in which it is argued that the closed social
and philosophical systems that are collectivist and place the needs of the
group over the needs of the individual need to give way to ‘‘open societies’’
in which ‘‘individuals are confronted with personal decisions’’ and ‘‘strive to
rise socially, and to take the place of other members,’’24 begins to return to
prominence in the form of the monetarist policies of Milton Friedman. At
the same time, one sees at the level of cultural theory the beginnings of the
postmodern logic in which the contradictions of society become the restric-
tions between closed and open readings of the text and the focus is on exam-
ining the processes of reading rather than the conclusions of analysis. In other
words, capitalism had reached a historical limit that needed to be overcome.
It is in this context that theories of openness and fluidity became useful as
ways of making more effective (that is, profitable) use of technological devel-
opments as well as for thinking globally as the economic markets in Europe
and Asia rebounded.
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In the contemporary moment, the theory of the digital text corresponds
to the renewed global expansion that begins to take place in the 1990s, but
which first started with the restructuring of capital during the 1970s and
1980s in response to the crisis of a falling rate of profit that led to a crisis of
overproduction and lower rates of economic growth. Once again, the con-
flict is defined as the end of the closed society (that is, the Soviet Union)
and its philosophy (Marxism) and the emergence of the new open global
order (neoliberalism). Just as in the theories of the open society, what un-
derlies this new theory, in which the digital becomes text and therefore
indecipherable, is the broader assumption that we have entered a funda-
mentally new moment in history in which concepts such as class and pro-
duction can no longer account for the informational realities of network
capitalism because network capitalism operates on a new economic logic in
which knowledge replaces labor. Because knowledge is represented as an
inexhaustible resource that cannot be owned in the traditional sense of pri-
vate property, it is posited that what defines an individual’s social status is
not production but consumption—the ways in which individuals exchange
and make use of digital culture as it flows through the Internet. For exam-
ple, as Henry Jenkins argues, in the new digital economy ‘‘each of us con-
structs our own personal mythology from bits and fragments of information
extracted from the media flow.’’25 Similarly, Mark Poster writes, ‘‘the art of
network computing brings forth a culture that highlights its future transfor-
mation’’ and ‘‘rather than confirming the completeness of the real . . . insists
on the virtuality of the real, its openness to possibility.’’26
According to this logic, by having access to the means of representation
rather than control over the means of production, it becomes the responsi-
bility of the individual to create the reality that he or she desires to live in
regardless of their class status. This ‘‘responsibility,’’ which ultimately turns
all social issues into private troubles, is said to be the effect of a new regime
of cultural freedom from the homogenizing cultural structures of moder-
nity. As Silvio Gaggi states in From Text to Hypertext, ‘‘Books, stories,
poems, essays, or articles may no longer be conceived as primary units,
more or less complete and self-sufficient statements of one kind or another.
Instead, there will simply be a textual network that one enters, through
which one moves, and from which one exits.’’27 Whereas print assumed a
particular, determined relationship between the text and the real, in the age
of the digital text Gaggi argues, ‘‘there is no source of values or priorities
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which tell the reader which direction or path he or she should choose.’’28
Similarly, as Christian Vandendorpe writes in From Papyrus to Hypertext,
‘‘while reading a book is marked by duration and a certain continuity, read-
ing hypertext is marked by a sense of urgency, discontinuity, and constant
choices.’’29 In other words, in spite of the fact that we are said to be moving
into an age of information, the availability of the digital text supposedly
means less understanding of its meaning. The digital has, instead, become
the sign of ambiguity, uncertainty, and openness. Thus, becoming recog-
nized as a ‘‘subtle’’ and ‘‘sophisticated’’ reader who knows and can navigate
the pluralities of the new forms of digital reading and writing—what might
be called the shuffling of the text in which multiple narratives exist simulta-
neously, playing endlessly against one another to undermine any singular
meaning of the work—depends upon accepting the impossibility of under-
standing the world with any kind of certainty.
One of the more influential versions of this reading of the digital text
within cyber-cultural studies is Richard A. Lanham’s The Electronic Word:
Democracy, Technology, and the Arts. According to Lanham, the unspoken
assumption of print is that it is an essentially noiseless—in the sense of
cultural or social interference—reproduction of reality and the promise that
the truth of any reading is justified by the ability of writing to accurately
reflect reality. He thus describes reading in the print age as concerned pri-
marily with ‘‘looking through’’ the text: ‘‘Look through a text and you
are in the familiar world of the Newtonian Interlude, where facts were facts,
the world was really ‘out there,’ folks had sincere central selves, and the best
writing style dropped from the writer as ‘simply and directly as a stone falls
to the ground,’ precisely as Thoreau counseled.’’30 According to this read-
ing, what matters is not the text, but the world outside of the text. The text
is read as a mimetic reflection of the truth of life, or what Henry James calls
‘‘a direct impression of life’’31 and ‘‘the sense of reality.’’32 On the contrary,
in the digital age, Lanham argues, it has become impossible to ignore the
mediations of the screen. He writes, ‘‘when the text moves from page to
screen . . . the digital text becomes unfixed and interactive.’’33 What this
means is that in becoming digital, and thus able to be manipulated endlessly
by both reader and writer in ways that the fixity of print supposedly does
not allow, the text becomes interminable—there is no longer any ‘‘final cut’’
and thus ‘‘no conventional endings, or beginnings, or middles either.’’34 As
such, we can no longer just ‘‘look through’’ the text. As readers we are
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forced to confront the impossibility of moving from the inside of the liter-
ary to an understanding of the outside of reality. Instead, Lanham posits
that we are to ‘‘look at’’ the text, in its (temporary) manifestation on the
screen. It is by looking ‘‘at’’ the text, rather than projecting an outside
‘‘through’’ the text, that ‘‘we have deconstructed the Newtonian world
into Pirandello’s.’’35
The emergence of a digital text—in which the form of scientific under-
standing of the relation between the outside (reality) and inside (literary)
represented by the figure of Newton is blurred and becomes the oscillating,
postreferential writings of Luigi Pirandello (Il Turno, Suo Marito)—is posi-
tioned as a direct challenge to the theoretical principles which Lanham lo-
cates as the foundation of modern society up until the digital age. He writes,
‘‘The center of Western culture since the Renaissance—really since the
great Alexandrian editors of Homer—the fixed, authoritative, canonical
text, simply disappears into the ether,’’36 which, in turn, means that ‘‘the
definitive and unchangeable text upon which Western humanism has been
based since the Renaissance, and the Arnoldian ‘masterpiece’ theory of cul-
ture built upon it, are called into question, put into play.’’37 To ‘‘look at’’
the text is for Lanham to take into account the mediations of form, the plays
of language, and the ways in which, this argument goes, what is outside the
text is really put there by what is inside the text. In short, that what the text
produces is not reliable knowledge of the world, but rather what the literary
critic Paul de Man calls ‘‘negative knowledge’’ in which we accept the idea
that the text ‘‘is a reliable source of information about anything but its own
language.’’38
There is both a local and a global contradiction in this argument. To
establish a historical boundary between at and through, print and post-
print, and analog and digital is to assume a theory of referentiality that can
effectively understand the development of society independent of historical
narratives. That is to say, even as it denies the possibility of looking beyond
the screen, Lanham’s theory nonetheless depends upon a reading of history
as progressive and moving towards a more democratic reality through the
development of new technologies. In this sense, to what extent is ‘‘looking
at’’ the text fundamentally different from ‘‘looking through’’ it? If we ac-
cept the argument that the at undoes the through then it becomes impos-
sible to see why history should be divided into a past and a present at the
moment at which the computer screen emerges. at and through, print and
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postprint, analog and digital are all binaries, and thus the problem is clearly
not with thinking in binaries, nor in selecting one as the true reflection of
reality. The problem that Lanham cannot account for directly is that his
history ignores that history is divided, but this division is not reducible to
the narratives of history in a kind of self-reflexive information feedback loop
or to developments in technology in a weak form of technological deter-
minism. It is the social relations of production that shape history. In other
words, the problem is not simply that Lanham has not escaped the meta-
physics of presence. Rather, the problem is an objective division between
the owners of the means of production and the property-less workers that
cannot simply be reduced to language. In this way, what Lanham is propos-
ing is a theory of history which addresses class conflicts, but redefines it as
the control over meaning before promising that with the new developments
in technology everyone will have the opportunity to redefine the text (and
thus take temporary control over the property of the text). This is another
name for the spiritualism, which, as Marx argues, is the ‘‘inverted conscious-
ness’’ of an ‘‘inverted world.’’39 In other words, it emerges from actual social
conflicts—in this case, the conflict over whether digital technologies will be
put to use for meeting the needs of all, or whether it will continue to be
used destructively in the interests of private accumulation of capital—but
turns away from reality and towards the idea, solving in the realm of the
spiritual what can only really be solved by transforming the material reality
which produces the contradiction.
Mimesis, Nonmimesis, and Nonmimetic Reflection
The representation of the digital as resisting conceptualization and requir-
ing ‘‘playful’’ modes of analysis that operate ‘‘beyond the metaphysics of
truth and appearance of the utopian imagination informing the revolu-
tionary ideas of modernity’’ because they ‘‘cannot be planned or even
thought in advance’’40 has its roots in the postmodern critical writings of
Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, Julia Kristeva, Michel Foucault, and
Jean-François Lyotard. Although postmodernism has become a term that
has fallen out of style because it could no longer effectively be used to
justify growing inequalities and thus has been swept aside with the ‘‘end
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of theory’’ pronouncements, postmodernism ‘‘lives on’’ after its death be-
cause it still provides an effective spiritual solution to material contradic-
tions of contemporary capitalism. In the guise of opening a space for the
freedom of the individual from so-called closed structures of reason and
rationality, postmodernism provides ideological cover for capitalism by
denying that there is any understandable connection between the struc-
tures of meaning and culture (where individual freedom is said to reside)
and the exploitation of labor that the capitalist system is based upon.
What in particular makes these theories socially conservative is that they
put forward a worldview that severs the economic from the cultural and in
doing so propose that what is ultimately necessary is not social transforma-
tion but cultural refiguration. The exploitative relations of capitalism are
held in abeyance, protected from social criticism by the notion that it is
impossible to say with any certainty whether there is any connection be-
tween the material relations that determine the structure of people’s lives—
whether, for instance, they must sell their labor on the market or whether
they purchase the labor power of others—and the cultural representations
of these relations because certainty has been declared suspect and a sign for
being a crude and not a subtle or fun reading of the text. The distinction I
am referring to here is between what Walter Benjamin describes as ‘‘coarse
thinking’’ or thinking that ‘‘dispense[s] with illusion’’41 on the one hand,
and, on the other, the blissful reading that Barthes describes as ‘‘the dialec-
tics of desire, of an unpredictability of bliss’’ that avoids judgment or critique
but instead seeks to continually reconfigure a text in new ways.42 Unlike the
‘‘coarse thinking’’ that seeks to sharply uncover the relation between culture
and society, the blissful reading denies that contemporary culture has any
history that can be known with certainty and therefore any ability to be
fundamentally changed. It is assumed that what exists now has always ex-
isted and will always exist, regardless of what happens, because the opera-
tions of power that structure every text—whether literary or social—means
that the play of the text cannot help but refigure itself in essentially the
same ways even after having been deconstructed. In this way, it is the bliss-
ful reading that ultimately projects forever into the future the relations of
inequality and oppression that are said to constitute any social system. The
idea that capitalism will exist in perpetuity operates as the underlying as-
sumption of a blissful reading and is smuggled in under the guise of power.
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The writings of Jacques Derrida have been particularly influential in es-
tablishing the theory of the digital-as-text and therefore as an excessive sign
that always exceeds closure, determination, and conclusion. He has become,
in many ways, the ‘‘master’’ theorist of the global network economy because
through his arguments that the purpose of analysis should not be to ‘‘de-
stroy structures from the outside,’’ but to find moments of pleasure from
within by ‘‘inhabiting those structures’’ and demonstrating how the struc-
tures can become spaces of ‘‘play’’ even if they can never be fully overturned
or transformed by exposing the slippages of meaning,43 he ultimately dis-
misses the possibility of transformative critique and replaces it with the
playful and desireful logic of the ‘‘in-between.’’ One of the central texts in
which Derrida advances this thesis is ‘‘The Double Session.’’ In this essay,
Derrida provides a close reading of Plato’s Philebus and Mallarmé’s Mimique
in order to challenge what he argues is the basis of all Western thought in
mimesis, or the theory that the meaning of the signifier is determined by a
direct connection to a stable referent independent from itself. Instead,
through his reading of Mallarmé, Derrida proposes what is essentially a
politics of immanence in place of a politics of critique in arguing for the
necessity of reorienting theory away from the mimetic toward what he calls
dissemination, the displacement of the search for truth and the ‘‘abandoning
of all depth’’44 in favor of the ‘‘affirmation of the non-origin, the remarkable
empty locus of a hundred blanks no meaning can be ascribed to, in which
mark supplements and substitution games are multiplied ad infinitum.’’45
The ‘‘double’’ in the ‘‘double session’’ is thus about the impossibility of
moving beyond the binary—including the binary of class—and instead cele-
brating the pleasure that the temporary suspension of the system can pro-
vide before it restructures itself. In positing the irreducibility of the
binary—the simultaneous logic of both/and/neither—the ‘‘double session’’
has become so influential because it responds to the contradictory needs of
capital to provide working people with a skillful mode of reading that can
deal with the intricacies of a global, digital economy that requires the ability
to think in terms of a transnational network of production and exchange,
while representing what is ultimately a form of know-how for the digital age
as ‘‘sophisticated’’ and ‘‘daring.’’ What Derrida calls the ‘‘double session’’ is
precisely the theoretical framework for the textualization of the digital—the
suspension of analysis and the play of surfaces that blocks understanding of
the economic laws of contemporary capitalism.
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The ‘‘double session’’ is initiated by the placing of a text within a text;
specifically, Derrida begins by ‘‘cutting and pasting’’ an excerpt of Mal-
larmé’s Mimique into a passage from Plato’s Philebus, such that the latter
surrounds the former. What Derrida refers to as the formal ‘‘play’’ of the
text is intended to be read as the first example of the ‘‘double session’’ and
to draw the reader’s attention to the surfaces of the text. It foregrounds the
playfulness of text and, in many ways, is a precursor to the digital logic that
interlinking one text with another renders meaning indecipherable because
there is no longer any way to determine which is primary and which is
secondary. It turns the text into a side-by-side and nonconfrontational logic,
in which two arguments exist simultaneously in a post-dialectical frame
without resolution, hierarchy, or synthesis. He writes, ‘‘a short text by Mal-
larmé, Mimique, is embedded in one corner, sharing or completing it, with
a segment from the Philebus, which, without actually naming mimesis, illus-
trates the mimetic system and even defines it, let us say in anticipation, as a
system of illustration.’’46 For Derrida, Plato’s mimetic system of reference
is based upon the presupposition that writing is simply the recording of an
independent referent, and thus that the truth or falsity of writing depends
upon its accuracy in reflecting what is external to it. In this context, he
writes, ‘‘true history, the history of meaning, is told in the Philebus.’’47 What
Derrida means by ‘‘true history’’ is an ontological theory of meaning which
depends upon the ‘‘presumed possibility of a discourse about what is, the
deciding and decidable logos of or about the on (being-present).’’48 On the
contrary, Mallarmé’s text is read by Derrida as exposing the fallacy of ontol-
ogy as a reliable basis of truth. He states, ‘‘Mallarmé . . . preserves the
differential structure of mimicry or mimesis, but without its Platonic or
metaphysical interpretation.’’49 This is because, Derrida explains, Mal-
larmé’s theory of nonmimesis assumes ‘‘no total message located in some
imaginary order, intentionality, or lived experience’’ and thus that ‘‘the text
is no longer the expression or representation (felicitous or otherwise) of any
truth.’’50 By placing Mallarmé’s text inside of Plato’s, the reader is meant to
see that their relationship is one in which Mallarmé’s theory of nonmimesis
is at work within Plato’s theory; in fact, in his reading of Plato, he implies
that the theory of nonmimesis is actually prior to Plato’s theory of mimesis
and what Plato’s theory has to suppress in order to function. On these
terms, Derrida is proposing that what is posited as truth and which is said
to secure the meaning of writing is actuality an effect of writing itself. In
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contrast to this, what Derrida advances in ‘‘The Double Session’’ is a
counter-reading of writing to challenge what he argues is the fallacy of truth
in all writings, a fallacy which he believes closes off the play of meaning
and restricts the possibilities for thinking difference without antagonism or
synthesis.
In the excerpt from Plato’s Philebus cited by Derrida, Socrates is engag-
ing in a dialogue with Protarchus regarding the relation between represen-
tation and reality, specifically the basis upon which an image that emerges
in the mind can be characterized as true or false. Socrates begins this section
of the dialogue by establishing that the inner workings of the mind (opin-
ion) are equivalent and in fact prior to what is expressed by the spoken word
(assertion), and that when alone a person will ‘‘continuing thinking the same
thing [as if they were speaking aloud].’’51 The purpose of the ordering of
‘‘opinion’’ (thought) and ‘‘assertion’’ (speech) is to show that the illustration
of the idea—its manifestation in speech—comes after it first arises in the
mind. Following this, Socrates argues a person’s thoughts, which are com-
pared to writing a book ‘‘on the soul,’’ can be classified as true or false
depending upon whether they correspond to the truth of logos. He states,
‘‘when this experience writes what is true, the result is that true opinion and
true assertions spring up in us, while when the internal scribe that I have
suggested writes what is false, we get the opposite sort of opinions and
assertions.’’52 I will return to the issue of ‘‘reality’’ as it is defined here;
what is central to this passage is the understanding that the truth value of a
statement is determined not within itself—that is, it cannot be decided on
its own terms—but in relation to something outside the statement. That
there is an outside to thought within Plato’s writings can be seen in his
definition of the idea, which is described as ‘‘the conjunction of memory
with sensations, together with the feelings consequent upon memory and
sensation.’’53 According to this definition, any idea about the world consists
of a relation between internal reason and external reality. That is, on the
one hand, the idea consists of ‘‘the conjunction of memory with sensations,’’
or the history of past experiences combined with the experiences of the
present and, on the other hand, ‘‘the feelings consequent upon memory
and sensation,’’ or the ways in which we respond to our past and present
experiences of the world. In other words, the basis of the idea and, at the
same time, the means by which it is possible to determine whether or not
one’s understanding of the world is true, is the existence of a reality outside
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and independent of the idea. According to Derrida, it is here that Plato
establishes ‘‘the history of meaning,’’54 by which he means the assumption
in virtually all of Western thought that ascribes the very possibility of mean-
ing to the ability to ‘‘see through’’ language to reality. He writes, ‘‘the very
concept of history has lived only upon the possibility of meaning, upon the
past, present, or promised presence of meaning and truth.’’55 It is this mi-
metic system—the idea of the truth of history residing elsewhere—which,
for Derrida, is at work in all of history, literature, and science and which,
he argues, represents the fallacy of truth at the center of Western thought.
According to Derrida, Plato’s theory of meaning is based upon an inter-
nal division in which what is assumed to be outside of language is an effect
of language. He argues that in Plato’s definition, writing is presented as a
kind of dialogue between the individual self and the other. Yet, it can be
described from the beginning as an illusory dialogue because ‘‘the need for
the book or for writing in the soul is only felt through the lack of presence
of the other . . . the object is to reconstitute the presence of the other by
substitution.’’56 In other words, writing is defined here as a substitute for
what is missing from reality and it is on this basis that it can become a
substitute for reality itself. When one does not have access to the outside
reality represented by the true dialogue with the other, one recreates this
reality internally and in turn judges the validity of this representation based
upon its accuracy in reproducing that which is missing. Derrida explains,
‘‘It is through recourse to the truth of that which is, of things as such, that
one can always decide whether writing is or is not true, whether it is in
conformity or in ‘opposition’ to the true.’’57 That is, insofar as Plato situates
the book as either a true or a false substitute for reality, it must be possible
to compare what has been written with the absent reality it supplements. It
is on these terms, Derrida argues, that ‘‘writing in general is interpreted as
an imitation, a duplicate of the living voice or present logos.’’58
More specifically, Derrida defines the Platonic theory of mimesis as
follows:
There is thus the 1 and the 2, the simple and the double. The double comes after
the simple; it multiplies it as a follow-up . . . First there is what is, ‘‘reality,’’ the
thing in itself, in flesh and blood, as the phenomenologists say; then there is,
imitating these, the painting, the portrait, the zographeme, the inscription or
transcription of the thing itself.59
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What is particularly troubling in this passage, according to Derrida, is the
articulation of writing as imitation, which presupposes a relation of ‘‘repeti-
tion, resemblance (homoiōsis), doubling, duplication’’60 between reality and
writing; specifically, the idea that the purpose of writing is to come after
reality as its transparent illustration. Instead, Derrida argues that it is pre-
cisely the supplemental status of writing as described by Plato—in which
‘‘truth or falsity only declares itself at the moment the writer transcribes an
inner speech, when he copies into the book a discourse that has already taken
place and stands in a certain relation of truth (of similarity) or falsity (dissimi-
larity) with things in themselves’’61—that essentially inverts the relationship
between what is and what is written, undermining the assumption that the
validity of what is written is dependent upon the existence of what is.
To demonstrate this, Derrida turns to Plato’s dismissal of painting, which
is described in the Philebus as coming after writing and in The Republic as
‘‘having no serious value’’ insofar as it is simply a copy of what is without
‘‘knowing whether what [the painter] has produced is good or bad.’’62 Der-
rida explains that in Plato’s theory of mimesis, ‘‘either [the mimetic repro-
duction] hinders the unveiling of the thing in itself, by substituting a copy
or a double for what is,’’ as in the case of painting, or ‘‘it works in the service
of truth through the double’s resemblance (homoiōsis),’’ as in the case of
writing.63 However, despite the fact that painting is described as following
writing and is thus positioned as a ‘‘degenerate and somewhat superfluous
expression’’64 of what has already been determined to be truthful by having
been written, he argues that even in Plato’s discourse it is ‘‘what gives us
the image of the thing itself, what communicates to us the direct intuition,
the immediate vision of the thing, freed from discourse that accompanied
it, or even encumbered it.’’65 Painting is the image of what is prior to its
illustration in language and yet, despite the fact that it is closer to logos
because it illustrates truth as it emerges in thought prior to language, Plato
still positions painting as coming after writing, as supplementing what is
already known. But, having shown that writing is supplemental to logos in
that logos cannot be known except through writing, Derrida declares that
contrary to the idea that painting comes after writing, Plato is dismissive of
painting precisely because it is no less, and is perhaps even more, a direct
reproduction of reality. Painting is, in fact, the very logic of the logos that
Plato must suppress because it exposes the supplemental, and therefore un-
reliable, nature of writing. Specifically, although logos is the means by which
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the truth of reality becomes known, if it emerges first within the individual
mind prior to its utterance in language then ‘‘logos is first and foremost a
faithful image of the eidos (the figure of intelligible visibility) of what is . . .
a sort of primary painting, profound and invisible.’’66 That is, if logos is itself
only a representation, a redoubling of a truth which emerges before writing
but which can only be recognized as such after it has been written, then the
internal division in Plato’s theory of mimesis, and thus of the entire history
of Western philosophy, is that what is known to be true and what is false
that only becomes truthful after it has been illustrated. Truth, in other
words, is what happens after writing, not before it. For this reason, Derrida
proposes that ‘‘what is imitated is more real, more essential, more true, etc.,
than what it imitates.’’67 Or, put differently, if truth can only be known
through its illustration after the fact, the imitation is more true than what
it imitates because it is only through the redoubling of the image that the
truth of the original can be uncovered. In short, the original is dependent
upon the imitation for its existence while, at the same time, because the
imitation exists only where the original is not, the imitation does not de-
pend upon the original for its existence. In fact, it is precisely the absence of
the original that calls the imitation into being. This, according to Derrida, is
‘‘the closure of metaphysics.’’68 It is the ‘‘presumed possibility of a discourse
about what is, the deciding and decidable logos of or about the on (being-
present)’’69 which places the ontological outside of language, as the basis for
deciding the truth or falsity of a statement, and yet relies upon language to
supplement and replace the ontological when it is not there. Thus, what
Derrida concludes is exposed in the relationship between painting, writing,
and truth that the Platonic theory of mimesis must suppress is precisely that
the ontological does not come before language but that, by its very nature
as the supplement to the ontological, it is language that produces the onto-
logical ground upon which it rests.
In order to demonstrate that writing cannot be judged true or false based
upon its relation to an ontological outside, Derrida counterposes to the
Platonic theory of mimesis as a reflection of what is with what he argues is
Mallarmé’s postreferential theory of the nonmimetic. His purpose is to re-
veal that at the center of all writings is not, as Plato proposes, an ontological
truth but rather that all writing operates as a kind of miming of reality
which ‘‘does not allude, but alludes to nothing, alludes without breaking the
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mirror, without reaching beyond the looking-glass’’ to something beyond
language.70
Mallarmé’s Mimique is an account of a pantomime, Pierrot Murderer of
his Wife, in which the eponymous character imagines the murder of his
wife, Columbine, considering and discarding several options (strangulation,
stabbing, poison, shooting) before deciding that he will ‘‘tickle [his] wife to
death.’’71 At this point in the narrative, a double mime occurs. In acting out
what Pierrot imagines the death scene to be, ‘‘the Mime plays the roles of
Pierrot and Columbine alternately,’’72 thus portraying Pierrot tickling him-
self as he imagines tickling his wife. During this scene, Pierrot ‘‘is over-
taken, incoercibly, by ‘Columbine’s tickle, like a contagious, avenging ill’ ’’
which forces him to collapse in a painful ecstasy onto their bed.73 Despite
his attempts to escape, the painting of his wife that hangs over the bed
comes to life, laughing at him before ‘‘Pierrot is again overcome by trepida-
tion and tickling, and finally he dies at the feet of his ‘painted victim laugh-
ing still.’ ’’74 What actually happens, in other words, is a kind of suicide, in
which Pierrot becomes his wife and suffers her fate in the act of miming
her murder.
For Derrida, the challenge to the Platonic theory of mimesis comes from
two aspects of the play. The first is the question of authorship. Mallarmé’s
account of the play is based upon the second edition of a published account
of the play, ‘‘issued four years after the first, five years after the performance
itself.’’75 Derrida recounts the history of the play in the following terms:
a mimodrama ‘‘takes place,’’ as a gestural writing preceded by no booklet, a
preface is planned and then written after the ‘‘event’’ to precede a book written
after the fact, reflecting the mimodrama rather than programming it. The preface
is replaced four years later by a note written by the ‘author’ himself, a sort of
floating outwork [hors-livre].76
He argues that what is significant here is not only that Mallarmé’s account
is a reproduction of another text in a series of attempts to describe what
occurred, but that the very act described, the ‘‘mimodrama,’’ was acted out
without direction. That is to say, it was ‘‘prescribed . . . to the Mime that
he not let anything be prescribed to him but his own writing, that he not
reproduce by imitation any action (pragma: affair, thing, act) or any speech
(logos; word, voice, discourse). The Mime ought only to write himself on
the white page he is; he must himself inscribe himself through gestures and
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plays of facial expressions.’’77 Thus, while there is a real object that Mal-
larmé is addressing—the booklet recalling the performance—the perform-
ance itself has not been directed, or, rather, has been directed not to refer
to any known gestures. Furthermore, any accounts of the event—including
the preface to the text—were written well after what took place. For Der-
rida, this means that the actions of the mime, the initial author of the text
that Mallarmé is reproducing in his text, ‘‘represents nothing, imitates
nothing, does not have to conform to any prior referent with the aim of
achieving adequation or verisimilitude.’’78 Instead, he writes, ‘‘the plays of
facial expression and the gestural tracings are not present in themselves’’
and ‘‘don’t represent anything that comes before or after the mimo-
drama.’’79 Insofar as the mimodrama itself describes ‘‘an orgasm-crime that
has never been committed and yet turns into a suicide without striking or
suffering a blow,’’80 the actions of the mime are said to not reflect or repre-
sent anything outside of the performance. His actions are a writing that
refers only to itself. For this reason, Derrida concludes that the writing of
the play ‘‘no longer belongs to the system of truth, does not manifest, pro-
duce, or unveil any presence; nor does it constitute any conformity, resem-
blance, adequation between a presence and a representation.’’81 Given the
repetition of the narrative—Mallarmé writes about a pamphlet which de-
scribes a play that depicted in a spontaneous and undirected form a crime
that did not take place—it becomes impossible to determine where the truth
of the text should be located because there is no originary event being re-
counted. It is the inscription by the mime of what is not there that marks
precisely the absence of an original. Derrida writes, ‘‘We are faced then with
mimicry imitating nothing; faced, so to speak, with a double that doubles no
simple, a double that nothing anticipates, nothing at least that is not itself
already double.’’82 It is, in short, described as an open system of representa-
tion for which ‘‘there is nothing prior’’ to the actions of a mime whose
movements ‘‘form a figure that no speech anticipates or accompanies’’ and
thus challenges any attempts to enclose it within a system of writing because
it is ‘‘not linked with logos in any order of consequence.’’83
The second aspect of the text that Derrida addresses is Mallarmé’s ac-
count of the play. In particular, Derrida focuses on the following line:
‘‘The scene illustrates but the idea, not any actual action, in a hymen (out of
which flows Dream), tainted with vice yet sacred, between desire and fulfillment,
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perpetration and remembrance: here anticipating, there recalling, in the future,
in the past, under the false appearance of a present. That is how the mime operates,
whose act is confined to a perpetual illusion without breaking the ice or the
mirror: he thus sets up a medium, a pure medium, of fiction.’’84
Derrida raises two points about this passage, which is placed in quotation
marks in the original text. First, it appears in Mallarmé’s text as a citation.
However, Derrida marks that Mimique is actually the third version of the
text, and insofar as the citation changes with each version, he writes, ‘‘on
comparing these three versions, we can draw a first conclusion: the sentence
in quotation marks is indeed a simulacrum of a citation . . . Aside from the
fact that such a ‘citation’ is nowhere to be found . . . the fact that it changes
slightly in the course of the three versions would suffice to prove that we
are dealing with a Mallarméan fiction.’’85 For Derrida, this ‘‘simulacrum of
a citation’’ is another example of the way in which Mallarmé’s text exposes
the operation of writing: as a citation to a referent that does not exist, but
rather comes into being after its own illustration.
Second, and more importantly, Derrida argues that what is at the center
of the text is a slippage in meaning in the signifier of the hymen. Described
as the source ‘‘out of which flows Dream,’’ and therefore from which mean-
ing emerges, the hymen is nonetheless situated as an in-between space, both
‘‘sacred’’ and ‘‘vain,’’ ‘‘desire’’ and ‘‘fulfillment,’’ ‘‘perpetration’’ and ‘‘re-
membrance.’’ Derrida writes, the hymen ‘‘is an operation that both sows
confusion between opposites and stands between the opposites ‘at once.’ ’’86
That is to say, he proposes that the hymen becomes in this passage the
signifier simultaneously associated with both what has occurred in the past
and what may occur in the future. It is for this reason caught perpetually
between meanings and thus, because ‘‘the hymen differs (defers) from the
present, or from a present that is past, future or eternal, then its sheet has
neither inside nor outside, belongs neither to reality nor to the imaginary,
neither to the original nor to its representation.’’87 It is a reflection of the
nonspace of meaning, which refers to no stable or reliable referent. Instead,
it always gestures towards reference without ever realizing itself as one or
the other. By operating within the space of the in-between the hymen is a
code for what disrupts all systems of understanding and replaces them with
the pleasureful knowing that one cannot ever reach understanding and
thereby stop the play of meaning. On these terms, the hymen operates as
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that which undoes the meaning of the text from within. As it cannot be
reduced to any referent or presence, it thus defers both the possibility of
ever reaching conclusion as well as being located as the result of any origin.
The figure of the blank space on the page functions in the same terms.
Derrida writes that what appears to act as ‘‘the polysemic totality of every-
thing white or blank plus the writing site (hymen, spacing, etc.) where such
a totality is produced’’88—in other words, as the virtual possibilities for the
numerous and infinite readings of a text which can be constructed over the
blank, erasing the emptiness of white space with the plenitude of the sign—
in actuality, ‘‘re-marks itself forever as disappearance, erasure, non-sense.’’89
That is to say, Derrida argues that the blank, contrary to its common repre-
sentation as the empty space on which the presence of the text is con-
structed, instead ‘‘marks everything white . . . [and, at the same time] . . .
allows for the mark in the first place’’90 thereby producing ‘‘a tropological
structure that circulates infinitely around itself.’’91 For this reason, interpre-
tation is not a matter of a multiplicity of equally valid meanings. On the
contrary, what writing multiplies is the absence of meaning. Writing here
is understood to be the supplement to the blank; it takes the place of the
blank but cannot be said to eliminate it. It is neither reality nor the absence
of reality, but that which marks the boundaries of reality without fully en-
closing it. Writing always has to suppress precisely that it cannot ever fulfill
the absence over which it is transcribed. It is in this sense that Derrida
defines writing as an act of desire—the wish of collapsing the signifier and
the signified into a reality that in the act of being written prevents any such
realization. Whereas the mimetic theory of writing presupposes the ability
of writing to fulfill the need of presence by taking the place of what is
absent, Derrida argues that nonmimetic writing defers and delays presence.
In other words, writing is that which calls further attention to what Derrida
calls the ‘‘non-sense of spacing.’’92 In attempting to describe and to take the
place of that which is not there, writing only multiplies the signifiers with-
out connecting them to any meaning. The process of multiplication of ref-
erence without referent is what Derrida calls dissemination and what, he
argues, ‘‘forbids us to seek a theme or an overall meaning in an imaginary,
intentional, or lived domain beyond all textual instances.’’93
In order to address the limits of Derrida’s theory of dissemination, it is
necessary first to engage the false binary he establishes between mimesis
and nonmimesis. According to Derrida’s reading, the fallacy of writing as it
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operates within the history of Western philosophy from Plato to Mallarmé
is the presupposition of a metaphysical outside to writing which serves as
both the source of meaning and as the final guarantee of truth. Although
not directly stated, the implication of this reading is that the mimetic system
serves as the means by which power is established and maintained. That
is to say, insofar as mimesis is defined as the transparent and unmediated
replication of what is, the effect is to displace the way in which power oper-
ates by fixing the play of meanings so that they reflect the interests of the
powerful while appearing natural, thereby maintaining the appearance that
what is cannot be read differently. By unleashing the play of meaning, de-
construction becomes the primary means for disrupting power and exposing
its claims of truth as nothing but the effects of the system of ideas upon
which power is based. In other words, power here is read as the effect of
the control over ideas, a control which is established and maintained by the
ideas themselves.
What appears, at first glance, to be a ‘‘radical’’ theory of social change is,
I argue, highly conservative. What makes Derrida’s nonmimetic theory so
appealing, particularly in the digital age, is that it appears to open a space
within the existing culture from which to challenge dominant assumptions
without ever having to suffer the consequences of taking a side. It is a desir-
ing politics of the ‘‘side-less’’ and the ‘‘in-between.’’ However, while he is
not incorrect in marking the instability of ideas and the semiotic means by
which they are communicated—that is, in the simplest sense, signifiers
change their meaning—insofar as his analysis goes no further than describ-
ing this instability he occludes the possibility of explaining when and why
signs lose their natural appearances and become the site of conflict. The
meaning of signs are the site of conflict because what they reference—the
material relations of production—is a site of conflict; namely, the conflict
between the few that own the means of production and the many that own
only their labor power. If we assume, as Derrida does, that the signifier
is always supplemental to the ontological, we can reach only two possible
conclusions. First, that the arbitrary nature of language is not determined
by its relationship to the social. Regardless of the historical conditions, then,
the arbitrary nature of the signifier will always act as a space for the eruption
of desires that result from the suppression of semiotic play. In this context,
even the most progressive or revolutionary society is assumed to operate
within the same system of power as the most regressive or conservative.
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Second, the play of the signifier requires no social transformation in order
to be realized. If semiotic play is unrelated to exploitation, then exploitation
does not have to end for the emergence of (individual) desire. On these
terms, the theory of dissemination provides an effective worldview for an
expanding global capitalism. It denies that there is any connection between
the exploitative relations of production and political, cultural and social for-
mations while, at the same time, promoting the idea that social change is
unnecessary because social relations do not alter the inherent violence of
language. Instead, the only change which can occur is on the surfaces of
capitalism; namely from within culture. It privileges a slow and subtle read-
ing that pours over the text, looking each time to make it new so as to
extend the play of language. As such, dissemination actually corresponds to
the dominant economic theories which argue that it is consumption and not
production, ideas and not labor, which determines meaning.
Derrida accomplishes this by reducing all theoretical positions outside of
his own to the same logic, to what he defines as mimesis. Immanently speak-
ing, Derrida is not incorrect in reading the Platonic theory of mimesis as
a static theory of representation and, ultimately, of social change. If one
approaches the theory of mimesis historically, rather than textually, one
begins to see why the development of the theory of mimesis—in which
knowledge of the world is assumed to be reliable and quantifiable—reflects
both a society for whom mathematics and the sciences had become increas-
ingly important and, at the same time, why the Platonic theory of mimesis
nonetheless turns reality into a static entity. According to Plato, reality is
assumed to be the manifestation of the truth of the transcendental ideal, the
eidos. As such, the conditions of history are read as the unfolding of the ideal
in the world which, in turn, has the effect of naturalizing unequal social
relations by denying that inequality is the effect of any material causes. As
Ellen Meiksins Wood writes, Plato ‘‘elevates the division between ruling
and producing classes to a philosophical system’’ in which ‘‘the first princi-
ple’’ and ‘‘the key to both ethical and epistemological truths’’ is ‘‘a hierar-
chical organization of classes in which the ruling class is fed by the ruled.’’94
However, it is precisely such a historical reading that Derrida’s theory
erases. In this sense, although Derrida positions deconstruction as the
‘‘other’’ of Platonic idealism, by dehistoricizing the concepts of truth,
meaning, and power he ultimately reproduces the very idealist logic he
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claims to critique. Or, to put this in slightly different terms, the disconnect-
ion between social relations and the shifts in signification means we are to
assume that ‘‘play’’ is ahistorical and at the center of language throughout
time. Thus, while it is different from Plato in the sense that it does not
assume the existence of a transhistorical ideal, the presupposition of an end-
less series of reversals between jouissance, or what Derrida refers to as ‘‘the
heights of pleasure,’’95 and repression is similar in reaching the conclusion
that the existence of exploitation and oppression is impossible to change.
There is, I maintain, an alternative to both the Platonic theory of mime-
sis and the Derridean theory of nonmimesis; namely, the historical materi-
alist theory of nonmimetic reflection. I will provide a more extended
explanation of this concept later in this chapter; for now, suffice it to say
that the theory of nonmimetic reflection does not deny that the relation
between the signifier and signified can, at any moment, become a site of
confusion and disagreement. However, in contrast to Derrida, it does not
assume that the arbitrary nature of the sign prevents us from understanding
the relationship between the meaning of a text and the history of social
relations. Rather it locates the contradictory nature of the sign as an effect
of the conflicts over the material conditions of life. It is social life that deter-
mines the meaning and value of representation and as social life under capi-
talism is a site of class conflict, so is language.
In this understanding of the relation between language and the actual
relations that language represents, I am drawing upon the dialectical analy-
sis of society and culture as developed by Marx and Engels. As Marx and
Engels write, ‘‘man’s ideas, views and conceptions, in one word, man’s con-
sciousness changes with every change in the material conditions of his exis-
tence, in his social relations and in his social life.’’96 In other words, how we
see the world is an effect of how we live in the world. In the history of
human society, which to this point is a history of class struggle, as society
develops the forces of production and thus expands the possibilities for so-
cial life, the old relations and the old ideas which defend them come into
conflict with new relations and their new ideas, thus drawing attention to
the historical limits and contradictions of the prior modes of representation.
That is to say, it does not assume that ontology the conditions of our social
reality are transhistorical, nor does it assume that ideas simply change. If,
as Marx and Engels write, culture appears to contain an unending struggle
between play and repression, as Derrida proposes, it is because, ‘‘the social
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consciousness of past ages, despite all the multiplicity and variety it dis-
plays’’ has been shaped by ‘‘the exploitation of one part of society by the
other.’’97 To put this even more sharply, conflicts over meaning are a reflec-
tion of the class conflicts over the productive forces in society.
In his essay ‘‘Art and Objective Reality,’’ Georg Lukács provides a useful
example of how the theory of nonmimetic reflection approaches the rela-
tionship between culture and reality. Lukács argues, ‘‘the artistic correct-
ness of a detail has nothing to do with whether the detail corresponds to
any similar detail in reality.’’98 In fact, he suggests, ‘‘the artistic truth of a
detail which corresponds photographically to life is purely accidental, arbi-
trary and subjective.’’99 Instead, Lukács writes, ‘‘The detail in a work of art
is an accurate reflection of life . . . when it is the accurate reflection of the
total process of objective reality, no matter whether it was observed by the
artist in life or created through imagination out of direct or indirect experi-
ence.’’100 What Lukács is proposing is that the reality depicted in a cultural
text is determined not by the more-or-less mimetic qualities of the text, but
by the extent to which the text has been shaped by the totality of social
relations. A picture, for example, might be a mimetic reproduction of the
real, but it tells us nothing about the history of what it depicts. If taken as a
substitute for actual conditions, it becomes a one-sided representation that
naturalizes the existing. At the same time, the fact that the meaning of what
the photograph depicts changes, which is what follows from Derrida’s the-
ory of dissemination, also tells us nothing except that throughout history
the semiotics of meaning do not stay the same. Again, what matters, I argue,
is an examination of why meanings change and, further, that the reasons
why such changes take place must be sought in the roots of society; that is,
in the relations of production.
Based upon this counter-reading of the play of the signifier, it becomes
possible to reread Mimique as a nonmimetic reflection of the material condi-
tions that existed at the time it was written and which continue into the
period that Derrida deconstructs the text. For Derrida the mime’s ‘‘gestural
writing’’ represents ‘‘a reference without a referent’’101 because it has not
been directed either by a prior writing or by an actual event insofar as the
crime itself does not take place. He writes, that the mime ‘‘follows no prees-
tablished script, no program obtained elsewhere.’’102 As such, when the
mime ‘‘illustrates’’ the crime, Derrida posits that he is not following a
‘‘model’’ based upon ‘‘ontology’’ or ‘‘any dialectic.’’103 He is a mime miming
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nothing. Instead, he states that by ‘‘tracing’’ the events of the play ‘‘upon
the white page he himself is, the Mime does not allow his text to be dictated
to him from any other place.’’104 What I argue, however, is that contrary to
Derrida’s reading the whole event has been ‘‘dictated . . . from another
place,’’ in the sense that the ‘‘intelligibility’’ of the play, in the most basic
sense, requires the existence of an entire series of historical relationships.
What Derrida represents as a spontaneous act of writing without reference
is a decidedly historical gesture that, while not mechanically dictated, can-
not be understood independently of the history of social relations. The
basic plot of the mimodrama—a husband who plans to kill his wife, but kills
himself in the process—presupposes, to take only one example from the
narrative, an audience who knows what marriage is. By is, I do not mean
that marriage is a transcendental signifier without its own history. Instead,
what I am referring to is the fact that the mime and the audience both live
within a set of historical relations in which marriage is understood to be a
particular kind of relationship between two individuals. The mime does not
have to explain to the audience the relationship between Pierrot and Col-
umbine—what it means that they are married—because it is simply assumed
to be part of the normal functioning of everyday life. In fact, on this point,
it is telling that Derrida also does not feel it necessary to explain this, nor
does he comment on the events leading up to the play (the meaning of the
alleged ‘‘unfaithfulness’’), because it can be said that at the moment we also
share the same set of historical relations in which the meaning of marriage
has not fundamentally changed. It goes without saying what Columbine’s ac-
tions are supposed to signify. Thus, even if the mime chooses to represent
the relationship in a way that is new, it nonetheless does not fundamentally
challenge the material relationship of marriage as to require explanation.
By focusing our attention on the staging of the play, Derrida limits the
possibilities for inquiry to variations on a theme which exist within a partic-
ular set of historical limits. It can be a new representation on an old theme,
but the theme itself remains the same. He suspends any analysis of the play
and the way in which it is both shaped by and comments on the material
conditions of marriage under capitalism, thereby positing that these condi-
tions are, in a basic sense, eternal.
However, marriage is not a transhistorical condition of being. Marriage
is, in fact, a property relation with a long history of changes corresponding
to developments in production. As Engels writes in his historical study of the
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family, the singular family structure depicted in the play, ‘‘was the first form
of the family based not on natural but on economic conditions, namely, on
the victory of private property over original, naturally developed, common
ownership.’’105 Under capitalism, the social purpose of marriage is further
concentrated to ‘‘a contract, a legal transaction’’ regarding the distribution
and inheritance of private property.106 If we even briefly begin to analyze the
play from such a historical perspective, it becomes clear that the basic ele-
ments of the plot are not unfamiliar but reflect a particular moment in the
history of marriage. While Derrida’s analysis is an attempt to suspend the
possibility of reaching any conclusions about Pierrot’s actions, the play is a
narrative about a patriarch planning to murder his wife because she has been
unfaithful. In other words, insofar as the monogamous family arises with
private property and ‘‘is based upon the supremacy of the man’’ and ‘‘its
expressed aim is the procreation of children of undisputed paternity’’ for the
purposes that ‘‘these children may in due time inherit their father’s wealth
as his natural heirs,’’107 then Columbine’s alleged infidelity has threatened
the patriarchal lineage central to the laws concerning the inheritance of
property and thus her actions represent a challenge to the established order.
Far from being an undirected event, what Mallarmé describes is, in actuality,
an all too familiar narrative in the history of the oppression of women. It is
the cultural expression of a social relation in which the ownership of property
by some means the exploitation and subjugation of others.
Of course, a reader might argue that, immanently speaking, the hus-
band’s intent to murder his wife backfires with his unintended suicide under
his wife’s laughing portrait. Does this not undo, as Derrida suggests, the
authority of the husband by exposing that his patriarchal status within
the relationship is itself the product of the impossible desire to control the
meaning of marriage-as-text and not any ontological reality? Isn’t it the case
that Columbine’s Nietzschean laughter marks precisely Pierrot’s inability
to establish the terms upon which his actions will be read? Are we not
trapped within the postreferential space of the undecidable in that both
Pierrot and his wife are dead and not dead at the same time? First, it is
important to note that Columbine does not actually appear in the play ex-
cept as an image. The entire narrative unfolds from the perspective of Pier-
rot, who relays the events to the audience. Thus, although he commits
suicide in the play, he nonetheless remains alive to explain what happened.
In other words, it remains entirely his narrative. In addition, even if we accept
PAGE 149................. 18088$ $CH3 08-04-11 13:44:19 PS
150 Reading and Writing in the Digital Age
that his narrative is undone in the blurring of his identity with Columbine’s,
we are again within the terms of a conservative theory of social change. Given
that the basis of his authority is established in terms of the control of the
image and not his property rights, the material conditions which created the
conflict to begin with are not transformed. Thus, while it can certainly be
argued that his account of the mimodrama reflects the social changes which
are occurring at the time Mallarmé is writing—in which, as Engels explains,
developments in the means of production meant that for the first time, full
and real equality based upon ‘‘the passage of the means of production into
common property’’ could be realized108—it can be argued that by placing the
entire narrative within Pierrot’s voice the play is actually about restoring the
control over the meaning of marriage at a time of social upheaval. In other
words, in situating the entire episode as an issue of representation rather than
property, it takes the material possibilities of labor and rewrites them so that
they effectively extend the relations of capital.
It is the same with Derrida’s theorization of the concept of the hymen.
While Derrida, following Mallarmé, argues that the hymen, ‘‘undoes, out-
wits, under the rubric of the present . . . the assurance of mastery’’109—that
is, the ability to say with certainty the meaning of any signifier—it is signifi-
cant that the entire theory of writing as desire is framed in decidedly mascu-
line terms. When he writes that ‘‘in a hymen depending upon the verse, blank
once more, composed of chance and necessity, a configuration of veils, folds,
and quills, writing prepares to receive the seminal spurt of a throw of the
dice,’’110 what is presented as an undecidability reflects a theory of desire that
is written from the perspective of Pierrot. That is to say, in theorizing desire
in masculine terms, Derrida reproduces the assumption that the feminine is
the other of reason. What is an ideological theory of gender which emerges
within capitalism to explain the economic inequalities that exist between men
and women in terms other than the relations of production becomes in Derri-
da’s text the essential condition of writing. This is the ultimate effect of the
theory of dissemination—the naturalizing of social inequalities and the dis-
placement of any transformative critique of the existing.
The Economic Reality of Digital Postreferentiality
Despite the ‘‘death’’ of postmodernism, Derrida’s influence remains the
guiding framework of digital textualism. One of the key books in digital
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theory on the status of the relation between representation and the referent
‘‘after print’’ is David Jay Bolter’s Writing Space: The Computer, Hypertext,
and the History of Writing. What has made it particularly popular is its adap-
tation of the postmodern attack on understanding for the digital age. Ac-
cording to Bolter, ‘‘The shift from print to the computer does not mean
the end of literacy . . . but the literacy of print.’’111 Whereas ‘‘in the age of
print, it is permanence and fixity that is valued,’’112 the digital text differs
because, ‘‘electronic writing is the first text in which the elements of mean-
ing, of structure, and of visual display are fundamentally unstable.’’113 What
this means, for Bolter, is that the text is no longer ever singular, but always
already plural. He writes, ‘‘An electronic book is a fragmentary and poten-
tial text, a series of self-contained units rather than an organic, developing
whole.’’114 In a more extended passage he argues,
Today, we cannot hope for permanence and for general agreement on the order
of things. . . . What we have instead is a view of knowledge as collections of
(verbal and visual) ideas that can arrange themselves into a kaleidoscope of hier-
archical and associative patterns—each pattern meeting the needs of one class of
readers on one occasion.115
According to this reading, the digital text is understood as marking a break
with past structures of referentiality—in which the signifier could be traced,
even if contingently, to an outside—into a new moment of postreferen-
tiality, in which signifiers can never be traced to any stable referent but
instead are always already linked to a plurality of possible interpretations
without conflict or resolution. To put this on slightly different terms, the
digital text is said to usher in a new mode of representation in which it is
no longer an issue of engaging with reality but rather refiguring reality itself
through the play of signification.
The impact of postreferentiality on the production of culture is particu-
larly evident for Bolter in the ways in which it has changed the function of
the author. He argues that the definition of cyber-culture is marked spe-
cifically by the shift from an analog author bound to the age of print to a
digital author of hypertext. He argues:
The conceptual space of the printed book is one in which writing is stable, monu-
mental, and controlled exclusively by the author. It is the space defined by perfect
printed volumes that exist in thousands of identical copies. The conceptual space
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of electronic writing, on the other hand, is characterized by fluidity and an inter-
active relationship between writer and reader.116
It is necessary to point out that the concept of the author, in this context, is
not only conceived of as the source of meaning but becomes also a code
word for the possibility of causality and for connecting the meaning of a
text to a structure of determinacy. Bolter argues, ‘‘the traditional view of
literature as mimesis (imitation) is also troubled by electronic writing and
for the same reason, the active participation of the reader. Because the text
changes with each reading, the electronic author cannot simply capture a
replica of nature in his or her text and offer that replica to the reader.’’117
Instead, ‘‘no single definition can triumph at the expense of all others.’’118
That is to say, the idea of tracing the meaning of a work back to an author
operates in Bolter’s account not only as an expression of the humanist mode
of textual interpretation, but also to the possibility of relating a text to any
outside. There is, in other words, no true reading because there is no possi-
bility of determining what relation exists between reality and representa-
tion. The digital text, on these terms, is taken as the becoming of Derrida’s
famous declaration ‘‘there is nothing outside of the text.’’119 If there is one
concept to define the digital text, he concludes, it is that it exists ‘‘in a
perpetual state of reorganization’’ and is ‘‘in constant danger of breaking
down and combining into new patterns’’120 because of any text that has been
digitalized is now defined by the possibility of multiple authors. The text is
forever left open to endless future reinterpretation and reappropriation in
(supposed) contrast to the closed readings of the past.
In defining the digital text as ‘‘a fluid network of verbal elements’’121
within which each ‘‘reader calls forth his or her own text out of the network,
and each such text belongs to one reader and one particular act of read-
ing,’’122 Bolter is arguing that the digital text is marked not only by an in-
creasing difference from the original, but that the digital text undermines
the idea of the original entirely through the ability of anyone to produce a
seemingly endless multiplication of copies that continuously alter the origi-
nal in unpredictable ways. According to this reading, just as the text multi-
plies the mediations of that which it refers to until it becomes impossible to
distinguish what was original and what came after, it also questions the very
possibility of locating an original that was not always already influenced by
something else.
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In this sense, Bolter is challenging, on the one hand, the possibility of
writing as access to a stable referent that defines the humanist approach to
writing, for instance in the work of theorists such as Henry James, F. R.
Leavis, Eric Auerbach, and I. A. Richards, in which it is assumed that the
literary text is an expression of the relationship between the author and the
world that, in turn, enables the text to assume the ability to communicate
between two independent individuals. In other words, the idea that it is the
ability of the writer to represent the sense of reality—the emotional impact
of reality as generated by the individual’s unique narration—that gives the
text its value. For example, in defining a humanist theory of referentiality,
I. A. Richards argues, ‘‘the very structure of our minds is largely determined
by the fact that man has been engaged in communicating for so many hun-
dreds of thousands of years, throughout the course of his human develop-
ment, and beyond that.’’123 What he means by communication is, however,
deeply connected to a faith in the ability to relate the truth of reality to
others independently of the mediations of language. Richards writes, ‘‘the
arts communicate experiences, it has been said, and makes states of mind
accessible to the many which otherwise would be only possible to few’’ and
thus serve as ‘‘an occasion for a collectedness and concentration difficult to
attain in the ordinary cause of life, and the means by which human effort
may acquire a continuity analogous to but more subtle than the continuity
of science.’’124 Interpretation on these terms is the interpersonal means by
which the ideal, and therefore distinct from the mediations of a changing
reality (science), can be transferred from one consciousness to another.
Postreferentiality, on the contrary, is based precisely on the impossibility
of any direct, reliable relation between the text and reality and, instead, the
free play of the sign in opposition to any singular or closed interpretation.
It assumes a plurality of meanings which cannot be transferred from one
consciousness to another because of the fact that those who participate in
any exchange of signs are subsequently changed, even momentarily, by the
exchange itself. Bolter, on these terms, argues that contemporary culture is
marked by the increasing mediation between signs by layers of technology
that provide the reader with images on a screen, but which lack any materi-
ality or depth. Bolter writes, ‘‘there has never been anything behind the
text, the process of reading and interpreting has always taken place in front
of the text—in the eye and the mind of the reader.’’125 Rather than two free
and autonomous individuals who participate in the exchange of ideas, the
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exchange of ideas shapes the identity of those who participate and, in turn,
becomes the basis upon which each can play with reality itself without the
pressure of worrying that it will have any consequence in the actual world
precisely because it locates the real as the product of the text itself.
In fact, in drawing conclusions on the meaning of ‘‘post-referential’’ cul-
ture, Bolter claims to go further than what Derrida writes in ‘‘The Double
Session,’’ in the sense that it is characterized as still too interested in defin-
ing the limits of the social rather than the possibilities of the open society
that the digital economy supposedly represents. He argues that while ‘‘elec-
tronic writing does not permit a return to traditional assumptions of stable
and monumental texts’’ and thus that we ‘‘cannot return to the compara-
tively unself-conscious literature before modernism,’’ it nonetheless ‘‘takes
us beyond the paradox of deconstruction, because it accepts as strengths the
very qualities—the play of signs, intertextuality, the lack of closure—that
deconstruction poses as the ultimate limitation of literature and lan-
guage.’’126 He continues, instead, ‘‘the Author must be ready to accept for
his or her electronic text the conditions that deconstructionists have
claimed for printed texts. An electronic text that remakes itself for each
reader and for each act of reading is not incoherent, even if it does embrace
its own contradictions.’’127 According to this argument, the plurality of the
digital text through the redistribution of the means of representation will
allow everyone to have a voice in the new economy of signs. Freedom, in
other words, now exists entirely at the level of cultural exchange as a substi-
tute for the freedom from necessity that is determined at the level of the
economic. On these terms, the idea that the digital text does not position
people in any sort of fixed relation is based upon the presupposition that it
can no longer be said that who we are—what class we belong to—is any-
thing other than a fluid and temporary lifestyle defined more by the culture
we consume than where we are located in the division of labor. Bolter
writes, ‘‘just as our culture is moving from the printed book to the com-
puter, it is also in the final stages of the transition from a hierarchical social
order to what we might call a ‘network culture.’ ’’128 In place of political,
cultural, social, religious, and above all, economic hierarchies, ‘‘a powerful
leveling force is at work in our society.’’129 It is particularly important to
take notice here of what Bolter argues is the status of class in the digital
economy:
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The only great hierarchical force left is money, and today the possession of
money creates and depends upon no other distinctions . . . we use money to play
at class, at hierarchical organizations that no one now takes seriously.130
What this means for Bolter is that the outside of society (class) is defined
by the playful possibilities made possible by the increasingly availability of
money (consumption). He concludes:
The point here is that our culture of interconnections both reflects and is
reflected in our new technology of writing. With all these transitions, the making
and breaking of social links, people are beginning to function as elements in a
hypertextual network of affiliations. Our whole society is taking on the provi-
sional character of a hypertext: it is rewriting itself for each individual member.131
At the center of these assumptions, in short, is the idea that network capital-
ism defies all class relations and social inequalities by suspending the oppo-
sition between owner and worker in the marketplace. Individuals are
presumed to operate as an independent agent who can determine for them-
selves the meaning of their lives by accessing the primary means of self-
interpretation—the wage. As such, what Bolter is offering is a variation on
ideology of the fairness of the wage in which it is argued that capitalism
today no longer depends upon the exploitation of labor, but rather is pri-
marily driven by consumption and desire. According to this narrative, the
transition of the major industrialized countries to service and knowledge
economies means that there is no longer any division between those who
own and control the means of production and those who own only their
labor power. Instead, insofar as capitalism is said to depend upon the gener-
ation of knowledge, it is no longer based upon a resource—labor—that can
be controlled or exploited. As the reserve of knowledge cannot be ex-
hausted, it is simply a matter of time before every individual has the same
access to knowledge, regardless of his or her class status. In turn, because
ideas cannot be owned, class can no longer be defined in strict terms of
property relations. Capital and labor are simply complimentary binaries
without conflict or antagonism. Network capitalism is thus represented as
an entirely open system in which the binaries of class are not erased, but
forever suspended by the play of finance.
In contrast, Marxism begins from the premise that life is determined by
the social relations of production. That is to say, it starts from the position
that culture—the ways in which individuals make sense of the world around
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them and the ways in which this sense becomes a material force through
labor—is a reflection of the developments of the mode of production. In
the supposedly open society of the postprint, digital culture of global capi-
talism, the possibilities for truly radical advances in productive forces that
would eliminate all forms of social inequality are restricted by the contradic-
tion between private ownership and accumulation of capital and the proper-
tyless workers whose labor is the basis of private accumulation. In other
words, what is established through continual representation across all sites
of culture—from television, music, the Internet and film, to the social struc-
tures of education, church, family—as open and possible is what Marx calls
‘‘commodity fetishism’’; that is, those ideas that take as their starting point
the logic of capitalist production—that the exploitative relation between
capital and labor is really free and the basis of all possible future forms of
freedom—and represent this as the boundary of all discussion that cannot
be crossed. Culture, in this context, takes on the dimensions of class struggle
because it is the space in which people become conscious of their class inter-
ests in the conflict over the means of production and the organization of
society and begin to ‘‘fight it out.’’132 For this reason, it is not an coincidence
that cultural theory has taken the position that network capitalism repre-
sents a fundamentally new social relation in which ‘‘anti-capitalist oscilla-
tions have lost their grounding in the once clear opposition between
capitalism and socialism,’’133 ‘‘new identities and social movements cannot
be reduced to class,’’134 there is ‘‘no longer an outside to capital,’’135 and that
‘‘the free market offers opportunities for new emerging identities.’’136 What
is represented as open thinking in refusing to ‘‘believe that all forms of
power can be explained by capitalist relations’’137 is in actuality the argu-
ment that there is no alternative to capitalism, that we must accept the
existing property relations, and that the enjoyment of consumption and cul-
ture is a fair substitute for ending the exploitation of labor that occurs under
wage labor. That such arguments can be represented as a challenge to exist-
ing power relations in any sense of the term would be ridiculous if not
for the fact that capitalism requires such challenges in order to eliminate
constantly ideological concepts that no longer assist in the organization and
accumulation of profit while continuing to represent an exploitative system
as open, fair, and just. In contrast, if the full potential of labor is to be
realized and not just put to use in the interests of profit, what is necessary
is a mode of analysis in which the study of culture is a study of the ways in
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which our sense of the world is not natural but historical and, in a class
society, the site of a conflict that has its basis in the relations of private
property.
Senses, Surfaces, and Reflection
In The German Ideology, Marx and Engels establish a framework through
which the study of culture can become a material force for understanding
and for transforming social relations by connecting culture as a sense of
reality to developments in the formation and reformation of the mode of
production. History, they write, is the dialectical process by which ‘‘defi-
nite individuals who are productively active in a definite way enter into
these definite social and political relations’’ and these definite social and
political relations in turn ‘‘are continually evolving out of the life-process
of definite individuals.’’138 What distinguishes Marx and Engels’ analysis
from either print or postprint or digital theories of representation and ref-
erentiality is that it seeks to begin the investigation of all social phenomena
‘‘not as they may appear in their own or other people’s imagination, but as
they actually are, i.e., as they act, produce materially, and hence as they
work under definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions inde-
pendent of their will.’’139 In other words, in order to determine whether
we live in an open or closed society, a society that has suspended class
relations or one that has exacerbated them, it is necessary to examine cul-
ture in relation to the material conditions in which people actually live, not
how they might appear to live. This is one of the central tenets of material-
ism and why it is more than ever necessary for examining the contradic-
tions of the network society which promotes the ideology that digital
culture suspends class inequality by providing access to the means of repre-
sentation—what has been called ‘‘the increased integration of the aesthetic
in economic production’’140—and instructs people in ever more sophisti-
cated ways of ‘‘getting the job done.’’ A historical materialist analysis of
culture is not just concerned with knowing how things work—that is to say,
with the immanent intricacies of the text required to find work on the
global labor market that have become the mark of sophistication and sub-
tlety—but why they work the way that they do.
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Culture and ideas are always effects of material relations. All of the devel-
opments that are described as culture—everything from leisure time activi-
ties, to global advances in science, and the local ways in which people cook
their food and where they go to work—are predicated upon the ability of
society to produce the conditions necessary for maintaining its existence. In
arguing that ‘‘the satisfaction of the first need, the action of satisfying and
the instrument of satisfaction which has been acquired, leads to new
needs,’’141 Marx and Engels locate the development of social resources, in-
cluding advances in science and technology, in terms of the meeting of
needs and it is in the process of meeting needs that society drives to increase
its knowledge of the world and its ability to expand production. In other
words, as society progresses through the division of labor, it not only creates
new ways of meeting the old needs, but in fact also creates the conditions
for new needs to develop.
To address social relations in their totality, as Marx and Engels propose,
means understanding that the relationship between culture and the eco-
nomic is a dialectical relation, but with determination. That is to say, cul-
ture and the economic are not simply binary states of being. They exist in
a hierarchical relation in which developments at the level of production
make possible developments at the level of ideas. This is, of course, an un-
popular reading in the academies in the North because it calls into question
the dominant ideology that acts of consumption—whether in real life or in
the construction of virtual avatars—suspend class inequalities by providing
people with the opportunity in which, as Stuart Hall claims, to ‘‘play the
game of using things to signify who they are.’’142 It is usually dismissed as
too reductive and turning all consumers into ‘‘dupes’’ of capitalist ideology.
This is not what the historical determination of culture means, however,
and is an easy way of not having to address the fact that capital does have an
interest in circulating knowledge that obscures issues of exploitation and
replace them with narratives of equality and fairness. To presuppose that
people have a clear and complete understanding of the world around them
simply by participating in it is to eliminate entirely the necessity of science
and going beyond the surface appearances. But the spontaneous and the
obvious are, as the French Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser argues,
among the most ideological sites in capitalism and require that the develop-
ment of scientific ways of examining culture if one is not to remain at the
level of ideology.143 To go beyond the surface appearances of digital culture
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thus requires taking up the unpopular notion that ‘‘a certain mode of pro-
duction . . . is always combined with a certain mode of co-operation, or
social stage [and as such] the ‘history of humanity’ must always be studied
and treated in relation to the history of industry and exchange.’’144 To ana-
lyze culture is to understand that it is a product of a particular stage of
development of the productive forces of society. By examining the ways in
which any society develops within a set of definite conditions of production,
‘‘we thus see that the social relations within which individuals produce, the social
relations of production, are altered, transformed, with the change and development
of the material means of production, of the forces of production’’ and, at the same
time that, ‘‘the relations of production in their totality constitute what is called the
social relations, society, and, moreover, a society at a definite stage of historical
development, a society with peculiar, distinctive characteristics.’’145 What
Marx calls ‘‘peculiar, distinctive characteristics’’ is precisely the way in
which the relation between production and consumption, culture and the
economic are not mechanical, but dialectical. In fact, it is capitalism, not
Marxism, which promotes the idea that people have no agency in trans-
forming their conditions of existence by constantly circulating the idea that
there are no alternatives to the market. On the contrary, it is precisely the
consequence of Marx and Engels’ theory of culture as an effect of the eco-
nomic that enables people to understand history as the history of human
labor power and, therefore, able to be changed by those whose labor actu-
ally creates the conditions of existence.
Within this framework, developments of culture are shaped by the mate-
rial conflicts over the organization and ends of social production. For this
reason, the study of culture needs to distinguish between ‘‘the material
transformation of the economic conditions of production’’ and ‘‘the legal,
political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic’’ forms in which class struggles
are fought out.146 This is another way of saying that, although class relations
shape the cultural, culture is never a transparent reflection of class—it is
never simply a mimetic reflection but a site of conflict. In fact, the work of
a materialist cultural critique requires the explanation of why the diverse
forms of cultural life are complex reflections of underlying class relations.
This mode of analysis is based on the fact that the appearances of social life
are not self-evident, particularly under capitalism, because the very process
through which the labor of some in society is appropriated by the few pro-
duces ideological forms of consciousness that mystify and invert the actual
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relations of production. The division of labor under capitalism, in other
words, produces ways of thinking that treat the fundamentally unfair and
unfree relations—which force working people to work to survive under con-
ditions that involve the expropriation of their surplus labor—as free and
fair. As Marx argues in the first volume of Capital, in the relations of the
market, the transformation of the products of labor into commodities ‘‘con-
verts every product into a social hieroglyphic’’ and that to understand the
social requires that ‘‘we try to decipher the hieroglyphic, to get behind the
secret of our own social products.’’147 What this means for the study of
culture is a mode of analysis that assumes neither that culture is a pure
reflection of the social ideal, as in the case of traditional humanism, nor the
postreferential slippages of digital textualism, but rather what can be called
a nonmimetic reflection of the relations of production. The historical mate-
rialist theory of nonmimetic reflection is a critical practice which works to
uncover in cultural practices the unseen laws of motion which shape them.
In defining culture as the space for the ‘‘training of sensibility’’ in the
‘‘delicate organizations of feeling, sensation and imagery,’’ as F.R. Leavis
writes,148 traditional humanism takes the surface to be a symbol of depth;
but its depth is not actually under but above the surface. It dehistoricizes the
senses and turns them into structures of feeling that can ‘‘check and control
the blind drive onward of material and mechanical development’’149 by lo-
cating the source of the senses above the messy contradictions and conflicts
of class society. This is another way of saying that what is presented as depth
is actually the space of the spiritual, holy, and divine. Althusser addresses the
effects of the humanist theory of referentiality when he writes ‘‘neither Bal-
zac nor Solzhenitsyn give us any knowledge of the world they describe, they
only make us ‘see,’ ‘perceive,’ or ‘feel’ . . . the world.’’150 In this way, classic
theories of mimesis focus on the sensuousness of the world, as if senses were
spontaneous and independent from history. Traditional humanism thus
makes the same mistake the German philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach made:
‘‘he does not conceive sensuousness as practical, human-sensuous activ-
ity.’’151 For Marx, our senses—the way in which we come to understand and
interact with the world around us—are the effect of the abstract relations
of labor. Sensuousness is the praxis by which people work on and change
nature and in the process change themselves.
But if traditional humanism spiritualizes sensuousness, the new nonmi-
mesis tropologizes life as an archive of representation, memories, and signs.
It substitutes for the humanist articulation of the senses as spirit with what
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Roland Barthes calls the ‘‘linguistic sensuality’’ which comes from the sus-
pension of meaning and the endless play of the text.152 It is the pleasure of
finding the ‘‘in-between’’ of the text, the moment when the text is caught
between the ‘‘both/and’’ where the senses reside. Postreferential theories,
and chief among them Derrida’s theory of dissemination, call for interrupt-
ing the relation between depth and surface and for the dismissal of all ab-
stract relations in the social as essentialist. Postreferential theory, in other
words, alibis its rejection of abstract relations through its antiessentialism.
But, what is antiessentialism except a theory of what I call ‘‘de-understand-
ing’’ the social? In turning the sensuous into the suspension of meaning,
nonmimetic theory renders impossible any theory that seeks to draw con-
clusions from analysis. In this sense, it provides the perfect theory for a
capitalism caught in the contradictions of overproduction, in which the
most effective sense is that which constantly renews the commodity as a
space of desire without consequence.
Both the humanist theory of mimesis and the postmodern theory of non-
mimesis are a poetics of surfaces that correspond to the historical needs of
capital to isolate what our senses perceive from what the material conditions
make possible. What unites both, in other words, is the way they demateri-
alize the cultural forms in which this conflict is fought out. They either
invert the relation between culture and the economic—between the mate-
rial basis of society and the level of ideas—treating consciousness itself as
the driving force of history or in a more complex move reduce conscious-
ness to the material suggesting that there is no basis on which to distinguish
one from the other.
On the contrary, the historical materialist theory of nonmimetic reflec-
tion is the analytics of the social relations of production that are made invisi-
ble by the inversions of the market. For example, in the same way that, in
the political realm, capitalism gives rise to not just one but numerous politi-
cal formations, from constitutional democracies to fascism to nonelected
transnational organizations such as the World Trade Organization and the
World Bank, depending upon what provides the most effective means of
organizing production for profit, cultural forms also are a reflection of the
economic conditions from which they emerge.
Bertolt Brecht, the Marxist cultural critic and playwright, provides a clear
articulation of the ways in which developments in production shape cultural
forms; specifically, how the refining of oil transformed social life. He writes,
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the extraction and refinement of petroleum spirit represents a new complex of
subjects, and when one studies these carefully one becomes struck by quite new
forms of social relationships. A particular mode of behavior can be observed both
in the individual and in the mass, and it is clearly particular to the petroleum
complex. But it wasn’t the new mode of behavior that created this particular way
of refining petrol. The petroleum complex came first, and the new relationships
are secondary.153
In other words, the development of new ways of refining petroleum trans-
formed people’s ability to travel, to heat their homes, to cook their food, to
work and to enjoy leisure time . . . and these changes are reflected in new
forms of art that emerge. By using this example, I am not suggesting that
technological developments such as the refining of petroleum constitute the
mode of production. Rather, new ways of refining petroleum do have a
material impact on the forces of production and, in turn, change the ways
in which people view and act in the world because both are the effect of
advances in the productivity of labor. As Brecht argues, the changes at the
level of ideas are dependent upon the same development of productive
forces that enabled the discovery of petroleum, which necessitated the at-
tempts to find more effective ways of refining it for manufacture, and which
provided the material basis upon which new ideas could emerge. Culture is
nothing other than a product of human labor.
Marx and Engels, to be clear, do not deny that our knowledge is medi-
ated or that new advances in science and technology can transform our
thinking about the world around us in ways that we cannot yet imagine.
Their work, in fact, is premised upon putting the most advanced develop-
ments in production, which necessitate an increasingly complex under-
standing of the world, to the most productive use by meeting the needs of
all. What they do criticize, however, is that the very fact that knowledge is
mediated by change means that the world is unknowable, or that the in-
creasing complexity of scientific knowledge in any way effectively discon-
nects that knowledge from the social relations from which it develops.
According to Marx and Engles,
the sensuous world . . . is not a thing given direct from all eternity, remaining
ever the same, but the product of industry and of the state of society; [It is] the
result of activity of a whole succession of generations, each standing on the shoul-
ders of the preceding one, developing its industry and intercourse, and modifying
its social system according to changed needs.154
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In other words, the extent to which knowledge of the world is mediated is
determined historically, and is a reflection of the level of development of
the productive forces of society. Knowledge, in short, is a product of human
labor power (what, in this passage of the German Ideology is called the ‘‘sen-
suous’’ activity of individuals). It is on these terms, for example, that Marx
and Engels discuss the development of the natural sciences such as biology
and physics which, because they describe what appears to be unchanging,
seem to be unmediated by historical developments. However, they write,
‘‘even this ‘pure’ natural science is provided with an aim, as with its material,
only through trade and industry, through the sensuous activity of men.’’155
Engels provides a useful concrete example of the relationship between labor
and knowledge in The Dialectics of Nature. He writes:
If, after the dark night of the Middle Ages was over, the sciences suddenly arose
anew with undreamt-of force, developing at a miraculous rate, once again we
owe this miracle to—production. In the first place, following the Crusades,
industry developed enormously and brought to light a quantity of new mechan-
ical (weaving, clock-making, milling), chemical (dyeing, metallurgy, alcohol), and
physical (lenses) facts, and this not only gave enormous material for observation,
but also itself provided quite other means for experimenting than previously
existed, and allowed the construction of new instruments.156
Knowledge, in other words, is a product of the ability of human labor power
to constantly develop new means of production, which require new ways of
thinking about the world, which in turn lead to new developments that
expand our understanding.
In the contemporary moment, theories of culture that privilege knowing
over understanding have become dominant in both high theory and popular
culture precisely because they reflect the ruling class’s stake in the material
developments of digital capitalism. Their dominance is reflected in the
funding and resources which are continually provided despite the fact that
that economic reality calls into question their conclusions about a postclass,
consumer-driven, digital economy almost every day. They respond to the
contradictions of digital capitalism by preparing a work force who are excel-
lent readers of the local and the contingent and who can quickly adapt when
corporations move productive facilities overseas, purchase controlling inter-
est in a foreign manufacturing plant, or when stock and commodity prices
rise or fall on the stock market on the basis of future projected earnings,
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but who have little understanding of the underlying logic of the system in
the private accumulation of surplus value. It is a consciousness, as Ernest
Mandel writes, that is divided by a ‘‘contradictory combination of partial ratio-
nality and overall irrationality’’157 and, in this sense, comes to reflect the very
logic of the market and, therefore, cannot help but reproduce it everywhere.
On the contrary, to say, as Marx does, that culture is historical and thus
shaped by the conflicts of history is, therefore, also to retheorize the very
question of openness. Unlike the textualist notion of openness, which fo-
cuses on the immanent plurality of texts and language, openness for Marxism
is the historical possibility conditioned by labor relations. True openness is
neither a textual effect, nor something that exists immanently within the
human spirit. It is predicated on the transformation of the relations that
allow humans to live off of the exploited labor of other humans. It is ‘‘the
positive transcendence of private property as human self-estrangement, and
therefore as the real appropriation of the human essence by and for man.’’158
This is another way of saying that only when the right to private property,
which capitalism formalizes into law because it is the basic structure of capi-
talist economic relations, is eliminated and no one has the right to exploit
another person can a truly open society be developed. Private property rela-
tions are necessarily closed relations. They restrict access to socially pro-
duced wealth and the means of its production to the few, and subject the
many to relations in which they are controlled by their own products (and
are thus alienated from their labor, from themselves and from each other).
It is thus by connecting culture—whether print, postprint, analog, or
digital—with the organization of the productive forces in society that Marx
and Engels enable the uncovering of the ways in which culture reflects the
material realities of class inequality and thus provide the means for knowl-
edge of the social to become the understanding denied by bourgeois culture.
As culture is part of the totality of productive forces in society, they do not
understand culture as somehow exceeding the inequalities of society and
thus operating as a cross-class, universal space beyond the limits of social
production. They write:
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class
which is the ruling material force of society is at the same time its ruling intellec-
tual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal,
consequently also controls the means of mental production, so that the ideas of
those who lack the means of mental production are on the whole subject to it.
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The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant
material relations, the dominant material relations grasped as ideas.159
What is at the core of this passage are the ways in which culture, as a prod-
uct of social relations, necessarily reflects the ways in which those relations
are structured. This means that culture is not an autonomous zone, but
rather part of the social totality and thus a space in which the class conflicts
occurring at the point of production also come to the foreground. The
resources that people have available to them—whether they have a job, a
place to live, access to health care, or means of transportation—are deter-
mined both by the level of development of the productive forces of society,
as well as by the relations of production in which some own and control the
means of production and others own only their labor-power as a means of
survival. In other words, it is not possible to separate the ideas that people
have about the world from the accumulated history of the society in which
they live and the ways in which the society around them is organized. By
approaching culture as the history of the formation and reformation of
modes of production, cultural studies becomes, I argue, a means of analyz-
ing developments in culture to discover the root cause of social contradic-
tions. It turns cultural studies from a witness to social transformation into
an active force for change that enables people to understand the complexity
of the world around them as an integral aspect of social agency.
It is in this context that the idea that the digital text represents a radical
break from the past because the complexity of interactions which shape and
transmit digital culture has fundamentally reversed the relationship between
the world and ideas, such that ideas no longer are shaped by social relations
but rather that social relations are now shaped entirely by ideas. What, for
example, are the consequences for thinking about digital culture if one sepa-
rates the advancements in science and technology that have resulted in the
development of a global system of communication and exchange from the
human labor power that created it? What does it mean to erase, or at the
very least minimize, the role of labor in the production process? Arguably,
it means to shift cultural studies away from acting as a material force for
social change and to turn it into a support system for the global expansion
of capital.
Rather than representing a new literary theory for reading and writing
in the age of network capitalism, digital culture theorists are instead keeping
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up with the new technological developments through which capital in-
creases exploitation. In other words, they are taking what is really a very
one-sided view of technological change—which does provide the benefits
of increased cultural openness for some—and presenting it as if it were a
universal condition, available to all. The one-sidedness of such a theory is
so useful to capital because in order to advance its thesis, it must bracket off
the actual conditions of deepening economic inequality which shape the
global world. While the textual theories of the digital claim to be a theory
of open networks and connections, they are founded instead upon a closed
disconnection—the disconnection between the exploitation of labor and
commodity production. Only by reconnecting the study of culture and class
will literary and cultural studies be able to grasp the contemporary and act
as a material force for social change by freeing the productivity of human
labor from the restrictions of private accumulation.
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The Ideology of the Digital Me
In this chapter, I investigate the argument that we are entering the age of
the cyborg, which is said to represent the opening of a space for the pluraliz-
ing of identity and difference beyond past social divisions of class, race,
gender, sexuality, and (dis)ability. I argue that by positing knowledge as the
basis of reality—for example, by proposing that social divisions such as class
are the effect of an instrumental logic of classification—cyborg theory ob-
scures the fact that knowledge is always shaped by class relations. Instru-
mental reason is itself not disembodied from the social, but deeply
implicated in capital’s drive to increase the rate of profit. In developing my
argument, I advance a labor theory of digital culture that resituates the so-
cial, economic, and cultural changes that are said to define the cyborg in
terms of the organization of capitalism since the end of the long boom and
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Capitalism as Difference Engine
Capitalism is a dynamic system in which the competition between capitalists
results in the continual development of the means of production. This pres-
sure requires that capital continually recruit new concepts and new ways of
thinking that can both work with and expand the conditions of production
that have emerged while simultaneously limiting these developments to the
furthering of the profit system. The digital condition is the most recent
version of this contradiction between progress in the forces of production,
on the one hand, and the restriction of this progress to a system of private
accumulation, on the other. It is in moments such as this that capital turns
to cultural theory to establish cognitive environments that can effectively
negotiate the possibilities of the new, while restricting their development
to the logic of the old (that is, profit accumulation). In other words, in the
graveyard of concepts that is the intellectual history of capitalist ideology,
capitalism is nonetheless an engine of conceptual differences that must con-
stantly invent new ways of obscuring the economic relations while provid-
ing the skills necessary for people to enter the new division of labor. If it is
to remain relevant, mainstream cultural theory constantly has to adapt its
reading of culture to the new possibilities for the logic of the market in
order to prepare the next generation of workers for the new global market-
place. In the case of the digital condition, what this means is that the devel-
opment of the forces of production are turned at the level of culture into a
promise of a new heterogeneous democracy that honors difference, hybrid-
ity, and plurality. Digital capitalism, as representative of the most expansive
development of the forces of production in human history as well as the
most extensive development of capitalism globally, is defined instead as an
economy that suspends class divisions by allowing people to escape the lim-
its of their material bodies and enter into the fictional world of cyberspace,
where all identities are said to be in play. Insofar as it is argued that life
itself has become digital, this suspension of identity in cyberspace is read
back onto reality to argue that all identities in the digital age exist some-
where in-between the virtual and the material. That is to say, it is argued
that it exposes identity itself as a fiction that has no basis in reality, especially
the reality of a world divided by class. In this way, the ideology of the digital
promotes the illusion that the new digital economy is the other of class
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inequality because it allows anyone to transform his or her identity if the
new digital society does not fulfill his or her desires.
It is in this sense that the ideology of the digital me collapses the material
and the cultural, rendering matter to be an effect of culture and culture to
be the space of desire. On these terms, the material is dematerialized and
turned into a space upon which the desires of the individual can be in-
scribed. Desire, in turn, is described as the space of agency because it is
that which provides the individual with the possibility of thinking the world
differently. Desire, in other words, is defined as a productive act because it
is the process by which the individual turns dissatisfaction into a new virtual
reality. Central to the digital is thus a rewriting of the material world of
property as the materiality of desire in which unequal property relations are
turned into equal access to the realm of the digital. Within the framework
of the desiring theory of materiality, interactivity and ‘‘active consumers,
and even critical and creative users’’ replaces a world of ‘‘passive audiences
or spectators.’’1 It is from within this framework of ‘‘me-teriality’’ that the
digital condition is theorized as a mode of heterogeneity without precedent:
a forever virtual reality in which individuals have ‘‘a significantly greater
role in authoring their own lives.’’2 Moreover, that which limits the desire
of the individual is seen as the violent imposition of the homogeneous. This
is the logic of Antonio Negri’s reading of Derrida in ‘‘The Specter’s Smile.’’
In fact, Negri argues that Derrida’s theory of deconstruction, which at-
tempted to suspend class binaries by declaring that all language was the
sight of play and therefore that what any concept referred to was ultimately
undecidable and could not be used to understand the world with any cer-
tainty, has been surpassed by capitalism itself. Today, Negri writes, capital-
ism has become a system of change to the point that ‘‘there is no longer any
outside’’ but instead ‘‘nothing more than a real illusion before us and behind
us.’’3 The concept of a ‘‘real illusion’’ is intended to playfully mark the col-
lapse of the virtual and the material worlds into an undecidable binary that
undoes all binaries. According to Negri, capitalism is no longer a system
based on the ownership of property, but instead maintains control over
labor by restricting the play of individual desire. Negri argues that capital-
ism can only control labor by creating the illusion of property. In contrast,
throughout the essay Negri celebrates Spinoza’s concept of the ‘‘pathema of
the soul’’ which he describes as a ‘‘dual state of mind’’ that exists ‘‘between
passivity and activity,’’ that ‘‘lives in the present though it is prefabricated
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in memory,’’ and which endures ‘‘the past while turned towards action.’’4
For Negri, ‘‘pathema’’ is the spiritual solution to class that breaks capital-
ism’s illusory hold over the multitude by exposing ‘‘the perpetually uncer-
tain but nevertheless open moment of an ontological passage which leads
the mind to grasp the very nature of Desire, beyond the (past) determina-
tions of existence or the (present) external dialectic of sadness and joy.’’5
Negri argues that to break the illusion of property is only possible by con-
tinually creating one’s own illusions that, by changing so rapidly, operate
outside of capital’s attempts to control desire. He writes that the only means
to fight ‘‘exploitation’’ (by which he means the poverty of desire) is by ‘‘con-
stituting a new reality, a new hybrid being, different each and every time,
constructed and therefore snatched away from humanities arch-ghosts with
each instance.’’6
What Negri proposes here is ultimately no different than what capitalism
promotes every day in every film, television show, pop song, and mass-
market novel—that consumption (or wage) is a fair exchange for labor be-
cause it provides one with access to the marketplace of identity. It is, in fact,
another way of promoting the appearance that the free market actually does
cater to you the consumer whose desires are real and therefore able to direct
the markets to meet your demands. In other words, the proof that desire is
real is the existence of so many commodities such that there always seems
to be exactly what you were looking for. And if it is not there, it is argued,
then just ask the company for it or keep searching as the market will eventu-
ally find you. However, this claim, as Adorno and Horkheimer write, that
the free market responds to ‘‘satisfy the spontaneous wishes of the public’’
is nothing but ‘‘hot air.’’7 That is to say, in the era of digital capitalism,
ideology promises that through consumption ‘‘all are free to dance and
enjoy themselves, just as they have been free, since the historical neutraliza-
tion of religion, to join any of the innumerable sects. But freedom to choose
an ideology—since ideology always reflects economic coercion—every-
where proves to be freedom to choose what is always the same.’’8 In pro-
moting a vision of markets as the realization of desires, Negri is simply
providing the ideological alibi necessary for capitalism to maintain what is
its real illusion—that wage labor is not the site of exploitation and that the
wage-for-labor exchange is always fair and freely chosen.
Despite representing the most advanced level of scientific and techno-
logical development in human history, the digital is not in and of itself
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transformative; it is an extension of existing class relations. It homogenizes
because capitalism cannot continue without homogenizing; for example, in
turning concrete labor into abstract labor and use value into exchange value.
The cultural politics of the digital are based on concealing the homogeniza-
tion of humanity and representing it as heterogeneity. It appears to attend
to the lifestyle of the customer and thus gives the impression of heterogene-
ity and cultural plurality to the homogeny of wage labor.
The Desiring Nonscience of Digital Humanities
The digital humanities are an extension of the culture industry in the sense
that they are the means by which theories of culture are determined to be
realistic or unrealistic, new or old. These designations have nothing to do
with the substance of the arguments. Any arguments that challenge the
dominance of capital will always be declared old and unrealistic and there-
fore not worthy to participate in the exchange of ideas. In contrast, those
cultural theories that separate culture and the economic will always be read
as new and therefore acceptable for public consumption. That is to say, all
new bourgeois theories of culture are simply new lines within the accepted
commonsense of the profession as the defenders of culture.
A prime example of the digital humanities and the way in which they
update cultural theory to adapt to the new conceptual skills required by
capital of the next generation of workers is Bruno Latour’s We Have Never
Been Modern. Latour, in order to position himself as the theorist of the new
who is able to move beyond the clearly outdated theories of the old, has to
both establish the terms of the new as well as the logic by which the division
between the old and the new can be determined. In both cases, what has led
to the reading of his arguments as successful among academics in the North
is that he abstracts history from class struggle by disconnecting epistemol-
ogy from its material conditions.
The first move is to declare that the present is in a crisis in which ‘‘[a]ll
of culture and all of nature get churned up again every day’’9 and that as a
result our ‘‘intellectual life is out of kilter.’’10 The next move is to provide
the means of reading this crisis as not the result of a growing contradiction
between the forces and relations of production, but a crisis of epistemology
with no connection to class conflict. Instead, he argues that the failure of
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theory has been in presuming that modern history—what he describes as
an ‘‘emancipatory’’ history—came to an end with postmodernity when, in
fact, history is only now coming to an end. He writes, ‘‘we have to rethink
the definition of modernity, interpret the symptom of Postmodernity, and
understand why we are no longer committed heart and soul to the double
task of domination and emancipation.’’11
Postmodernism has become a failed concept for capital because, insofar
as it promised the end of class when in reality class lines have been drawn
increasingly sharper, it can no longer provide ideological cover for the in-
terests of capital. In other words, the division of history into modern and
postmodern has never been anything more than a cultural reading of his-
tory, in which different regimes of capital accumulation were read as funda-
mentally different modes of production. By turning economic continuity
into cultural difference, cultural theory was able to sell, for a period of time,
the idea that capitalism had changed, that social inequality was a thing of
the past, and that the present had no need for historical materialism or
ideology critique. History, on the contrary, is the making and remaking of
the mode of production through class struggle and it is this history that
capitalism has to deny regularly at the level of ideology. It is for this reason
that theory, in which all theory was equated with postmodernism, is said to
have come to an end. The numerous ‘‘end of theory’’ narratives that have
emerged in recent years are less about getting theory right, than using the
ideological exhaustion of postmodernism as a means of attempting once
again to remove class theory from the academy. This is accomplished by
declaring that all theories (even the ones that critiqued postmodernism)
were equally poor readers of culture, while at the same time clearing the
conceptual brush in order to install new ideological concepts so as to make
variations in the same old economic logic appear as new and thus able to
enter the publishing market as replacements for the ideology of postmod-
ernism. For example, in ‘‘Medium Theory: Preface to the 2003 Critical In-
quiry Symposium,’’ W. J. T. Mitchell writes that now is the time for
‘‘medium theory’’ that is ‘‘sober’’ about the ‘‘expectations that critical the-
ory can realistically envision today’’ and ‘‘does not hold out much prospect
of revolutionary change.’’12 In other words, at the end of theory is a politics
that doesn’t take sides, hopelessly and despairingly trapped in-between real-
ity and the virtual.
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It is on similar terms that Latour collapses and eliminates modernism
and postmodernism, as a means not of actually moving beyond either mod-
ernism or postmodernism, but in an attempt to sell a new theory for ex-
plaining the contradictions of the digital condition as having nothing to do
with private property. He proposes that the failure of modernity is a central
fallacy that there is a clear and defined boundary between the ‘‘laws of exter-
nal nature’’ and the ‘‘conventions of society.’’13 Modernism, on these terms,
is based upon maintaining a strict division at the level of ideas between the
barbarism of the past, in which the social is dominated by the ‘‘natural,’’
and the civilization of the future, marked by the domination of the natural
by the ‘‘social.’’ According to this reading, to be modern requires an episte-
mological constitution of strict and recognizable difference. He writes,
‘‘The process of partitioning’’ between past and future, the domain of ob-
jects and the domain of society, ‘‘was accompanied by a coherent and con-
tinuous front of radical revolutions in science, technology, administration,
economy and religion, a veritable bulldozer operation behind which the
past disappeared forever, but in front of which, at least, the future opened
up.’’14 As such, the modernist belief in science and rationality, which for
Latour means both industrial capitalism and socialism, is described as regu-
larly and routinely operating as an exclusionary logic against the other. He
states,
The various manifestations of socialism destroyed both their peoples and their
ecosystems, whereas the powers of the North and the West have been able to
save their peoples and some of their countrysides by destroying the rest of the
world and reducing its peoples to abject poverty.15
On the contrary, ‘‘the double failure that was my starting point, that of
socialism (at stage left) and that of naturalism (at stage right) has made the
work of purification less plausible and the contradictions more visible.
There are no more revolutions in store to impel a continued flight for-
ward.’’16 It is in the same terms that Latour argues that postmodernism is
no better insofar as it means giving up entirely on the project of science.
He writes, ‘‘Postmodernism is a symptom, not a fresh solution’’ because it
‘‘senses that something has gone awry in the modern critique, but is not
able to do anything but prolong that critique, though without believing in
its foundations.’’17 Reading postmodernists as ‘‘disappointed rationalists,’’
Latour states, ‘‘instead of moving on to empirical studies of the networks
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that give meaning to the work of purification it denounces, postmodernism
rejects all empirical work as illusory and deceptively scientific.’’18 In other
words, he declares that the failure of postmodernism is that rather than
reject the modernist binary between the natural and social, and thus open
a space for rethinking both, they reject the natural entirely and limit the
possibilities for analysis to ‘‘disconnected instants and groundless denuncia-
tions.’’19 In short, for Latour postmodernism is as absolute in its thinking as
modernism, it merely takes the other side.
The purpose of collapsing socialism and naturalism, or modernism and
postmodernism as mirror images of the same epistemological drives is to
establish himself as a fair dealer, who can read without the so-called biases
of the history of the past so as to be recognized as apparently nonideological
and therefore beyond the failures of past cultural theory. What he proposes
is that rather than simply abandon the boundaries between the natural and
the unnatural, which are used to justify the effects of progress—poverty,
war, racism, ecological destruction, and so on—we need to replace the con-
cepts of social and natural with a more fluid and less determined set of
criteria for reading the world without theories of progress and scientific
rationality. He states that ‘‘modernity is often described in terms of human-
ism, either as a way of saluting the birth of ‘man’ or as a way of announcing
his death . . . it overlooks the simultaneous birth of ‘nonhumanity’—things,
objects, or beasts.’’20 It is from within the space of the nonmodern and the
nonhuman that he proposes that ‘‘we can combine association freely with-
out ever confronting the choice between archaism and modernization, the
local and the global, the cultural and the universal, the natural and the
social.’’21 For Latour, to be nonmodern, as opposed to modern or postmod-
ern, means giving up concepts such as truth, objectivity, and extraterritorial-
ity in favor of uncertainty, daring, warmth, and the ‘‘crazy ability to
reconstitute the social bond.’’22 It is a desiring nonscience without conclu-
sions or consequences.
Latour’s nonhuman proposal is a reading of identity as shaped by the
genealogy of social meanings, which, by separating the history of ideas from
the history of the social relations of production, denies that his reading of
history has anything to do with economic relations. That this is the case is
evident in his arguments concerning what he calls the ‘‘reductionism’’ of all
modernist theories. He writes, ‘‘we cannot retain the illusion (whether they
deem it positive or negative) that moderns have about themselves and want
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to generalize to everyone: atheist, materialist, spiritualist, theist, rational,
effective, objective, universal, critical . . . prisoners of an absolute dichotomy
between things and signs, facts and values.’’23 Instead, the nonmodernist
digital consciousness is defined by the multiplication of ‘‘new definitions
of humans’’ which do not ‘‘displace the former ones, reduce them to any
homogeneous one, or unify them.’’24 The reduction of capitalism and so-
cialism, atheists and spiritualists, into the singular category of modernism
shows that Latour is not opposed to collapsing binary opposites into broad
generalizations. As such, it must be the case that Latour is not opposed to
reduction, but is only opposed to certain kinds of reduction. That is to say,
by reducing history to the conflict between the human and the nonhuman,
he ultimately reads all of social history as a conflict of epistemology, while
denying that this epistemology has its own social history. To be clear, the
problem is not that Latour is reductive. Rather, the problem is that he lo-
cates the determination of all social conflict at the level of ideas, thereby
erasing the material differences between modes of production. There is no
difference, in his arguments, between the progressive and regressive socie-
ties of the modern period—socialism is described as equally reductive as
capitalism—and thus there is no reason to change the economic relations
of the contemporary. Instead, it is about finding differences at the level of
culture while denying that science should reach any global conclusions
about these differences. In defining the possibilities for social change as a
matter of locating difference while limiting this inquiry to a search for only
those differences that emerge within the fissures of epistemology, it be-
comes clear that what Latour is opposed to is the possibility of radical eco-
nomic change. For Latour, there is no outside to capitalism.
What Latour establishes is the perfect ideology for digital capital. In
praising the development of the nonhuman as creating an open space with-
out determination, he is simply repeating in a new idiom the argument that
the digital economy operates beyond the restrictions of class by providing a
virtual space for the realization of desires. If desire was restricted conceptu-
ally—that is to say, if one had to fit into a certain identity (atheist or spiritu-
alist) before—then in the digital age there is no reason to make any such
decision. One can be both an atheist and a spiritualist in cyberspace because
identities are nothing but conceptual models that have no material basis.
What this is really saying is that property no longer matters in an age when
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anyone can escape into the virtual world, where the owner and worker com-
pete on equal footing. The ideology of desire as productive in the digital
age is thus a spiritual solution to class conflict. It creates the appearance of
the kingdom of heaven (cyberspace) in which all will be judged equally,
regardless of what exists in the kingdoms of earth (capitalism) and, further-
more, argues that in the coming of digital society, heaven will be realized
on earth.
Cyborg as Postclass Fantasy
The erasure of class in the ideology of the digital increasingly takes place
through the substitution of desire (spirit) for need (matter) as the force of
historical change. From the possibilities of cloning, stem cell research and
nanotechnologies to the development of social networking sites such as
Facebook, it is argued that the ability of science to turn reality into a narra-
tive that can be re-edited endlessly to fulfill the desires of the digital me
forever undoes the concept of reality. For example, N. Katherine Hayles
argues that our knowledge of the emerging nanorealities requires knowl-
edge that is ‘‘in some sense already virtual,’’ an in-between space that is both
‘‘on display’’ and ‘‘invisible’’ as it is ‘‘mediated through precision scanning
probe microscopes, data streams, and computer-generated visualizations.’’25
Similarly, Colin Milburn argues that to ‘‘think nanotechnologically’’26 re-
quires ‘‘a new epistemological orientation toward the world, a new thinking
of being that is no longer the perspective of the human, but instead that of
the posthuman, the postbiological, the machinic, the cyborg, the net-
worked, the uploaded, the synthetic, the schizophrenic, the alien, the mon-
strous, the wired, and the weird.’’27 At the core of these arguments is the
idea that as technology grows in its ability to transform reality it is increas-
ingly the autonomous desire of the individual that drives reality and there-
fore it is desire that is the remaining space for agency. In turn, because it is
argued that desire always exceeds the conceptual, it suspends the possibility
of locating the individual in any regime of truth. Instead, because the digital
is read as a dual consciousness of a simultaneously real and virtual existence,
the individual is understood as operating in-between social binaries—
between truth and illusion, reality and fiction, and, ultimately, between pro-
ducer (labor) and consumer (capital). Mark Poster, for example, argues that
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the ‘‘electronic mediation’’ of digital desires ‘‘subverts the autonomous, ra-
tional subject’’ in favor of ‘‘an abyss of indeterminate exchanges between
subject and object in which the real and the fictional, the outside and the
inside, the true and false oscillate.’’28 Likewise, in The Inhuman, Lyotard
posits the inevitability of ‘‘oscillation’’ between ‘‘native indetermination’’
(the natural) and ‘‘self-instituting reason’’ (the social) as the resultant of
what is the basis of what he has termed the ‘‘inhuman,’’ namely the ‘‘dereg-
ulation’’ of meaning.29 The problem, to be clear, is not that the new scien-
tific developments don’t hold tremendous potential for transforming our
lives. Rather, what I am arguing is that the limit is the way in which they
become the basis within contemporary cultural theory for providing a spiri-
tual resolution to the economic contradictions of society.
Privileging the discourses of exchange, oscillation, and fluidity, the new
digital subject seeks refuge in the indeterminacy of a spiritual dynamism
represented most explicitly by the theory of the cyborg—the subject who is
described as neither human nor machine, neither subject nor object, neither
rational nor irrational, but a contingent construction operating within the
network of localized desiring flows. As Ollivier Dyens writes, the cyborg is
based upon the idea that:
When a human is digitalized (when his image is digitalized), the resulting image
is no longer the ‘‘mirror’’ of a living being. A digitalized human becomes other
. . . an impure being (phantom, simulacrum) with no stable definitions of who or
what he (she? it?) is, several things, several sexes, several organs, and several
machines all at once . . . Once digitalized, the image of a human being is released
from its origin and can transform itself into a multitude of landscapes; it becomes
a system unimpeded by any conceptual limits.30
It is on these terms that Dyens goes on to argue that to deal with the new
digital reality historical and social analysis must become a form of ghost
hunting; a ‘‘simulacrum,’’ he writes, ‘‘is a ghost, an illusion. It is at the same
time here and there, true and false. It falsifies time, it questions the ordering
of memories, it forces the multiplication of realities, and it compels phe-
nomena and their representations to collide and contaminate each other.’’31
In other words, reading the reality of the cyborg is about the surface play
and the resistance of digital culture against any shaping by any social forces.
In the most basic terms, then, the cyborg is based upon the assumption that
in the configuring of the digital me all fixed social divisions of class, race,
and gender are replaced with fluid spaces of self-creation.
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Perhaps the most influential version of this argument is put forward in
the work of cyborg-theorist Donna Haraway. In her often reprinted essay,
‘‘A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in
the 1980s,’’ Haraway argues that digital culture results in the ironic produc-
tion of the cyborg: a hybrid subjectivity that is neither natural nor social
and, on these terms, opens a playful space of resistance within the very logic
of science and reason. Haraway bases her reading on the presupposition
that the forms capital takes are more important than its underlying logic of
exploitation. She declares, for example, that digital capitalism represents
‘‘an emerging system of world order analogous in its novelty and scope to
that created by industrial capital . . . from an organic, industrial society to
a polymorphous, information system’’32 such that the concept of a more
‘‘ ‘Advanced capitalism’ . . . is inadequate to convey the structure of the
historical moment.’’33 It is the polymorphous logic of the digital economy
which, according to Haraway, pressures the possibility of any grand narra-
tive that ignores the specificity of individualized relations. Positioning cy-
borg theory as against ‘‘the tradition of progress’’ and the ‘‘tradition of the
appropriation of nature,’’34 which she describes as an outdated modernist
logic of objectivity versus the new logic of hybridity, Haraway declares that
the new relations between human and machine blur the binary capitalist
relations of owners and workers, enabling the production of the economic,
cultural, and political heterogeneity which defines cyborg consciousness. It
is the cyborg, as ‘‘a condensed image of both imagination and material real-
ity,’’ realized in the collapse of ‘‘science fiction and social reality,’’35 which is
said to resist the conceptualization and totality that marks the homogenous
culture of past capitalisms. ‘‘Exchange in this world,’’ she writes, ‘‘tran-
scends the universal translation effected by capitalist markets.’’36 On these
terms, the logic of the cyborg shifts from the struggle against exploitation
to finding ‘‘pleasure in the confusion of boundaries’’37 and ‘‘contradictory
standpoints.’’38 It is, she writes, no longer ‘‘ ‘clear-sighted critique ground-
ing a solid political epistemology’ versus ‘manipulated false consciousness’ ’’
but rather a position of ‘‘ambivalence’’ and ‘‘subtle understanding of emerg-
ing pleasures, experiences and powers, with serious potential for changing
the rules of the game.’’39
Similar, then, to Latour’s argument that history is now no longer charac-
terized by ‘‘revolution,’’ but by the ‘‘small modifications of old beliefs,’’40
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Haraway’s theory of the cyborg is said to correspond to the end of ‘‘sal-
vation history’’ and the West’s ‘‘escalating dominations of abstract indi-
viduation.’’41 According to Haraway, the primary failure of radical social
movements has been that in reducing individuals to abstract categories of
class, gender, and race they have been unable to escape the homogenizing
logic of capitalism they claim to be opposed to. The emergence of the digi-
tal me means that instead of essentialized groupings of ‘‘class, race, and
gender’’42 cultural politics in the digital age becomes a process of exploring
the surface contradictions of capitalism in order to locate ‘‘new kinds of
unity’’43 based upon affinity, not class consciousness.44 Within this narrative
Haraway posits that there is no difference between socialism and capitalism
and both are read as movements of modernity which attempt to reduce the
play of subjectivity.45 On the contrary, the possibility of cultural heteroge-
neity is said to exist today within capitalism, rather than outside of it. In
other words, by denying that there is any difference between the economic
relations of socialism and capitalism, Haraway’s theory of revolutionary so-
cial change no longer depends upon a transformation of the mode of pro-
duction. Instead, insofar as it is understood as the difference between two
different but equally homogenizing cultural logics, Haraway creates the ap-
pearance that liberation is something that can occur in spite of capitalism.
Cyborg politics are thus described as, ‘‘the struggle for language and the
struggle against perfect communication, against the one code that translates
all meaning perfectly.’’46 That is to say, it is a struggle for plurality from
within rather than collectivity from without. What are the terms for hetero-
geneity from within capitalism except those of the free market. If we assume
that radical change is possible from within capitalism, then we must accept
the terms of capitalism—the exploitation of labor. This reduces the possi-
bilities of the political to a project of working within the existing to negoti-
ate better terms. As such, the global project of human emancipation from
exploitation is turned into a local process of cultural liberation and the plu-
ralizing of identities within the structure of class relations.
It’s All Up to Me: The Digital Future in Contemporary Film
The narrative of finding liberation and pleasure through consumption
rather than outside of it has become a popular representation within digital
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culture and one finds such ideas in mainstream cyber-films such as Dark
City and The Matrix. The effect of these films is to take the discursively
complex theories of writers such as Negri, Latour, and Haraway and make
them available for a wider audience. In other words, they are the means by
which new ideologies are popularized. In turn, because they provide a sur-
face narrative in which the alienation of work under capitalism is resolved
in the dimensions of a coming digital society, they help to foster the notion
that it is not the wage labor/capital relation that is the problem. Instead,
class inequality is read as a purely technological issue and that digital tech-
nologies and the new avenues of consumption they engender are the solu-
tion. What is particularly interesting is the way in which both films make
use of multiple techniques in order to speak to different segments of the
work force, in this way continuing to foster the idea that the digital econ-
omy is driven by desire because there is always a commodity that responds
to the interests of you.
Dark City combines the imagery of the 1927 German science-fiction
classic Metropolis with the tone of the Noir films of the 1930s and 1940s
such as the Maltese Falcon and The Big Sleep in order to appeal to both the
more educated sectors of the work force who are trained to read such inter-
textual references as the mark of sophistication and subtly, thereby reinforc-
ing their self-identification as smart readers, as well as those who might be
interested in the more popular cultural forms of the detective novel and
science-fiction narratives in the mold of The Twilight Zone and The Outer
Limits. The film opens with the protagonist, John Murdoch, awakening in
a strange hotel room to find that he has no memory and no history beyond
vague recollections of a traditional middle-class life cut short by the tragic
loss of guidance (signified by the death of his parents in a house fire). In a
panic over his inability to remember how he got there, he looks in the
mirror and finds that he no longer has a clear image of who he is: the mirror
is broken, his image is seen by both him and the viewer as fractured, and,
thus, that the correspondence between what he knows and what he sees is
no longer reliable. It is the way in which the film is able to raise as a possibil-
ity that the middle-class life that he once believed in might not exist as he
remembered and, as a result, might not be what he really desired. In other
words, it opens up the possibility that our desires might be false, or at least,
directed at a false object.
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The plot then follows Murdoch as he both dodges the police—he has
been falsely accused of several murders—and attempts to find his way back
to Shell Beach, his childhood home. As the plot progresses, it becomes
clear, however, that the film is not going to be a traditional ‘‘noir-ish’’ story
as something besides Murdoch is out of place. The city, it seems, never
emerges from darkness and, as he soon finds out, physically changes every
evening at midnight. In addition, everyone he meets has heard of Shell
Beach, but no one remembers how to get there. It is as if Shell Beach has
become a mass delusion, a symbol of lost pleasures which the system once
provided but which seem no longer attainable. In this sense, the film ad-
dresses the anxieties of the working class in the United States who are con-
stantly fed the images of the American Dream, but whose wages have not
risen since the 1960s, thereby rendering the idea of Shell Beach, much less
the reality, virtually impossible to even dream of, much less realize.
It is at the end of the film that we learn the truth about the Dark City
and John Murdoch. The city is actually an island floating in space, con-
structed by a group of alien parasites known as the Strangers, who are trying
to find out what makes humanity human in order to escape their fate as a
dying race. Each night they place all of the inhabitants in a trance and re-
arrange their surroundings so as to monitor how and why they respond to
difference. Murdoch, of course, represents a threat to their plans because
he is no longer subject to the mechanisms of the trance. Through the proc-
ess by which the Strangers attempt to regain control over Murdoch to find
out why he is able to escape the evening rituals and thus see their project—
they attempt to harness his memories directly and share them among the
group—he is implanted with their powers. He gains the same telekinetic
powers they have, with the ability to overcome all of the boundaries of the
material world, and engages in a battle that takes both he and the leader of
the Strangers (because they can fly) to the skies above the city. At the film’s
conclusion Murdoch defeats the aliens to become the new leader of the city.
Unlike the leaders who wanted to keep the city in the dark, he begins to
metaphorically tear down the walls surrounding the city and opens the skies
so that sunlight shines for the first time. He then surrounds the city with an
ocean in order to recreate and return to Shell Beach. We are, of course,
aware that what appears real is false—the Shell Beach to which he returns
never existed—but more importantly we learn that the logic of reality is not
the same. Whereas the memories of the past were directed by the owners
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of the city, under Murdoch’s control reality has become malleable and
shaped by the heterogeneity of individual desire. He is not required to return
to structures of the past; he wants to. Reality has become a matter of per-
sonal choice and it is desire that makes reality happen. The film is thus a
narrative that reinscribes the idea of the American Dream and locates its
possibilities not in the material world, but at the level of ideas. The failure
of the past was the attempt to impose the desires from above, while in the
new reality desires are achieved because they come from the individual.
This is the narrative of the digital economy, which promises that it is knowl-
edge, not labor, that creates value and that it is through knowledge that
everyone will be able to escape the rigid structures of the past and find their
way to Shell Beach.
The Matrix makes use of almost the same imagery, the same cultural
references, and in fact actually shared some of the same sets with Dark City
which, even if for unintended economic reasons, makes their shared imag-
ery important to consider for thinking about how the future is being repre-
sented. The Matrix is, perhaps, an even more culturally complex film even
though it was marketed for a more popular audience. On the one hand, it
directly references the high theory of Jean Baudrillard, while, on the other
hand, it is a catalog of pop culture references, from the Hong Kong action
movies of John Woo, to comics such as Superman and the X-Men, to classic
fairy tales such as Cinderella and Sleeping Beauty. In this sense, the film is an
attempt to be all things to all consumers, to be the plural commodity that
gives everyone what they want and, therefore, be the ultimate digital space:
the commodity that actually does respond to what the audience has been
asking for, regardless of what the request was.
The film centers on Thomas Anderson, a typical dot-com worker who,
at least on the surface, is living an alienated and mundane life. The initial
imagery of this world is dreary: Anderson works in a cubicle with dozens of
other identical-looking workers, and is clearly bored with the terms of his
life. The visual effects of the film mimic this tone. The opening sequences
are colored with a greenish hue that resembles the stale florescent lighting
of the modern office. In this sense, the film reproduces a world that is not
very different from what has come before. Despite entering the information
age, Anderson’s job as a symbolic analyst does not seem to fulfill its initial
promise of a new economy. Far from the imagery of a plural world beyond
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work, the digital world appears in the beginning of the film to be an exten-
sion of the social relations of the past. However, following a scene in which
Anderson is confronted by his boss and told that if he continues to believe
that he is ‘‘special’’ and that ‘‘the rules do not apply to him’’ he will be
fired, the viewer begins to learn that there is in fact another side to Thomas
Anderson—in his private life he is known on the web by the hacker alias
Neo and spends his time selling cracked software and searching for the
world’s most famous computer hacker, Morpheus.
What is particularly interesting is that even this exciting alter-ego is not
enough to satisfy Anderson’s unfulfilled desires. Despite his life as a hacker,
he remains alone. For example, when he is apprehended by what appear
to be members of the FBI or Secret Service and is interrogated about his
knowledge of Morpheus, the lead interrogator, Agent Smith, makes it clear
that despite his cool hacker alias, he is still the same person who helps his
‘‘land-lady take out the garbage.’’ In other words, the viewer is meant to
identify with the possibility that the promises of the digital economy are
false, and have not produced anything but a stunted adolescence. Like Dark
City, the viewer is meant to question whether their desires are just unful-
filled or whether what they desired has been an illusion that will never be
realized.
Ultimately he learns that Morpheus is, in fact, actually looking for him
because he believes Anderson is ‘‘the one.’’ Following his encounter with
the agents, Anderson sets up a meeting with Morpheus to learn what the
matrix is, but, in an endless doubling that is the hallmark of the film, is told
that one cannot be told what the matrix is. In this scene the matrix is estab-
lished as both in experience and not in experience, as both the truth of the
world and its illusion, thereby picking up the narrative that in the digital
age, all conceptual boundaries are in crisis. Of course, that the film wants
Anderson to both question all of his experiences and yet rely on his experi-
ences to tell him the truth of reality—he is given the choice to either go
back to his boring life as a computer programmer or to find out ‘‘how deep
the rabbit hole goes’’—is an indication of how disruptive of ideology the
film will ultimately be.
It is at this point that Neo, like Murdoch, learns that the world he
thought he knew does not exist. Instead, reality has been replaced by an
ideological simulacra, described by Morpheus as ‘‘a prison for your mind,’’
that was established sometime in the past to ensure that humans do not
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question their enslavement to the instrumental reason of machines in the
present. What is interesting is how both films, at the moment the main
character learns about the nature of reality, incorporate what have become
the aesthetic of dark lighting found in many science fiction films into part
of the narrative. The truth of reality is that humans have been overthrown
by artificial intelligence and instead of humans using machines to produce
the means of subsistence machines now ‘‘farm’’ humans, using their neural-
electrical energy to support a tenuous existence in a world that, in an echo
of Dark City, is absent of sunlight. Humans, in turn, have become cyborgs:
half human, half machine, batteries whose bio power serves as the powers
supply for the AI’s power plant. The paradox, at least in the first film of the
trilogy, is that humans are only able to participate in acts of resistance
against the machines from inside the matrix. Their resistance is further lim-
ited, Neo is told, by a lingering attachment to the past: if they die in virtual
reality of the matrix, then they die in the real world.
The turning point of the film comes when humanity is forced to confront
the limits of existence as he once believed it to be—rational and scientific.
When Morpheus is captured by the computer program guardians of the
matrix—the Secret Service agents seen earlier in the film—he is told that
what has occurred is the natural and inevitable outcome of the post-Fordist
transition from labor to knowledge. Agent Smith, one of the human forms
assumed by the guardians of the matrix, argues that having been freed from
the burden of labor, there is no longer any use for humanity. Instead, he
states, ‘‘Human beings are a disease, a cancer of this planet. You are a
plague. And we are the cure.’’ Agent Smith here is thus intended to repre-
sent in the extreme the instrumental logic of progress, rationality, and ho-
mogenization—the ‘‘singular consciousness’’ that brought about the
downfall of humanity. Humanity, in its commitment to rationality and in-
strumental reason, has effected its own enslavement. It is during Mor-
pheus’s capture, however, that Neo also begins to realize that he might, in
fact, be the one. What makes him the one is that he ultimately accepts the
terms of the matrix. Unlike the other freed humans—and in particular the
character of Cypher, a freed human who makes a deal with the Agents to
betray Morpheus in return for being re-entered into the false consciousness
of the matrix—he gives up entirely the idea of returning to the materiality
of the past and, instead, accepts the fluidity and virtuality of the future. He
realizes instead that the very logic of death in the matrix that others were
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so afraid of—in which the mind (that is, knowledge) determines the materi-
ality of real life (that is, labor)—actually represents a new cultural realm of
freedom based upon individual desire. What makes him a truly digital hero
for the contemporary age, in other words, is the realization that culture has
become excessive, operating independently from the historical and social
relations of the past, and thus that he no longer has to try to fit into a
modernist framework. Accepting that resistance to the matrix requires that
one gives up any notion of an outside to the existing, he gains the ability to
see that the world he inhabits is nothing but lines of code that can be rewrit-
ten to fit the desires of the individual. This triumph over materiality is com-
plete when, in a decidedly symbolic act of resistance, he takes over the
image of Agent Smith and explodes it from the inside. The film then ends
not with Neo’s escape from the matrix, but rather with a declaration that
he is going to create a new matrix, one without ‘‘rules and controls . . .
borders and boundaries . . . a world where anything is possible,’’ at which
point, like John Murdoch, he demonstrates his rejection of the limits of
materiality by flying away from the city into the sky. That is to say, while
the fact that the film represents a world in which knowledge is in flux and
thus that anything might be unreliable, what the film actually represents as
most important is the truth of desire. What will ultimately turn Anderson
into Neo is that after resisting it for most of the film, he finally realizes that
all of the time he really did want to be the one, and that it was by putting his
desires into action that he is able to change his reality so that it matches his
desire.
What has made both films such popular representations of the digital
economy is the way in which they acknowledge the social contradictions of
wage labor while also providing a way of understanding these contradictions
not in terms of the division of labor, but in terms of the limits of mass
production to meet the expanding individual desires of the new me. In this
context, the digital economy is defined as the opening of new spaces of
cultural democracy and not the extension of exploitation. In this sense, they
are the popular forms of digital theory in which class divisions are reduced
to a state of mind. That both films accept the idea that resistance today
occurs at the level of consumption, rather than the relations of production,
can be seen by the way in which both films hinge on the narrative of choice.
John Murdoch might desire returning to his false memories of a middle-
class life, but it is precisely that it is a matter of choice that makes his reality
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different despite its appearance as the same. Similarly, Neo does not have
to be Thomas Anderson, a lonely computer programmer. Instead, by con-
suming the wonders of digital technology, he becomes part of a hip and
fashionable clique at the cutting edge of culture. In fact, the narrative of
choice in The Matrix becomes so overwhelming as to almost be parodic. At
every stage of the film—regardless of whether it is saving Morpheus from
torture or opening an apartment door—Neo cannot advance without being
reminded that he is faced with a choice of whether to continue on his path
of becoming the one. Furthermore, by the third film, The Matrix: Revolutions,
this ideology of choice reaches its pinnacle when we learn that Neo’s entire
purpose as the one is essentially nothing more than to reboot the matrix
program, only this time giving people the free choice of whether they want
to live in the real world or spend their lives in the virtual world of the
matrix. On these terms, just as John Murdoch and Thomas Anderson can
only escape their fates by learning how to remake the images that surround
them without making any significant changes to their actual conditions of
life—neither fundamentally transforms their society, rather they learn that
revolution means to work within the existing—so too does the viewer learn
that in the digital age they can remake their lives with a simple change of
mind. By declaring that society is shaped by matters of personal choice,
what is obscured in both films is that choice is always historical. The choices
we can make, however, are determined not by what we consume, but rather
are dependent upon developments at the mode of production. In promoting
acts of consumption as resistance, Dark City and The Matrix thus offer read-
ings of the contemporary that extend, rather than challenge, capitalist
relations.
Human Labor and the Schizophrenic Machine
Reading digitally, as I have argued, is an attempt to address the growing
contradiction between technological advances in the forces of production
and the limits of the relations of production, which restrict the development
of technology to the production of profit. Instead of locating the contradic-
tion at the site of production, the main reading put forward by theorists
such as Bruno Latour and Donna Haraway and in the films Dark City and
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The Matrix is that the development of digital capitalism severs the connec-
tion between culture and the economy, thereby fostering the idea of social
change within the framework of capitalism without the necessity of address-
ing the logic of exploitation. This theory of a digital culture beyond the
exploitation of labor, far from representing the cutting edge theory of a
postexploitative stage of capitalism, extends capitalist relations by positing
that material differences can be located in the terms of the market. That is
to say, politics essentially becomes a matter of negotiating of better terms
rather than challenging the market itself.
According to the theory of a postexploitative and pluralized digital econ-
omy driven by individual desire, what enables the emergence of a heteroge-
neous culture is the substitution of accumulated or dead labor (technology)
for living labor (human labor power). In this reading, contemporary capital-
ism can no longer be considered capitalism because of the increasing impor-
tance that knowledge and innovation plays in the economy. In other words,
what critics such as Latour, Haraway and others are suggesting is that the
labor theory of value no longer applies in a knowledge economy and, as
such, it is no longer necessary to confront the primary contradiction of
capitalism between owners and workers because the primary commodity
(information) cannot be exhausted. This, however, mistakes developments
in the forms that production takes with the logic of production itself. As
Chris Harman writes in Economics of the Madhouse, ‘‘some forms of capital—
machines, factory buildings and so on—do make labor much more produc-
tive than it would be otherwise.’’47 However, even though ‘‘the most
elementary tool adds enormously to human productivity,’’ technology can-
not replace labor. ‘‘Machines and factory buildings are not things that exist
in their own right,’’ he explains, ‘‘they are the product of previous human
labor.’’48 That is to say, while a ‘‘human being can make things without the
machine,’’ the machine ‘‘cannot make anything without the human being
setting it to work.’’49 Although technology can enhance production, it al-
ways does so within the terms established by the relations of production.
For example, while the productivity of labor in the United States has con-
tinued to increase over the past fifty years, wages over the same period of
time have remained virtually stagnant. In fact, as Robert Brenner remarks,
one of the main reasons that the U.S. economy has remained attractive to
foreign investment in the latter half of the twentieth century is that it has
maintained a relatively regular growth in the productivity of labor—
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growing at an average of 2.9 percent in the period 1979–90 and increasing
to 3.5 percent in the years 1990–96—while simultaneously restricting the
growth of wages to near zero levels in terms of real wage growth.50 In other
words, while labor productivity has created numerous advances in both
manufacturing as well as consumer technologies, what is amazing about this
period is not the creation of the iPod or the World Wide Web. It is that
despite the increasing productivity of labor, the gap between the richest and
poorest Americans has continued to grow at an increasing rate. According
to the ‘‘State of Working America 2008/2009,’’ published by the Economic
Policy Institute, ‘‘in 1962, the wealthiest 1% of households averaged 125
times the wealth of the median household’’ while ‘‘in 2004, the wealthiest
1% of households averaged 190 times the wealth of the median household,
with particularly large increases in the 1980s and from 2001 to 2004.’’51
What is occluded, then, in the assumption that a digital economy shifts
the logic of capitalism through the introduction of new technologies is that
while the revolutionizing of the means of production is central to capitalist
development, the substitution of machinery for labor power cannot, in it-
self, supplant capitalism. Capitalism depends upon extracting surplus labor
from living labor, and not the accumulated labor of machinery, as the basis
of surplus value. Instead, because of the irrationality of the system, overinv-
estment in technology leads to a falling rate of profit and a crisis of overpro-
duction. Harman writes, ‘‘The pressure on each capitalist to keep ahead of
every other leads to continual upgrading of plant and machinery, and con-
tinual pressure on workers to provide the profits which make the upgrading
possible.’’52 However, insofar as it is ‘‘labour, not machinery, that creates
value,’’ the effect is that as ‘‘dead’’ labor increases over living labor, the costs
of investment ‘‘rises much faster than profit.’’53 In other words, technologi-
cal development is a double-edged sword for the capitalist. It enables the
capitalist to increase the productivity of labor, and thus gain a competitive
advantage in the marketplace, while simultaneously diminishing the rate of
surplus value. In turn, for working people while increased productivity re-
sults in the availability of commodities and resources, it results in a lowering
of wages and the inability to buy said commodities, as productivity increases
while wages remain stagnant or grow slower than the cost of living.
For example, the complex computer skills that were said to have replaced
the regimented industrial jobs of Fordism, and which once required years
of study but were said to be rewarded with a high-paying job, a nice home,
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and other aspects that are said to make up the heterogeneity of middle-class
life, have been made simple by more recent technological developments and
no longer command the kinds of high wages they once did. New electronic
devices are manufactured at accelerated rates and at lower cost; as an article
in Fortune magazine explains:
Increasingly, supereducated and highly paid workers are finding themselves trav-
eling the same road their blue-collar peers took in the late ’80s. Then, hardhats
in places like Flint, Mich., and Pittsburgh were suffering from the triple threat
of computerization, tech-led productivity gains, and the relocation of their jobs
to offshore sites. Machines—or low-wage foreigners—could just as easily do
their work. The white-collar crowd was concerned, but they knew that those
three forces would also help get the American economy humming. And they did.
Now that trust has come back to haunt them. Technology has allowed companies
to handle rising sales without adding manpower. Gains in productivity mean one
white-collar worker can do the work that would have taken two or three of his
peers to do ten years ago.54
This is the cruel reality of life under capitalism. Skills that today make work-
ers employable in jobs in which they can earn enough to provide for their
families are no guarantee that tomorrow they will not be facing the possibil-
ity of being out of work or of no longer being able to earn enough to sur-
vive, much less maintain middle-class status. The fact that under capitalism
workers have nothing to sell but their labor power means that any skills
they have spent tremendous time to acquire to make their labor power more
valuable could just as easily tomorrow command lower wages, or become
entirely unnecessary. It is this fact that condemns working people to a life
of constant uncertainty as long as capitalism remains. As Marx and Engels
explain in The Manifesto of the Communist Party, ‘‘The various interests and
conditions of life within the ranks of the proletariat are more and more
equalized, in proportion as the machinery obliterates all distinctions of
labor and nearly everywhere reduces wages to the same low level.’’55 In
other words, the cultural heterogeneity that appears at one moment is
quickly shown to be an illusion as the fundamental homogeneity of capital-
ism is once again exposed.
In suggesting that any remaining contradiction between capital and labor
is one of a residue of living labor that will be eliminated by the automation
of production, digital culture theories substitute conflict between living and
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dead labor that capitalism produces for the cause of exploitation itself, thus
proposing that freeing living labor through the automation of production
will eliminate the binary class division without having to change the terms
of capitalism. Capitalism can go on, it is argued, without labor. The substi-
tution of the secondary antagonism between living and dead labor for that
of the fundamental antagonism between capital and labor assumes that the
automation of production negates exploitation when, in fact, as long as
technological advancement is harnessed to the interests of capitalism, it only
further heightens the contradictions between capital and labor. While ad-
vancements in technology make possible the meeting of the needs of all,
the subjection of such advancements to the production of profit means that
what disappears is not work (in the abstract), but rather the means by which
millions of workers can meet their basic needs. The contradiction of the
systematic exploitation of the working class through technological advance-
ment is thus ideologically transformed in dominant discussions of technol-
ogy into a liberatory potentiality from within. It is such that the theories of
reading culture digitally reflect the real material conditions of life, but from
the position of the capitalist. While technological advances in the means
of production have created the potential to meet the needs of the world’s
population, the concentration of capital in the hands of the capitalist means
that rather than having their needs met, workers today are subjected to the
most brutal, and intensified, division of labor in which they become, as
Marx and Engels argue, ‘‘an appendage of the machine.’’56
The substitution of the fundamental antagonism between capital and
labor with that of a conflict between the reductionist logic of a ‘‘failed’’
epistemology of the past and a pluralized digital future which exceeds the
capitalist mode of production is evident in what has become one of the most
canonical texts in contemporary digital theory, Gilles Deleuze and Felix
Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. This text characterizes
the digital economy as an automated capitalism premised not on the produc-
tion of commodities as much as the circulation of ‘‘spectral values’’ which
transverse the antagonism between capital and labor such that ‘‘there is no
such thing as either man or nature now, only a process that produces the
one within the other and couples the machines together. Producing-
machines, desiring-machines, everywhere schizophrenic machines.’’57 This
theory of class as a hybrid entity assumes the possibility of technological
development in itself to transcend social antagonisms by representing the
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wage labor/capital relation as having been replaced by a spontaneous cou-
pling fueled by the mutual desires of all market participants. Deleuze and
Guattari’s articulation of capitalist production, in which the social division
of labor is rearticulated as a machine of production and consumption, thus
collapses the class division between owners and workers into a circular the-
ory of class-as-lifestyle—without the economic compulsion of necessity that
results from the private ownership of the means of production—and thus
substitutes for the exploitation of production the liberation of consumption.
To achieve this, Deleuze and Guattari must rewrite history as the drive
towards posthuman labor, and thus posit that the primary conflict of the
modern period was between the philosophic division of the human and na-
ture that has now been effaced by the development of the machine. Accord-
ing to this reading, technological development fractures the modernist
attempt at theorizing culture as part of a social totality and replaces it with
the figure of the ‘‘schizophrenic.’’ In the new cultural climate of digital
capitalism, they write, ‘‘we no longer believe in the myth of the existence of
fragments that, like pieces of an antique statue, are merely waiting for the
last one to be turned up, so that they may all be glued back together to
create a unity that is precisely the same as the original unity.’’58 ‘‘Schizo’’
analysis, on the contrary, is represented as the alternative to what they de-
fine as the metaphysics of presence—regardless of whether this presence is
understood as either the materiality of class or the process of signification.
The ‘‘schizophrenic’’ operates in their text as that which disrupts bound-
aries through the introduction of desire into all modes of investigation. The
‘‘schizophrenic,’’ they write, is:
at the very limit of the social codes, where a despotic Signifier destroys all chains,
linearizes them, biunivocalizes them, and uses the bricks as so many immobile
units for the construction of an imperial Great Wall of China. But the schizo
continually detaches them, continually works them loose and carries them off in
every direction in order to create a new polyvocity that is the code of desire.59
That is to say, the schizophrenic becomes the figure for a postanalytic,
postscientific, posthistorical subject who cannot be reduced to any one read-
ing. On these terms, Deleuze and Guattari argue that the singular desires
of the individual and not labor are the real motor of history. They state,
‘‘Desire is not bolstered by needs, but rather the contrary; needs are derived
from desire: they are counterproducts within the real that desire
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produces . . . Desire always remains in close touch with the conditions of
objective existence; it embraces them and follows them, shifts when they
shift, and does not outlive them.’’60 By casting desire as that which produces
the real—as that which ‘‘is at work everywhere, functioning smoothly at
times, at other times in fits and starts. It breathes, it heats, it eats, it shits
and fucks’’61—Deleuze and Guattari claim that we can move beyond any
need to understand culture in relation to the economic. Instead, what is
necessary is releasing the heterogeneous desires of the individual as a means
of overcoming the homogenous logic of past forms of capitalism. They
write,
Desire is the set of passive syntheses that engineer partial objects, flows, and bodies,
and that function as units of production. The real is the end product, the result
of the passive syntheses of desire as autoproduction of the unconscious . . . The
truth of the matter is that social production is purely and simply desiring-production
itself under determinate conditions.62
There is, according to this argument, no logic that can account for the
heterogeneous workings of desire as it represents that which always exceeds
attempts at explanation and resists conceptualization. ‘‘Universal history,’’
they argue, ‘‘is the history of contingencies, and not the history of neces-
sity’’; it is an unending play between the ‘‘ruptures’’ and ‘‘limits’’ of desire
against the forms of oppression which inevitably emerge to control it.63 On
these terms, what Deleuze and Guattari situate as the alternative to the
labor theory of value is the valorization of desire as a means of resisting all
cultural determinations.
Once again, we are back to the argument that shifts in the mode of accu-
mulation exceed the logic of exploitation, such that there is no necessity
for addressing one in relation to the other. On their terms, technological
development is always a contradictory process because it creates the possi-
bilities of desire while simultaneously engendering the means by which de-
sire is controlled. In other words, within the logic of their argument, history
is reduced to the play of desire and control regardless of any specifics. In all
corners of history, in other words, and regardless of the organization of
production, there is always a structure of desire and control. As such, while
their theory of the schizophrenic is all about difference, it cannot ever lead
to any real material difference since all future historical formations are re-
duced to the same, eternal logic of the past.
On the contrary, in their work Marx and Engels provide a critical theory
of difference, in which the differences between oppressor and oppressed,
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exploiter and exploited, are not read as eternal, but rather as historical rela-
tions dependent upon material conditions. That is to say, in contrast to the
readings of Deleuze and Guattari, by reading difference as it is defined by
material conditions, Marx and Engels open a space for analyzing the repre-
sentations of society against its actual conditions. In turn, it becomes possi-
ble to consider the ways in which the actual conditions can be transformed
so that the way differences exist in society can also be changed. They write,
‘‘In the present epoch, the domination of material relations over individuals,
and the suppression of individuality by fortuitous circumstances, has as-
sumed its sharpest and most universal forms.’’64 However,
It was only possible to discover the connection between the kinds of enjoyment
open to individuals at any particular time and the class relations in which they
live, and the conditions of production and intercourse which give rise to these
relations, the narrowness of the hitherto existing forms of enjoyment, which were
outside the actual content of the life of the people and in contradiction to it, the
connection between everyday philosophy of enjoyment and the enjoyment actu-
ally present and the hypocrisy of such a philosophy which treated all individuals
without distinction—it was, of course, only possible to discover all of this when
it became possible to criticize the conditions of production and intercourse in
the hitherto existing world, i.e., when the contradiction between the bourgeoisie
and the proletariat had given rise to communist and socialist views.65
While Deleuze and Guattari assume the inevitability of inequality in the
very structure of desire, as Marx and Engels make clear in this passage, the
current forms of inequality are only one form of difference and that other
forms of difference, not exploitative relations based upon the meeting of the
needs of all, are possible. Technological developments cannot, therefore, be
read ahistorically as the effect of desire. Instead, technology is an index both
of the level of development of production as well as the social relations
under which that labor is carried out. On these terms, the developments in
production which enable the meeting of the needs of all, but which through
private ownership are used only to meet the needs of the few, serve as the
objective basis for the possibility of eliminating inequality through social
transformation.
Theories of digital culture as escaping the boundaries of the economic
are, therefore, the ideological reflection of the fact that as capitalism devel-
ops it invests increasing amounts of capital in revolutionizing the means
of production over and against the relations of living labor as a means of
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maximizing profit. While it can thus be objectively recognized that recent
technological developments increasingly point to the material possibility of
the end of wage labor, under capitalism this is impossible as the develop-
ment of the forces of production is tied to the interests of profit. Instead of
being judged based on the priority of social necessity, technological ad-
vancements are judged on their ability to valorize capital. It is in the inter-
ests of profit that the possibility of emancipation from wage labor, which
increases as capitalism develops, becomes the image of liberation through
consumption, which extends rather than challenges the logic of exploita-
tion. As Engels argues, technological advancements will not allow us to
escape from the contradictions of capitalism; there can be no emancipation
from wage labor without ending the logic of exploitation, because the fun-
damental antagonism between capital and labor is intensified, not tran-
scended, by automation:
During the first period of machinery, when it possess a monopoly character, profits
are enormous, and hence the thirst for more, for boundless lengthening of the
working day. With the general introduction of machinery this monopoly profit
vanishes, and the law asserts itself that surplus-value arises, not from the labor
supplanted by the machine, but from the labor employed by it.66
The dominance of the imagery of the digital in contemporary cultural the-
ory is an index of this contradiction and the attempt to solve it at the level
of ideas. The dominant readings of the digital condition in both popular
media as well as most cultural theory represent the process of increasing
productivity through the intensification of the production process—in
which capitalists accumulate tremendous profits while workers are subjected
either to increased domination by machinery or to the poverty of the indus-
trial reserve army—as the transformation from a system based upon the
exploitation of labor to a network of social relations in which the individual
has been liberated through the introduction of technology: a postcapitalist,
postproduction era of endless free time. However, as Marx argues in The
Poverty of Philosophy, ‘‘nothing is more absurd than to see in machinery the
antithesis of the division of labor.’’67 In other words, far from a new stage of
capitalist relations in which technology liberates workers from the exploit-
ative constraints of the past, in actuality digital capitalism becomes a hin-
drance to progress, with numerous examples of innovations and
advancements that were not introduced because of a possible negative effect
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on the rate of profit. Capitalism, in short, will not end because its relations
of production have been ‘‘desired’’ away through consumption or by in-
creasing developments in productivity alone. It homogenizes all social rela-
tions and reduces them to the terms of exchange value. In response, the
primary role played by cultural theory has been to legitimate exploitation
through the production of knowledge that promotes the appearance of in-
creasing heterogeneity at the level of culture by severing its connection to
the economic.
We live at a time of tremendous contradictions between what is and what
could be. Given the material conditions that exist for actual radical transfor-
mation and not just cultural refiguration, I argue that what is most urgently
needed today for true heterogeneity and difference to be realized is for
cultural theory to return to the concepts of class, labor, and production so
as to be able to understand how the forms of everyday life are shaped by
the economic relations and thus how and why the development of technol-
ogy means they can be transformed in the interests of all.
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Lukács, Georg. ‘‘Art and Objective Reality.’’ In Writer & Critic and Other Essays,
edited and translated by Arthur D. Kahn, 25–60. New York: Grosset & Dunlap,
1970.
Lunenfeld, Peter. The Digital Dialectic: New Essays on New Media. Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 1999.
Luxemburg, Rosa. The Accumulation of Capital. Translated by Agnes Schwarzchild.
London/New York: Routledge, 2003.
Lyotard, Jean-François. The Inhuman. Translated by Geoffrey Bennington and Ra-
chel Bowlby. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991.
———. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Translated by Geoff Ben-
nington and Brian Massumi. 1984. Reprint, Minneapolis: University of Minne-
sota, 1993.
Mandel, Ernest. Introduction to Capital Volume II, translated by David Fernbach,
11–79. New York: Penguin Classics, 1992.
———. Late Capitalism. Translated by Joris De Bres. 1978. Reprint, London: Verso,
1987.
PAGE 230................. 18088$ WRKS 08-04-11 13:43:55 PS
Works Cited 231
———. Marxist Economic Theory. New York and London: Monthly Review Press,
1968.
Mann, Clarence J. ‘‘Overview: Forces Shaping the Global Business Environment.’’
In Borderless Business: Managing the Far-Flung Enterprise, edited by Clarence J.
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